Does consistent aggregation really matter?†

C. Richard Shumway and George C. Davis*

Consistent aggregation ensures that behavioural properties which apply to disaggregate relationships apply also to aggregate relationships. The agricultural economics literature which has tested for consistent aggregation or measured statistical bias and/or inferential errors due to aggregation is reviewed. Tests for aggregation bias and errors of inference are conducted using indices previously tested for consistent aggregation. Failure to reject consistent aggregation in a partition did not entirely mitigate erroneous inference due to aggregation. However, inferential errors due to aggregation were small relative to errors due to incorrect functional form or failure to account for time series properties of data.

1. Introduction

[I]t is no longer useful to assume that ‘truth’ exists at some level, and that an analogous system may be fitted at another level, followed by an inquiry into the connection between the fitted values of the analogous system and the underlying ‘truth’. A seminal idea . . . suggests that there are different ‘truths’ at different levels of aggregation, and that they are connected by both the aggregation rules and the properties of the distribution of the microvariables. I think that when we come to know more, we shall find that good monthly and annual models do not really look alike, and that there is rhyme and reason for this difference.

(Griliches 1972, p. 37)

During the last two decades considerable attention has been given to the question of consistent aggregation of agricultural data. The primary goal is to facilitate analysis and inference with aggregate data and aggregate models.

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Mistakes due to aggregation are to be avoided, and consistent representative agent and/or multi-stage choice modelling is to be enabled. While few have any illusions that the true model structure can ever be identified, improved model specification is certainly sought in which the behavioural properties that apply to disaggregate relationships also apply to the aggregate relationships.

While the benefits of using aggregate data are often substantial, the costs can also be high and their magnitudes are generally unknown. One of the reasons the magnitudes are unknown is because of a mismatch in the literature. The literature reporting empirical testing for consistent aggregation with agricultural data has generally concentrated on commodity-wise aggregation while the literature focusing on the errors created by aggregation has primarily addressed aggregation across firms and individuals. In addition, the latter has seldom differentiated in their measurements between data sets that satisfy sufficient conditions for consistent aggregation and those that do not. Consequently, missing from both sets of literature is an explicit assessment of whether consistent aggregation really matters. What are the effects of inconsistent aggregation on econometric results and policy implications? Is it important whether individuals, firms, inputs, or outputs are grouped in ways that are consistent with the implications of empirical test results, whether they are disaggregated, or whether they are grouped for convenience or pragmatic reasons? What are the practical effects of inappropriate aggregation on economic inference?

We seek some preliminary answers to these questions in this article. We first proceed by documenting the historical attention given to the issues of consistent aggregation, incorrect aggregation, and the problems of drawing policy-relevant inferences from analyses with aggregate data. We then introduce a testing procedure adapted from Lee et al. (1990) to determine whether consistent commodity-wise aggregation really matters statistically and economically, conduct tests on US agricultural production data for which consistent commodity-wise aggregation tests were previously conducted, draw inferences, and present a conclusion.

2. Problems due to inappropriate aggregation

The problem of aggregation has been explored from various viewpoints. They have included theoretical works that identified restrictions on either technology (preferences) or data, which enable the representative agent framework to be applied to aggregate commodities. A few of the prominent authors in this area are Hicks (1936), Leontief (1936, 1947), Gorman (1959), Green (1964), Barnett (1979), and more recently Chambers and Pope (1996), and Lewbel (1993, 1996). They have also included a variety of
empirical works. Some of the latter tested for satisfaction of the restrictions for consistent aggregation in various data sets. Others considered ways to empirically incorporate heterogeneity across individuals or commodities into the aggregate analysis or examine the effects of failing to do so. Some of the prominent authors pursuing this approach are Theil (1954), Grunfield and Griliches (1960), and more recently Stoker (1986), Pesaran, Pierse and Kumar (1989), Hildenbrand (1998), and Just and Pope (1999). This literature has often split along two different objectives: aggregate prediction and aggregate parameter estimation.

In this section, we first identify sufficient conditions for aggregation that enable consistent multi-stage choice with aggregate commodities or representative agent representation of multiple firms or consumers. We then address two sets of empirical literature in agricultural economics. The first reports test results for consistent aggregation. The second measures mistakes from aggregation generally without regard to whether the aggregates provide empirical evidence that they satisfy sufficient conditions for consistent aggregation.

3. Theoretical restrictions enabling consistent aggregation

3.1 Sufficient conditions for commodity-wise aggregation

Commodity-wise aggregates exist and enable consistent two-stage choice models to be optimised if any one of four sufficient conditions is satisfied — Hicks composite commodity theorem, the Leontief composite commodity theorem, homothetically separable production or utility function, or generalised composite commodity theorem. The Hicks composite commodity theorem is satisfied for a commodity (output and/or input) subset if the prices of all items in the subset move in exact proportion over the data sample. The Leontief composite commodity theorem is satisfied for a commodity subset if the quantity ratios of all items in the subset move in exact proportion over the data sample. Homothetic separability is a structural property of the production (or utility) function and is satisfied for a subset if the marginal rate of substitution of all pairs of items within the subset are homogeneous of degree zero in the quantities of items within the subset (so the subset is homothetic in its quantities) and also independent of the quantities of all items outside the subset. The generalised composite commodity theorem recently discovered by Lewbel (1996) relaxes the rigid

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1 The subset is weakly separable if the second condition is satisfied but the first condition is not. A weakly separable production function is sufficient for the existence of a consistent quantity aggregate for the subset, but it does not imply the existence of a corresponding price aggregate which would be required to conduct consistent two-stage choice.
conditions of the Hicks composite commodity theorem. To be consistent with this theorem, the price ratios may vary across observations as long as the distribution of the ratio of the commodity price to the group price is independent of the level of the group price. That is, the relative difference between the individual commodity price and the aggregate commodity price must be independent of the aggregate commodity price. The three composite commodity theorems impose alternative restrictions on all observations in the data series while homothetic separability imposes restrictions on the technology or utility. Satisfaction of any one of the four is a sufficient condition for consistent commodity-wise aggregation.

3.2 Sufficient conditions for agent-wise aggregation

A number of sufficient conditions exist for consistently aggregating across agents (firms, individuals). Chambers (1988) identifies sufficient conditions for both linear and nonlinear aggregation across firms.

Aggregation across firms is most often sought by linear aggregation such as summing output and/or input quantities and averaging prices across the firms. In this case, the sufficient conditions for consistent aggregation are highly restrictive. Consistent linear aggregation in the long run is assured only if each firm produces the same output level using a technology characterised by constant returns to scale.

Sufficient conditions for consistent nonlinear aggregation across firms are less stringent but still demanding. Each firm’s cost function must be quasi-homothetic. Marginal cost does not have to be identical across firms or independent of firm-level output, but each firm-level production function must be a transform of a linear homogeneous function. Input requirement sets must be parallel across firms.

Identical technologies are treated in some empirical literature as a sufficient condition for consistent aggregation across firms. However, as Chambers notes, that alone is not sufficient for linear aggregation.

3.3 Empirical tests for consistent aggregation in agricultural data

Considerable research has been devoted to testing whether any of the sufficient conditions for consistent commodity-wise aggregation hold in agricultural data. A wide variety of outputs and inputs have been included in these tests. Most tests used production data. Considerably less empirical testing has used food (or agricultural) consumption data. Even less empirical testing has been reported for consistent aggregation across agricultural firms or individuals.

A variety of procedures have also been used. For consistent commodity-
wise aggregation, they include parametric and nonparametric testing for weak separability and homothetic separability and time series testing for generalised composite commodities.

3.4 Literature surveyed

A survey of ten agricultural economics journals since 1984 was conducted to identify articles that conducted empirical tests for consistent aggregation. The journals included Agricultural Economics, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, European Review of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Review of Agricultural Economics, and Review of Agricultural and Resource Economics. Nineteen articles were found in the survey period that reported such tests. In addition, we are aware of three earlier articles. All 22 are listed in Table 1. They included 20 articles that tested for consistent commodity-wise aggregation, one that tested for consistent aggregation across units of production (actually across already aggregated units of production), and one that tested for both. Of those that tested for commodity-wise aggregation, 8 tested for weak separability, 11 tested for homothetic separability, and 2 for generalised composite commodities; 17 conducted aggregation tests in agricultural production models and 4 in food demand models; 17 used parametric testing procedures and 4 used nonparametric procedures. All tests in production models, including those for spatial aggregation, used data that were already highly aggregated across firms. The aggregation tests across production units were conducted using state-level data. Most of the commodity-wise aggregation studies used state-level or national data. Only two production studies conducted commodity-wise aggregation tests using data aggregated to less than state-level areas. One demand study conducted tests on fully disaggregated individual decision data.

3.5 Commodity-wise aggregation test results

Of individual studies that conducted several tests of consistent aggregation, almost all rejected the hypothesis of consistent aggregation of some categories and failed to reject the hypothesis for others. There was little evidence of a clear pattern concerning the types of categories that were not rejected for one data set and those that were not rejected in other data sets. Examining the studies collectively, empirical tests of the hypothesis that all outputs could be consistently aggregated into a single index were reported...
Table 1  Articles in ten agricultural economics journals reporting tests for consistent aggregation, 1984–99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hypothesised Aggregates</th>
<th>Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaver</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shumway</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capalbo and Denny</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Production inputs</td>
<td>Separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope and Hallam</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Production inputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chavas and Cox</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Nonparametric weak separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eales and Unnevehr</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Consumption goods</td>
<td>Weak separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuroda</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Production outputs</td>
<td>Weak separability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonnieux</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Production inputs</td>
<td>Weak separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jegasothy, Shumway, and Lim</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Production inputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polson and Shumway</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Identical technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambers and Pope</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Laspeyres-form aggregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lim and Shumway</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Nonparametric weak separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villezca and Shumway</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Production outputs</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naya and Capps</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Consumption goods</td>
<td>Weak separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sckokai and Moro</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Direct weak separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sellen and Goddard</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Consumption goods</td>
<td>Homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams and Shumway</td>
<td>1998a</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Nonparametric homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams and Shumway</td>
<td>1998b</td>
<td>Production outputs and inputs</td>
<td>Nonparametric homothetic separability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asche, Brennes, and Wessells</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Consumption goods</td>
<td>Generalised composite commodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, Lin, and Shumway</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Production outputs</td>
<td>Generalised composite commodity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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with 61 data sets. Of these tests, 64 per cent rejected the hypothesis, 33 per cent failed to reject, and 3 per cent were ambiguous. More than 550 separate empirical tests of the hypothesis that a subset of outputs could be consistently aggregated into an index were reported. Of these tests, 58 per cent rejected the hypothesis, 41 per cent failed to reject, and 1 per cent were ambiguous. Of 56 tests of the hypothesis that all inputs could be consistently aggregated, 46 per cent rejected the hypothesis and 54 per cent failed to reject. These same percentages of rejections and failures to reject also applied to more than 200 tests of the hypothesis that a subset of inputs could be consistently aggregated into an index. Although there were differences in rates of rejection among output and input aggregation and among total and subset aggregation, a substantial proportion of aggregates were rejected and a substantial proportion were not rejected in each.

More of a pattern emerged when the evidence was examined relative to test procedure. Of 132 parametric tests of weak or homothetic separability, 84 per cent rejected the consistent aggregation hypothesis. Unfortunately, the parametric tests also maintained an auxiliary functional form hypothesis. Consequently, when the test rejected the hypothesis, it was not possible to know whether the hypothesis of homothetic separability was rejected or whether the specific functional form was rejected.

Since the nonparametric tests did not maintain specific functional forms, we would expect them to result in rejection less frequently. Our finding was consistent with that expectation. Of nearly 750 nonparametric tests of separability, only 52 per cent rejected the consistent aggregation hypothesis.

Although we had no a priori basis for expecting a smaller or larger percentage of rejections of homothetic separability than of the generalised composite commodity theory, the latter resulted in the smallest frequency of rejection. Of 30 time series tests of the generalised composite commodity theorem (GCCT), none rejected the consistent aggregation hypothesis, but only 2/3 of the tests resulted in a clear failure to reject. The rest of the GCCT test results were ambiguous. Thus, the parametric tests of separability led to the largest proportion of rejections, and the time series tests of the GCCT led to the smallest proportion of clear, and even ambiguous, rejections.

Finally, comparing test results for national and world boundaries vs. state and sub-state areas revealed a higher level of rejection (59 per cent) for the states and sub-states than for the nations and world (34 per cent). However, we should note that the distribution of tests varied greatly among geographic types. All of the GCCT tests were conducted on national and world data sets. Although a smaller share of the separability tests was nonparametric for national and world data than for state and sub-state data, the share of nonparametric plus GCCT tests was slightly larger for national and world data than for state and sub-state data.

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While the percentage of rejections varied most by test procedure, they also varied considerably between outputs and inputs and between national and state areas. These empirical findings consistently reflect one conclusion — there is no obvious empirical generalisation (or stylised fact) about consistent aggregation of agricultural data. Except for the GCCT tests, all the above classifications included considerable proportions of both rejections and nonrejections of the consistent aggregation hypothesis.

3.6 Agent-wise aggregation results

Both studies that tested for consistent geographic aggregation rejected the hypothesis in each data set. Although they used different approaches, both tested for consistent aggregation across states. The hypothesis was rejected even for pairs of states.

4. Aggregation mistakes

Other empirical literature has attempted to measure the mistakes made by aggregation. It appears that few have also conducted tests to determine whether the data satisfied sufficient conditions for consistent aggregation. In this section we note nine such articles from the agricultural and resource economics literature. Only one also conducts tests for consistent aggregation. Most use actual data observations, but a few of the applications are based on Monte Carlo simulation.

Buccola and Sil (1996) found evidence of substantial negative representative-agent aggregation bias in productivity growth. They conducted a Monte Carlo simulation based on data for four food manufacturing industries — meat processing, dairy, baking, and beverages — that operated with nonjoint technologies. Using base data, the aggregate estimate of productivity growth underestimated the true growth rate by 28 per cent. For some other scenarios, the underestimate was as high as 88 per cent and never lower than 21 per cent.

Hellerstein (1995) found that the bias in consumer welfare measures from aggregation within travel cost models was frequently less than the bias from distributional errors in limited dependent variable models of travel cost which used individual observations. Like Buccola and Sil, his analysis was based on Monte Carlo simulations. He found that the aggregation bias was generally greatly reduced by including distributional information in the aggregate model. He included the distributional covariance matrix in the modified aggregate model such that the variances and covariances were included along with the aggregated means in the set of regressors.

Reed and Riggins (1981) reported that estimation of corn acreage response
in Kentucky was improved by disaggregating the data into 14 sub-state regions. Statistical fit was greater, and parameter signs were more frequently consistent with expectations.

Park and Garcia (1994), on the other hand, found little loss in predictive accuracy by modelling Illinois corn and soybean acreage response at the state level rather than at the sub-state, crop reporting district, level. In addition, they observed that the state-level model provided estimates more consistent with expectations.

Like Park and Garcia, Arnade and Davison (1989) reported little adverse effects from aggregation bias in their analysis of US soybean export data. Their aggregate model included worldwide demand for US soybean exports while their disaggregate models were six major importing countries and regions. Although one of the conditions was violated for consistently aggregating the data to a single equation, the distortions from aggregation were smaller than the distortions from incorrect simultaneity assumptions.

Paul (1999) noted that aggregate time-series data told the same story as disaggregate cross-sectional data about the reasons for increased concentration in the meat packing industry. She found little evidence of excessive profits being generated by the meat packing plants and firms. Instead, both analyses revealed that cost economies, which were primarily transmitted to suppliers of cattle and demanders of meat products, appeared to be the primary cause of increased concentration.

Shumway et al. (1988) also found little impact from aggregation bias in their analysis of US agricultural production. When output supply and input demand estimates for ten farm production regions were aggregated to the national level, few elasticities differed by more than a magnitude of 0.1 from those estimated using national data.

Although not statistically significant, Thomas and Tauer (1994) found evidence that linear aggregation across inputs impacted estimated technical efficiencies of New York dairy farms. However, their nonparametric procedure was considerably more sensitive to the number of input categories included in the analysis than to improper aggregation.

Davis (1997) found evidence of statistically significant commodity-wise aggregation bias in his study of the demand for cigarette leaf tobacco by the US tobacco industry. The economic implication of the bias was to erroneously conclude that domestic and foreign tobaccos were substitutes rather than complements.

What implications can be drawn from these nine diverse studies? Of the cited studies, seven focused on representative agent or geographic aggregation and two considered commodity-wise aggregation. One found very large mistakes from representative agent aggregation (some of which approached 90 per cent). Another found statistically significant evidence of
commodity-wise aggregation bias that resulted in an important error of economic inference. A third found that estimation was improved by using agent-wise or geographically disaggregated data. The remaining six either found little error of inference created by the aggregations or they found that the error created by other common misspecifications exceeded those from aggregation. A majority of the studies found little inferential error because of the aggregations.

However, recognising that some studies found substantial errors due to aggregation, it is important to also note the observation of one article that representative agent aggregation bias was generally greatly reduced by including distributional information about the individual agents in the aggregate model. This observation echoes earlier findings by Blundell et al. (1993), Stoker (1986), Simmons (1980), Blinder (1975), and even a 1937 article by Staehle. It is also consistent with the recent recommendations by Just and Pope (1999) for dealing in a practical way with the seemingly pervasive problem of inconsistent aggregation across firms. They develop theoretical insight as well as a call for minimal improvements in data collection procedures to make feasible the practical recommendation of including 'second own- and cross-moments of producer characteristics' in aggregate supply and demand specifications.

5. Empirical tests for aggregation bias

We now turn to our own empirical tests. We first introduce a procedure for testing for the presence of commodity-wise aggregation bias. It is adapted from Lee et al. (1990). The test is applied to two aggregations in a data set that has been extensively tested for consistent aggregation. One of the aggregates received clear and unambiguous empirical support by the previous tests. The other aggregate was only partially (ambiguously) supported.

5.1 Theoretical framework

At some low level of aggregation, the tenets of economic theory are presumed to be untainted by aggregation. At that level consider the netput share equations associated with an explicit functional form (translog) of the variable profit function:

\[ y_i = \beta_{io} + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \beta_{ij} p_j + \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{ij} z_j + \varepsilon_i \quad i = 1, \ldots, m \]  

where \( y_i \) is the variable profit share of netput \( i \) (positive for an output, negative for an input), \( p_j \) is the log of the price of netput \( j \), \( z_j \) is the log of a
fixed factor or other exogenous variable, and \( \epsilon_j \) is the disturbance term with conditional expectation zero. The netputs are indexed by \( i \in D = \{1, 2, \ldots, m\} \), so there are \( m \) disaggregate netputs. By assumption, equation (1) satisfies all the properties coming from a well-behaved translog variable profit function. These include the following restrictions on the parameters, which result from linear homogeneity in prices of a twice continuously differentiable profit function:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} \beta_{iw} = 1, \sum_{i=1}^{m} \beta_{ij} = 0, \sum_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_{ij} = 0, \beta_{ij} = \beta_{ji}.
\]

In addition, equation (1) must be consistent with convexity and monotonicity of the profit function in prices. These latter conditions are only local properties of a translog profit function and are dependent on the magnitudes of \( p \) and \( z \). Now the question of interest is what happens to this system if a subset of the equations in equation (1) is aggregated together? Specifically, what theoretical properties are retained? What econometric results are retained?

To answer the above questions requires additional notation. Let there be an aggregate indexing set \( I = \{I_1, I_2, \ldots, I_M\} \subseteq D \), such that \( I_r \subseteq D \) for any \( r = 1, \ldots, M \leq m \). For example, the \( I \) set could be \( I = \{\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\}\} \) so \( I_1 \) contains the first two netputs, \( I_2 \) contains the third and fourth netputs, \( M = 2 \), and \( m = 4 \). When researchers consider aggregating quantities, it is also common to construct an aggregate price index to correspond to the aggregate quantity index. Operationally, what is done, perhaps tacitly, is that equations are aggregated together and the individual prices of the aggregate quantity are replaced with the aggregate price index. Ultimately it does not matter the order in which these operations are done, but in our case it is more enlightening for econometric reasons first to replace disaggregate prices with their associated aggregate price index and an explicit aggregation error and then aggregate over equations.

Following Lewbel (1993, 1996), let \( R_r \) be the log of the aggregate price index for netputs \( j \in I_r \). The deviation of the log of the disaggregate price from \( R_r \) can be defined as \( \rho_j = p_j - R_r \) for \( j \in I_r \), so:

\[
p_j = R_r + \rho_j
\]

The term \( \rho_j \) can be considered a measure of price aggregation error. Note that equation (1) can always be written equivalently using equation (2):

\[
y_i = \beta_{iw} + \sum_{r=1}^{M} b_y R_r + \sum_{j \in I} \beta_{iy} p_j + \sum_{j \in I} \gamma_{ij} z_j + \sum_{j \in I} \beta_{ij} \rho_j + \epsilon_i \quad i = 1, 2, \ldots, m
\]
There are three ways a subset of the equations in equation (3) can be aggregated for empirical purposes. Two of these are basically linear aggregation schemes and one is a nonlinear aggregation scheme. The first linear aggregation scheme is just to add together the \( i \in I \) equations and carry along the aggregation errors. This will be referred to as the *empirically aggregated system* procedure and is not based on any underlying theory. The second linear aggregation scheme is to employ the generalised composite commodity theorem (GCCT) of Lewbel (1996). It also involves adding together the \( i \in I \) equations in the system (3), but in this case the aggregation errors are part of the disturbance term and are well behaved. This will be referred to as the *generalised composite commodity system*. The nonlinear aggregation scheme employs the theory of weak separability (explicitly homothetic separability) to generate the aggregate system. As Lewbel discusses, and is not difficult to show, the aggregation errors disappear because of the restrictions on the technology. This system will be referred to as the *homothetic separability system*.

Because of their structure and implications for the aggregation error term, all three of the above systems can be nested within a generalised version of the empirically aggregated system and recovered by imposing certain parameter restrictions. Aggregating the \( i \in I \) equations in system (3) gives this generalised system:

\[
Y_s = b_{w} + \sum_{r=1}^{M} B_s R_r + \sum_{j \in I} b_{ij} p_j + \sum_{j \in I} \gamma_j z_j + \sum_{j \in I} \delta_j \rho_j + \epsilon_s \quad s = 1, 2, \ldots, M
\]  

(4.1)

\[
y_k = \beta_{k0} + \sum_{r=1}^{M} b_{kr} R_r + \sum_{j \in I} \beta_{kj} p_j + \sum_{j \in I} \gamma_{kj} z_j + \sum_{j \in I} \phi_{kj} \rho_j + \epsilon_k \quad k \notin I.
\]  

(4.2)

The *empirically aggregated system* is obtained from equations (4.1) and (4.2) by imposing the following restrictions:

\[
\delta_{ij} = b_{ij}, \quad \phi_{kj} = \beta_{kj}, \quad b_{ij} = \sum_{i \in I} \beta_{ij}, \quad B_s = \sum_{i \in I} \beta_{ij}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma_{ij} = \sum_{i \in I} \gamma_{ij}.
\]

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2The implicit assumption made throughout is that the underlying translog profit is a second order flexible approximation to the true profit function. As is well established by Blackorby et al. (1978) and Denny and Fuss (1977), if this function is homothetically separable, then this imposes certain (linear and/or nonlinear) restrictions on the profit function and hence net share functions. In particular, the profit function must either be a Cobb–Douglas of translog aggregates or a translog of Cobb–Douglas aggregates.
Of course, $E_i = \sum_{i \in T} v_i$. Also, since $\beta_{ij} = \beta_{ji}$, $b_{ij} = \sum_{i \in T} \beta_{ij} = \sum_{i \in T} \beta_{ji} = b_{ji}$.

As is obvious by (4.2), the empirically aggregated system may contain some disaggregate equations.

The generalised composite commodity theorem is based on the idea that the aggregation errors are well behaved and do not affect the parameter estimates, so the aggregation errors can either be included in the model or absorbed into the error term and the estimated parameters should not change significantly. Stated alternatively, this means that imposing the restrictions $\delta_{ij} = 0$ and $\phi_{ij} = 0$ or $\delta_{ij} = b_{ij}$ and $\phi_{ij} = b_{ji}$ will have no significant impact on the other parameters of the model. As is well known, this is true if the omitted variables are independent of the other variables in the system, which is what the GCCT requires. Here the generalised composite commodity system will be considered the system (4.1)–(4.2) with $\delta_{ij} = 0$ and $\phi_{ij} = 0$, and the empirically aggregated system is considered the system where $\delta_{ij} = b_{ij}$ and $\phi_{ij} = b_{ji}$. As an aside, if one is interested in the components of the aggregate parameters within the empirically aggregated system, they can be determined from the aggregation error parameters, $b_{ij}$ and $b_{ji}$. This is not the case when the restrictions $\delta_{ij} = b_{ij}$ and $\phi_{ij} = b_{ji}$ are not imposed or the aggregation errors are omitted.

The aggregation errors do not appear under weak separability. Thus, as indicated by Lewbel, a test for weak separability using only aggregate data and the aggregation errors is a test of the joint restrictions $\delta_{ij} = 0$ and $\phi_{ij} = 0$. Consequently, the homothetic separability system is equivalent to imposing these restrictions in equations (4.1) and (4.2) and is observationally equivalent to the generalised composite commodity system. For this reason, the system with the restrictions $\delta_{ij} = 0$ and $\phi_{ij} = 0$ imposed will be referred to as the theoretically aggregated system.

Equation (1) above possesses the properties of symmetry and homogeneity. These properties also carry over to all three aggregate systems, as shown by Lewbel (1993, 1996).

Theorem (Lewbel 1993 and 1996): If the disaggregate system (3) satisfies symmetry ($\beta_{ij} = \beta_{ji}$) and homogeneity ($\sum_{i=1}^{m} \beta_{io} = 1$, $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \beta_{i} = 0$, and $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_{ij} = 0$), then the aggregate system (4.1)–(4.2) will also satisfy symmetry and homogeneity:

\[
B_{rs} = B_{sr}, \quad b_{rs} = b_{sr}, \quad \beta_{rs} = \beta_{sr}, \quad \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_{so} + \sum_{i \neq l} b_{si} = 1,
\]

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{M} B_{ri} + \sum_{i \neq l} b_{ri} = 0, \quad \sum_{i=1}^{M} b_{iy} + \sum_{i \neq l} \beta_{iy} = 0, \quad \sum_{i=1}^{M} \Gamma_{ij} + \sum_{i \neq l} \gamma_{ij} = 0.
\]

Proof: The proofs are straightforward applications of the definitions of $b_{ij}$ and $B_{rs}$ using the rules of multiple summation and so are omitted here.
5.2 Econometric estimation and testing procedure

The theory presented in the previous section is deterministic and the relationship between the aggregate parameters $B_{sr}$, $B_{sj}$, and the disaggregate parameters $b_{ij}$ are very simple linear functions. However, as Theil (1954) demonstrated in his seminal work on aggregation, the relationships between the estimated parameters are not the same as between the deterministic parameters. In this section the relationship between the estimators of the aggregate and disaggregate parameter estimates is presented in a framework similar to Theil, and the significance of aggregation bias in estimating aggregate parameters is tested using procedures developed by Lee et al. (1990).

Using standard econometric notation, let the disaggregate system of share equations corresponding to equation (3) be written as:

$$y_d = X_d\beta_d + e_d$$  (5)

where $y_d$ is a $(N \cdot m \times 1)$ vector, $X_d = (I_m \otimes X)$ is a $(N \cdot m \times m \cdot k_d)$ matrix, $I_m$ is an $(m \times m)$ identity matrix, $X$ is a $(N \times k_d)$ matrix of regressors including a vector of ones, $N$ is the number of observations. The matrix $X$ is the same in all equations and may be partitioned as $X = (1, p, z, p)$ with $1$ being a $(N \times 1)$ vector of ones, $p$ the sub-matrix of logarithms of prices, $z$ the sub-matrix of other variables, and $p$ the sub-matrix of aggregation errors. The parameter vector $\beta_d = (\beta_d^1, \beta_d^2, \ldots, \beta_d^m)$ is the $(m \cdot k_d \times 1)$ vector of disaggregate parameter vectors $\beta_i^d = (\beta_{i1}, \beta_{i2}, \beta_{i3}, \beta_{ij})$ associated with the $m$ equations, and $e_d$ is the $(N \cdot m \times 1)$ vector of error terms.

The empirically aggregated system based on system (4.1)-(4.2) is just a linear transformation of equation (5) and a redefining of the aggregation error parameters (i.e., $b_{ij} = \delta_{ij}$ and $b_{ij} = \phi_{ij}$). The aggregate system can therefore be obtained by multiplying both sides of equation (5) by the transformation matrix $\varphi$, which must be designed according to which equations are to be aggregated together. For example, if $m = 3$ and the first two equations were to be added together, leaving the last in disaggregate form, then:

$$\varphi = \begin{bmatrix} I_N & I_N & O_N \\ O_N & O_N & I_N \end{bmatrix}$$

where $I_N$ is the $(N \times N)$ identity matrix and $O_N$ is a $(N \times N)$ matrix of zeros. So the empirically aggregated system becomes $y_d = \varphi y_d = \varphi X_d \beta_d + \varphi e_d$. However, because the $X$ matrix is the same for all equations and has been written in terms of aggregate prices and aggregation errors, an equivalent representation of the model $\varphi X_d \beta_d$ is to define $X_d = (X \otimes I_{m'})$, with $I_{m'}$ the $(M \times M)$ identity matrix and define a parameter aggregating matrix $A$ such...
that \( \varphi X_d \beta_d = X d \beta_d \). This is the matrix equivalent of writing an expression such as \( wa + wb \) as \( w(a + b) \) and amounts to collecting like terms. In the \( m = 3 \) example, where the first two equations are to be aggregated together, \( A \) would be defined as:

\[
A = \begin{bmatrix}
I_d & I_d & O_d \\
O_d & O_d & I_d
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where \( I_d \) is a \((k_d \times k_d)\) identity matrix and \( O_d \) is a \((k_d \times k_d)\) matrix of zeros. Note the first row of \( A \) generates the aggregate parameters while the second row regenerates the disaggregate parameters. Therefore, the \textit{empirically aggregated system} can be written as:

\[
y_d = X_d \beta_d + e_d.
\]

Based on the economic theory and deterministic aggregation, then \( \beta_d = A \beta_d \). This suggests that there are two ways to estimate \( \beta_d \): a deterministic approach that just uses the matrix \( A \) and an estimate of the disaggregate vector, say \( b_d = A \beta_d \), and an econometric approach that estimates \( \beta_d \) directly. As previously indicated, including the aggregation errors in the design matrix allows the components of the aggregate parameters to be identified but only if the identification restrictions are imposed in the estimation. In this context an appropriate econometric estimator of \( \beta_d \) is the restricted seemingly unrelated regression estimator, or:

\[
b'_e = C_e X_e^T \Omega_e^{-1} y_d + C_e X_e^T \Omega_e^{-1} (q - R_e \beta_d)
\]

where \( C_e = (X_e^T \Omega_e^{-1} X_e)^{-1} \) is the \( M \cdot k_d \) parameter covariance matrix, \( \Omega_e \) is the covariance distribution for the system disturbance vector \( e_e \), \( R_e \) is the \( J \times M \cdot k_d \) restriction matrix, \( q \) is the \( M \cdot k_d \times 1 \) restriction vector which for this article is always zero, and the subscript \( E \) refers to the \textit{empirically aggregated system} which explicitly includes the aggregation errors \( p \).\textsuperscript{3}

Assuming the disaggregate model is true, standard regularity conditions of the design matrix apply, and \( E(e_e) = 0 \), it is easy to show that the expectation of \( b'_e \) is:

\[
E(b'_e) = A \beta_d - E[C_e X_e^T (R_e C_e^T)^{-1} R_e A \beta_d].
\]

If the restrictions are true, then the last term will be zero and the aggregate estimator will be unbiased. If the restrictions are not true, then the bias will be the last term.

\textsuperscript{3} q is zero because we impose homogeneity by deflating all netput prices by one netput price. If homogeneity is imposed parametrically, then \( q \) would contain a 1.
In the generalised composite commodity system and the homothetic separability system, the aggregation errors are not carried along and are omitted in the estimation, though they could be included in the generalised composite commodity system. This leads, first, to a lack of identification of some of the disaggregate parameters and, second, to a different design matrix that is a subset of $X_A$. An easy way to handle the problem within the same estimation framework is to just redefine the restriction matrix $R$ appropriately to include the zero restrictions on the aggregation error terms. In this case let $b^*_r$ be the restricted estimator for the theoretically aggregated system. In a similar fashion to equation (8), then the expected value of $b^*_r$ is:

$$E(b^*_r) = A\hat{\beta}_d - E[C_T R^T_T (R_T C_T R^T_T)^{-1} R_T A\hat{\beta}_d]$$  \(9\)

where the $T$ subscript refers to the theoretically aggregated system, and $C_T$ and $R_T$ are appropriately redefined. As before, if the restrictions are true, then the estimator is unbiased.

To test whether there is aggregation bias associated with either $b^*_E$ or $b^*_T$, the framework of Lee et al. (1990) is trivially extended to the restricted systems estimator. Assuming the disaggregate model is correct, the null hypothesis is $H_0: \delta_E = b^*_E - b_d = 0$ or $H_0: \delta_T = b^*_T - b_d = 0$ with $b_d = A\hat{\beta}_d$ being the aggregate parameter vector constructed from the disaggregate parameter estimates. The relevant test statistic is then:

$$\delta^T \Psi^{-1} \delta_i \sim \chi^2_{M-k_d}$$  \(10\)

and $\Psi$ is the covariance of $\delta_i$, $i = E, T$ (Domowitz and White 1982, Theorem 2). This is a generalised Durbin-Hausman test and the general formula for the covariance is given in the appendix. As is common for this type test, a generalised inverse must be computed.

5.3 Data

The annual price and quantity data used in the analysis are for the period 1950–92. They come from Ball (1996). Research expenditure and price data for the period 1920–92 are from Huffman and Evenson (1993) and Huffman (1999). Except for an additional observation at the end of the series replacing two at the beginning, these are the same data used by Lim and Shumway (1997), and the research expenditure stock variables are constructed in the same way as in their paper. The disaggregate model consists of two outputs (livestock and crops), three inputs (hired labour, capital, and other purchased inputs), and four fixed factors (self-employed labour, real estate, private research expenditures, and public research expenditures). While we refer to this specification as the disaggregate model, it is admittedly already a highly aggregated model. However, the commodity-wise aggregations in this model
are entirely consistent with the results of prior tests for consistent aggregation. Aggregation is accomplished using the Tornqvist index. The variable names and their definitions are given in table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$q_1$</td>
<td>Livestock quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_2$</td>
<td>Crop quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_3$</td>
<td>Hired labour quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_4$</td>
<td>Capital quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_5$</td>
<td>Other purchased input quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Q$</td>
<td>Aggregate netput (output or input) quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_1$</td>
<td>Livestock share of profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>Crop share of profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_3$</td>
<td>Hired labour share of profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_4$</td>
<td>Capital share of profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_5$</td>
<td>Other purchased input share of profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>Aggregate netput (output or input) share of profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_1$</td>
<td>Log of livestock price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_2$</td>
<td>Log of crop price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_3$</td>
<td>Log of hired labour price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_4$</td>
<td>Log of capital price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_5$</td>
<td>Log of other purchased input price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P$</td>
<td>Log of aggregate netput (output or input) price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z_1$</td>
<td>Log of public research expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z_2$</td>
<td>Log of private research expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z_3$</td>
<td>Log of self-employed labour quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z_4$</td>
<td>Log of real estate quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z_5$</td>
<td>Dummy variable (1 for 1983, 0 otherwise)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Variable names and definitions

5.4 Estimation

Two aggregate models are considered. Based on work by Williams and Shumway (1998b) and Davis et al. (2000), there is only partial (ambiguous) empirical support for aggregating the two outputs into one output based on the generalised composite commodity theorem tests while there is clear empirical support for aggregating all inputs into one input based on homothetic separability tests. The first aggregate model combines the two outputs from the disaggregate model into one output but leaves all other variables as in the disaggregate model. The second aggregate model combines the three variable inputs into one input and leaves all other variables as in the disaggregate model. Variable profit share equations of outputs and variable inputs are estimated for each model with one share equation omitted.
to avoid the singularity problem. Estimation is accomplished using the iterative seemingly unrelated regression method to achieve maximum likelihood estimates (assuming normally distributed error terms) with invariance to the equation deleted from the system. Symmetry and homogeneity are maintained in the estimation. Because the aggregate parameter estimates constructed from the disaggregate parameter estimates (i.e., \( \mathbf{b}_A = A\hat{\mathbf{b}}_d \)) are the primary concern, the disaggregate parameter estimates are not reported here but are available from the authors on request.

5.5 Results from aggregating outputs

Table 3 gives the parameter estimates associated with the aggregate output system constructed from the disaggregate model parameter estimates (i.e., \( \mathbf{b}_A = A\hat{\mathbf{b}}_d \)) along with the corresponding price elasticities matrix. As can be seen, 26 of the 36 parameters are significant at the 10 per cent level or less. The main parameters that are insignificant are those associated with public and private research expenditures and self-employed labour. Nearly all other parameters and all the price elasticities are significant. All signs on the price elasticities appeal to intuition but their magnitudes are not consistent with a convex variable profit function in prices. Of course, a convex profit function is an implication of competitive behaviour only for individual firms and not for an aggregate of firms.

Table 4 gives the parameters estimated from the empirically aggregated system, \( \mathbf{b}_E \), (i.e., it includes the aggregation errors) along with the corresponding price elasticity matrix. Overall, the parameter estimates are similar to those constructed from the disaggregate model. All have the same sign and similar magnitudes to those constructed from the disaggregate model. Of the 36 parameters, 23 are significant at the 10 per cent level or less, which is three fewer than in the estimates from the disaggregate parameters. Most of the additional insignificant parameters are associated with the aggregation error of the livestock price.

The chi-squared test statistic for aggregation bias, equation (10), is a quadratic form. The summary statistics on the square of the components of the difference vector \( \mathbf{d}_E = (\mathbf{b}_E - \mathbf{b}_A) \) indicate that the average squared difference between the estimated aggregate parameters from the empirically aggregated system and the aggregate estimates based on the disaggregate parameters is 0.15, and the test statistic is 3.11. As is rather well known for this type of test, a generalised inverse must be used because the covariance matrix may not be of full rank and positive semi-definite. This in turn affects the degrees of freedom used in conducting the chi-squared test. If the covariance matrix were of full rank, then the degrees of freedom would equal the number of parameters — 36. In the present case the rank of the matrix...
Table 3a Output aggregation model parameters constructed from disaggregate parameter estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_4$</th>
<th>$z_1$</th>
<th>$z_2$</th>
<th>$z_4$</th>
<th>$z_5$</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>$-141.49$</td>
<td>$-3.33$</td>
<td>$0.28$</td>
<td>$0.63$</td>
<td>$2.42$</td>
<td>$0.36$</td>
<td>$-0.95$</td>
<td>$-1.07$</td>
<td>$14.06$</td>
<td>$6.83$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_3$</td>
<td>$8.88$</td>
<td>$0.28$</td>
<td>$-0.18$</td>
<td>$0.05$</td>
<td>$-0.15$</td>
<td>$-0.05$</td>
<td>$0.19$</td>
<td>$0.10$</td>
<td>$-0.95$</td>
<td>$-0.51$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_4$</td>
<td>$49.74$</td>
<td>$0.62$</td>
<td>$0.05$</td>
<td>$-0.59$</td>
<td>$-0.08$</td>
<td>$-0.26$</td>
<td>$-0.12$</td>
<td>$-0.33$</td>
<td>$-3.97$</td>
<td>$-1.85$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller.

Table 3b Output aggregation price elasticities constructed from disaggregate parameter estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netput</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$p_3$</th>
<th>$p_4$</th>
<th>$p_5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Q$</td>
<td>$1.48$</td>
<td>$-0.16$</td>
<td>$-0.31$</td>
<td>$-1.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_3$</td>
<td>$2.28$</td>
<td>$-0.48$</td>
<td>$-0.69$</td>
<td>$-1.11$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_4$</td>
<td>$2.19$</td>
<td>$-0.34$</td>
<td>$-0.31$</td>
<td>$-1.54$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_5$</td>
<td>$2.04$</td>
<td>$-0.16$</td>
<td>$-0.45$</td>
<td>$-3.99$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller. Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
Table 4a  Empirically aggregated output aggregation model parameter estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>( P )</th>
<th>( p_3 )</th>
<th>( p_4 )</th>
<th>( z_1 )</th>
<th>( z_2 )</th>
<th>( z_3 )</th>
<th>( z_4 )</th>
<th>( z_5 )</th>
<th>( p_1 )</th>
<th>( p_2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Y )</td>
<td>-140.19</td>
<td>-2.95</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_3 )</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_4 )</td>
<td>48.67</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-4.09</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller.

Table 4b  Empirically aggregated output aggregation price elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netput</th>
<th>( P )</th>
<th>( p_3 )</th>
<th>( p_4 )</th>
<th>( p_5 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Q )</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( q_3 )</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( q_4 )</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( q_5 )</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-3.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller. Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
and number of degrees of freedom is 27. Using degrees of freedom less than the desired degrees of freedom has the effect of reducing the size of the test, *ceteris paribus*. However, because the test statistic is so small in the present case, the *p*-value of the test statistic is 1.00 regardless of whether the degrees of freedom are 36 or 27, so the null of no aggregation bias clearly cannot be rejected. Thus, there is no statistically significant aggregation effect associated with aggregating together livestock and crops into one single aggregate and including the aggregation errors in the estimation.

With regard to the economic importance of using aggregate data in a completely specified aggregate model, consider the aggregate price elasticity matrices, tables 3b and 4b. The aggregate price elasticities in table 4b are very similar to those obtained by aggregating the disaggregate parameters. There are no sign changes between the two sets of elasticities, and only three of 16 elasticities differ by more than 10 per cent. In addition, all elasticities in both tables are statistically significant.

Table 5a gives the aggregate parameters estimated from the *theoretically aggregated system*, that is, the model that ignores aggregation errors in the specification. Based on Williams and Shumway’s (1998b) rejection of homothetic separability for this partition and Davis *et al.*’s (2000) finding of ambiguity with regard to the generalised composite commodity theorem, no clear support was previously found for consistent aggregation of all outputs into a single index. Thus, one might anticipate considerable difference in the parameter estimates. However, little difference is evident. These parameter estimates also appear similar to those constructed from the disaggregate model. All have the same sign and similar magnitudes to those constructed from the disaggregate model. Of the 30 estimated parameters (remember, zero restrictions are imposed on the aggregation error terms), 21 are significant at the 10 per cent level or less. The difference vector is $\delta_T = (b_T^d - b_T)$ and the average of the squared components of the difference vector is about twice as large as before, 0.27. However, the null hypothesis of no aggregation bias is still not rejected at any reasonable level because the test statistic is 32.69, which with 31 degrees of freedom (the rank of the covariance matrix) has a *p*-value of 0.38. With 36 degrees of freedom, the *p*-value is 0.62. Thus, there is no statistically significant aggregation effect associated with aggregating livestock and crops into one single aggregate and ignoring aggregation errors in the estimation. This result would tend to suggest that the ambiguous result found by Davis *et al.* (2000) for aggregating the two outputs into one output is of no concern for estimating aggregate parameters. Because explicit aggregation errors are seldom considered, these results suggest that nothing is lost by omitting them.

Table 5b gives the aggregate price elasticities based on parameter estimates obtained from the *theoretically aggregated system*. They are again very
Table 5a Theoretically aggregated output aggregation model parameter estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_4$</th>
<th>$p_5$</th>
<th>$z_1$</th>
<th>$z_2$</th>
<th>$z_3$</th>
<th>$z_4$</th>
<th>$z_5$</th>
<th>$\rho_1$</th>
<th>$\rho_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>-139.96</td>
<td>-3.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
<td>13.93</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_3$</td>
<td>8.76</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_4$</td>
<td>48.56</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-3.99</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller.

Table 5b Theoretically aggregated output aggregation price elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netput</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_4$</th>
<th>$p_3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Q$</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_3$</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_4$</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_5$</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-3.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller. Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
similar to those obtained by aggregating the disaggregate parameters. None change sign and again only three elasticities differ by more than 10 per cent. In addition, all elasticities are statistically significant.

5.6 Results from aggregating inputs

Table 6 gives the parameter estimates associated with the aggregate input system constructed from the disaggregate model parameter estimates (i.e., $b_t = A\hat{b}_t$), with the aggregating matrix $A$ redefined appropriately) along with the corresponding price elasticities matrix. Sixteen of the 24 parameters are significant at the 10 per cent level or less. The main parameters that are insignificant are again those associated with public and private research expenditures, self-employed labour, and the aggregation errors in the crop equation. Other parameters are significant, including all the price elasticities. As with the aggregate output system, all signs of price elasticities in the aggregate input system appeal to intuition but magnitudes are not consistent with a convex variable profit function.

Table 7 gives the parameters estimated from the empirically aggregated system (i.e., including the aggregation errors) along with the corresponding price elasticity matrix. There are much larger discrepancies between the parameter estimates in tables 7a and 6a than between the corresponding parameters for the output aggregate system. Many of the parameter estimates have clear differences in terms of signs and magnitudes. Of the 24 parameter estimates, only nine are significant. The main difference is that none of the price parameters are significant in the estimated aggregate model while all are significant when computed from the estimated disaggregate system. Although only one parameter that changes sign is significant in both systems, more than half of the parameters have a different sign in the aggregate model than when derived from the disaggregate system. However, all but one price elasticities are significant and have the same signs as in table 6b.

The difference vector is defined as before, $\delta = (b_t - b')$, and the average squared difference of the components is large — 46.75. Most of this difference is due to different estimates of the intercepts. The chi-squared statistic for aggregation bias is 36.16. The rank of the covariance matrix is 20. However, regardless of whether one uses the correct degrees of freedom or the desired 24, the null hypothesis of no aggregation bias is rejected at the 5 per cent level. The $p$-values are 0.01 and 0.05 for 20 and 24 degrees of freedom, respectively. Thus, there is a statistically significant aggregation effect associated with aggregating hired labour, capital, and other purchased inputs together into one input aggregate, even if the aggregation error is left in the model.
Table 6a  Input aggregation model parameters constructed from disaggregate parameter estimates

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_2$</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$z_1$</th>
<th>$z_2$</th>
<th>$z_3$</th>
<th>$z_4$</th>
<th>$z_5$</th>
<th>$\rho_1$</th>
<th>$\rho_4$</th>
<th>$\rho_5$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>105.87</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.57</td>
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<td>$Y$</td>
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<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.95</td>
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<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2.42</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller.

Table 6b  Input aggregation price elasticities constructed from disaggregate parameter estimates

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<td>1.12</td>
<td>−2.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller. Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
Table 7a  Empirically aggregated input aggregation model parameter estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
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<th>$p_2$</th>
<th>$P$</th>
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<th>$z_2$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>8.03</td>
<td>3.63</td>
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<td>1.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>$y$</td>
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<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<td>0.97</td>
<td>-2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller.

Table 7b  Empirically aggregated input aggregation price elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netput</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_2$</th>
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<tr>
<td>$q_2$</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>-2.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>$Q$</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>-3.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller. Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
With regard to the economic importance of using aggregate data in a completely specified aggregate model, the price elasticities all have the same sign and all but one are significant. However, their magnitudes differ substantially from those derived from the disaggregate system. There is no obvious pattern. Some elasticity estimates are more elastic while some are less elastic. All differ by more than 10 per cent and some by more than 100 per cent. All except the livestock own-price elasticity are significant in table 7b.

Table 8a gives the aggregate parameters estimated from the theoretically aggregated system, which ignores the aggregation errors in the specification, and table 8b gives the corresponding price elasticity matrix. Based on Williams and Shumway’s (1998b) clear failure to reject homothetic separability in this input partition and Davis et al.’s (2000) clear failure to reject the generalised composite commodity theorem in this output partition, one might not anticipate much difference in the parameter estimates. Indeed, there is much less of a discrepancy between the parameter estimates in tables 8a and 6a than between tables 7a and 6a. Overall, the parameter estimates appear similar to those constructed from the disaggregate model. All have the same sign and similar magnitudes to those constructed from the disaggregate model. All of the price parameters are significant.

Again, the difference vector is $\delta_T = (b'_T - b_A)$ and not surprisingly, the average squared difference of the components is small (0.65) relative to the empirically aggregated model, which was 46.75. The chi-squared statistic for aggregation bias from the theoretically aggregated model is 29.70. With 22 (24) degrees of freedom the $p$-value of the statistic is 0.13 (0.19), so the null hypothesis of no aggregation bias is not rejected at any reasonable level of significance. The fact that the empirically aggregated model is rejected while the theoretically aggregated model is not rejected highlights an important aspect of consistent aggregation. Recall in estimating the empirically aggregated model, it explicitly included the aggregation errors and allowed for the identification and imposition of some within- and cross-equation restrictions which cannot be imposed in the theoretically aggregated model. What these results tend to suggest is that the implicit zero restrictions associated with the theoretically aggregated model may be less binding than the restrictions associated with the empirically aggregated model.

With regard to economic implications, all price elasticities in table 8b have the expected signs and are statistically significant. All have the same signs as those constructed from the disaggregated model parameters, and most are
Table 8a Theoretically aggregated input aggregation model parameter estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_2$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$z_1$</th>
<th>$z_2$</th>
<th>$z_3$</th>
<th>$z_4$</th>
<th>$z_5$</th>
<th>$\rho_1$</th>
<th>$\rho_4$</th>
<th>$\rho_5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>105.87</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>9.79</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>$Y$</td>
<td>139.97</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>-3.16</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-13.87</td>
<td>-6.85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller.

Table 8b Theoretically aggregated input aggregation price elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netput</th>
<th>$p_1$</th>
<th>$p_2$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$q_1$</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_2$</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Q$</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>-2.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *All numbers in bold are significant at the 10 per cent level or smaller. Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
closer to the elasticity estimates constructed from the disaggregate parameters than were the empirically aggregated model elasticities. However, only two are within 10 per cent of the magnitudes of those elasticities.

5.7 Assessment of empirical findings

Aggregating all outputs from two output categories or all variable inputs from three input categories failed to produce statistically significant aggregation bias when aggregation errors were not explicitly included in the model. Thus, the statistical tests for aggregation bias also failed to reject the hypothesis that outputs and inputs could be consistently aggregated to such a high level of aggregation. On the output side these results indicate that the ambiguous finding of Davis et al. (2000) in terms of aggregating all outputs into one output is not problematic. It also indicates that the negative nonparametric test results for homothetic separability in outputs found by Williams and Shumway (1998b) have little impact on parameters estimated based on the assumption of separability. However, these results complement previous findings of Williams and Shumway (1998b) based on nonparametric tests of homothetic separability in inputs and the cointegration tests for generalised composite commodities conducted by Davis et al. (2000) on outputs. Thus, there is not full consistency between the tests for the existence of aggregates and the degree of parameter aggregation bias associated with the rejection or acceptance of the existence tests.

The economic significance of aggregation errors was not trivial and also did not reflect a high level of consistency with the statistical and related tests. Previous tests found less empirical support for aggregating all outputs than for aggregating all variable inputs. However, aggregating data for all outputs prior to estimation did not have an appreciable impact on price elasticities while aggregating data for all inputs prior to estimation had a very important impact. In the former case only two of 16 pairs of elasticities differed by more than 10 per cent (and the largest differences were about 30 per cent). In the latter case only two of nine pairs of elasticities differed by less than 10 per cent and some differed by more than 100 per cent.

As one possible explanation for this difference, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the more commodities that are aggregated together, the more likely there will be significant differences due to aggregation. This would not be surprising and is just a corollary of Griliches’ observation that there are ‘different truths at different levels of aggregation, and they are connected by both the aggregation rules and the properties of the distribution of the microvariable’. The mixture distribution of the macrovariable, formed from aggregating the microvariables, will likely continue to lose its resemblance to any subset of microvariable distributions as more and more microvariables
are aggregated together. This suggests there probably exists a *neighbourhood aggregation invariance principle* that is a decreasing function of the number of commodities aggregated together. Since more input categories than output categories were aggregated here into individual indices, it is possible that the larger number of input categories included in the aggregate adversely affected the economic consistency of relationships between the macro model and the macro system constructed from micro model parameter estimates.

Even when considerable empirical support exists for consistent aggregation, it is apparent that aggregating data can lead to serious errors in policy recommendations. Thus, one might appropriately ask how such errors compare with other types of specification error. For comparison, consider two other common specification errors — incorrect choice of functional form and failure to properly account for time series properties of the data. Considering three functional forms in their analysis of Canadian consumer demands, Berndt *et al.* (1977) found that own-price elasticities varied by 15–50 per cent when symmetry was maintained in their models and up to several thousand per cent with frequent sign changes when symmetry was not maintained. Shumway and Lim (1993) also found similarly large differences among elasticities and among policy inferences as well as sign changes in elasticities when they estimated three functional forms for US agricultural production. In both studies, all functional forms were second-order Taylor series expansions and seemingly equally suitable *a priori* for the analysis of production or consumption relationships. Lim and Shumway (1997) found that failure to properly account for the time series properties of the data in their analysis of US agricultural production produced differences in the magnitudes and signs of estimated price elasticities comparable to those observed among functional forms. Consequently, the elasticity differences observed here from a possible input aggregation specification error are small relative to the differences previously observed from specification errors due to incorrect choice of functional form or failure to account for the time series properties of data.

### 6. Conclusion

Few have any illusions that the ‘true’ model structure can ever be identified. Nevertheless, improved model specification is sought in this as well as other papers to ensure that behavioural properties which apply to disaggregate relationships also apply to the aggregate relationships. We have documented a wide variety of commodity-wise aggregation test conclusions in the empirical agricultural economics literature. We have also documented considerable variation in measured errors of inference in related literature.
because of inappropriate or imprecise aggregation. Through our own empirical testing with two aggregations and alternative model specifications, we determined that failure to empirically reject consistent aggregation in a partition was insufficient to totally mitigate erroneous inference due to the aggregation. In one of the cases, considerable elasticity differences were observed when aggregate data were used in analysis. However, the elasticity differences observed here from the possible aggregation specification error were small relative to the differences previously observed from specification errors due to incorrect choice of functional form or failure to account for the time series properties of data.

It is also important to emphasise and warn that any effort to decrease specification error cannot be taken to an extreme. It is useful here to think in terms of a ‘neighbourhood aggregation invariance principle’ because the level of aggregation ultimately should be dictated by the question of interest. Even if some inferential errors occur because of aggregation, one cannot expect very disaggregate firm level data or commodity categories to be useful in analysing what are often industry-level concerns such as supply and demand.

We conclude with an excerpt from Davis (1999, pp. 478–9) a statement based on Mill ([1844] 1950):

The theory of the firm is an inductive theory that came from observing the behavior of many firms and distilling from those observations the basic elements common to all of those firms. It does not actually describe the objective function and constraints of any particular firm, but only what all firms have in common as a ‘tendency.’ . . . A theory is like an inductive causal averaging procedure that ignores individual differences and concentrates only on similar tendencies. While highlighting a few common factors many more individual idiosyncrasies and factors are ignored. It is a theory of ‘the’ firm — the abstract firm. It is not a theory of ‘a’ firm, an individual firm. This simple but important distinction means the theory of the firm cannot be taken off the economics theory shelf and directly applied to some industry or firms without modification. A theory must be tailored to the market under study. A theory only provides a foundation for developing a more realistic account of the firm or industry under consideration. Thus when a researcher prepares to study a particular firm, adjustments, additions, and allowances must be made to the theory to take into account what Mill calls ‘disturbing causes.’ Alternatively stated, chopping off relevant aspects of markets (firms) or stretching other irrelevant aspects of markets (firms) so that they fit the Procrustean bed of a theory is poor applied economics.
Appendix

The covariance of \( \delta_i = (\hat{b}_i^\prime - b_i) = (b_i^\prime - A\hat{b}_i^\prime) \) is denoted by \( \Psi_i \). The general covariance and its asymptotic properties can be found in several places (see Turner and Rockel 1988, or within a GMM framework see Domowitz and White 1982). The derivations for the restricted seemingly unrelated regression estimator are rather tedious but straightforward and only the results are given here. The \( r \) superscript will be dropped here for simplicity. The general formula for the covariance is:

\[
\Psi_i = \text{Cov}(b_i) + \text{Cov}(b_{ir}) - \text{Cov}(b_i, b_{ir}) - \text{Cov}(b_i, b_{ir})^T.
\] (A.1)

The components of this general formula in the restricted seemingly unrelated regression case are as follows. Define in general the matrices \( M_i = I_n - CR_i^\prime(R_iC_iR_i^\prime)^{-1}R_i \) and \( C_i = (X_i^\prime \Omega_i X_i)^{-1} \) and the residual vector \( e_i \). By altering the \( i \) subscript, these matrices will alter accordingly as in the text where all matrices except \( \Omega_i \) are defined. The matrix \( \Omega_i \) is the covariance distribution for the system disturbance vector \( e_i \). Using this notation, it can be shown that the components of (A.1) are:

\[
\text{Cov}(b_i) = E[M_iC_i]
\] (A.2)

\[
\text{Cov}(b_{ir}) = E[AM_iC_iA^\prime]
\] (A.3)

\[
\text{Cov}(b_i, b_{ir}) = E[(M_iC_iX_i^\prime \Omega_i^{-1}e_i)(AM_iC_iX_i^\prime \Omega_i^{-1}e_i)^\prime].
\] (A.4)

As is standard practice, the residuals are used to estimate \( \Omega_i \) and the formulas (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) are used without the expectation sign in (A.1) to form the covariance \( \Psi_i \), which is used in the test statistic given by equation (10) in the text.

References


Hicks, J.R. 1936, Value and Capital, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Does consistent aggregation really matter?


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