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Abstract

The long-run economic performance of Argentina since World War One has been relatively disappointing until recently. Yet, in the interwar period, signs of future retardation and recurring crises were not so obvious. It is often claimed that an unmitigated success was the remarkably rapid growth of domestic financial markets. In conventional models, such “financial deepening” would help accelerate development, especially in an industrializing economy such as Argentina’s. Yet the promise of this trend was unfulfilled: first the outbreak of World War One and then the Great Depression proved a setback for the fledgling financial system, and a long-run deterioration set in after 1940. In this paper we trace the course of financial development using historical and international comparisons and we analyze both macro- and microeconomic aspects of financial intermediation.

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Introduction

The economic history of Argentina, a melancholy tale of long-run retardation throughout most of the twentieth century, is understandably something of a fascinating curiosity for scholars with any interest in growth, development, and history. A country that promised in the 1900s and 1910s to enter the league of the developed nations, simply could not make it. The 1914–1939 period thus defined a critical transition in Argentine economic history; yet signs of future retardation and recurring crises were not so obvious. Even scholars with the most cursory acquaintance with the historical record can point to this key period as a regime shift, when the move from convergence and relative prosperity to divergence and relative backwardness begun. All histories single out the interwar period, perhaps even the very year 1929, as the decisive break point (Díaz Alejandro 1970; Di Tella and Zymelman 1967; Cortés Conde 1979; Taylor 1994).

However, it is interesting to compare the scholarly consensus ex post, with the actual conditions of the day. For, in many aspects, the Argentine economy of the interwar period proved remarkably resilient, and may well have performed better than expected given the magnitude of the external shocks in product and factor markets beginning in 1914 and running through the 1920s and 1930s (Ortiz 1993). Such shocks were potentially devastating to a small open economy. But in her economic performance Argentina fared no worse than other settler economies in the transition to the interwar period (Díaz Alejandro 1984, Taylor 1994). That is, despite important and violent shifts in the terms of trade and the virtual state of autarky in international capital markets, the Argentine economy managed to overcome both the depths of the 1914–1918 and 1929–1931 crises (della Paolera et al. 1996). How was this possible, in an economy that at the turn of the century was still a primary production economy? How should it affect our view of the origins of Argentine relative retardation? Is it fair to say that autarkic forces in capital markets prevented an efficient allocation of investment to new endeavors? Or should we seek alternative or, at least, complementary explanations? For example, did Argentina simply suffer a lack of Schumpeterian entrepreneurial activity idiosyncratic to the country that might have explained the failure to smoothly industrialize? Most students have remarked that as a result of such a lack of incentives to industrialize public policies had to “force” a reallocation of productive resources. As a result the country went from

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1 An important view of the different entrepreneurial attitudes of native wealthy landowners and immigrants is included in a startling paragraph by Carlos Díaz Alejandro (1966, 20–21):

“It is the nearly unanimous opinion of students of Argentine economic history that before 1930 public policy was either indifferent or hostile to the expansion of the manufacturing sector, unless it was directly related to the expansion of exports of goods of rural origin. It is pointed out that the landed interests producing for export and which had a considerable amount of influence in the government, took a dim view of any import substituting efforts in Argentina which could hurt industries in foreign countries which were good customers of Argentina’s grain and meat. Furthermore, it is argued that the dominant rural interest eyed with suspicion an expansion of industry and a creation of a new industrial class which could challenge their social position and could compete with rural producers as employers of labor. Such attitudes gave rise to a low social status for industrial entrepreneurs not linked with exports who...were recruited primarily among recent immigrants...."
being one of the most dynamic, open, export-led economies before World War I to a closed, importsubstituting economy by the end of World War II.

However, few scholars have tackled the importance of financial and capital markets as a means to promote and enhance economic growth. Very little has been written on the interaction in Argentina between financial development and aggregate economic activity for the 1913–1939 period (see, however, della Paolera et al. 1996). A vague consensus suggests that some financial development took place, but it was not all that might have been hoped for. This was recognized by Díaz Alejandro (1985, 2), who noted that: “While the financial history of Latin America remains to be written, it appears that by 1920s most countries had succeeded in establishing commercial banks of the (then) traditional sort.... Although there was no ‘financial repression,' critics pointed to a lack of medium and long-term credit, particularly to finance industry and non-export agriculture....”

In his landmark history, Díaz Alejandro (1970, 28–35) offers further evidence for significant financial deepening in the interwar period. It is noted that investment rates were high (12%–15%), though lower than before World War I (when they were closer to 20%). In the interim, foreign capital shrunk in importance: in 1913 foreigners owned 48% of the Argentine capital stock, but this had fallen to 34% by 1927, and continued to decline. However, the domestic debt market featured an expanding array of debt instruments in fixed money terms, and mortgage activity grew. There was an increase in bank channels of mobilizing finance, notably via rapidly expanding savings accounts which expanded from 8% of GDP in 1913–14 to 22% in 1928–29. Monetization also expanded, and a traditional indicator, the ratio of monetary assets to GDP, rose from 46% in 1913–14 to 55% in 1928–29.

Not all signs were good, however. The equity market remained thin, and “companies relied primarily on bank credit for short-term financing and on retained earnings and ad hoc arrangements for long-term financing,” and activity on the Bolsa was dominated by trades in mortgage paper the bonds of state and national government bonds. Only around 10% of trades were in stocks of corporations. And even in bank finance, one institution loomed large, the Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA), which accounted for more than two-fifths of the assets of the commercial banking system, and which, in the absence of a central bank, had a quasi-public function. Still, despite these caveats, the evidence looked favorable to Díaz Alejandro (1970, 33–34). He argued that “[t]he domestic contribution to financing pre-1930 capital accumulation was large and tended to grow” and suggested that by 1930 Argentina had become a “highly monetized” economy with an “expanding [domestic] capital market.”

Almost thirty years after Díaz Alejandro’s essay, a pioneering work built on scarce data, we think it time to re-examine these issues and search for new evidence. Was Argentine finance truly one of the success stories of the interwar period? Was it expanding and laying the foundation for sustained economic growth? In this paper we focus on the relationship between the development of domestic financial markets and economic growth for the 1913–1939 period. This is our emphasis since it so often appears as a central redeeming feature of Argentine interwar history, yet it has received little attention from quantitative economic historians. Many economic historians have stressed the pre-1914 struggle of Argentina to adopt monetary regimes that would ensure macroeconomic stability and, in turn, facilitate
access to international capital markets (della Paolera 1994, Bordo and Rockoff 1996). But we have so far lacked a detailed analysis of the linkages between financial development, inside-money deepening, credit creation, the efficiency and level of investment, and economic growth. For the case of Argentina, an emerging economy, the role of financial development—in mobilizing domestic and foreign savings, allocating productive resources, facilitating risk management, and easing of trading of goods—is an essential element in understanding what happened after 1914.

In particular the Argentine economy suffered two immediate shocks at the onset of World War I: first, the British supply of financial services proved to be unreliable when international capital markets dried up and, second, there was a need to substitute for foreign mobilization and accumulation of resources by domestic sources which would have to rely on a domestic financial technology (Taylor 1992). As Levine (1996, 14) observes “…England’s financial system did a better job at identifying and funding profitable ventures than most countries in the mid-1800s….Indeed, England’s advanced financial system also did a good job at identifying profitable ventures in other countries, such as Canada, the United states, and Australia during the 19th Century. England was able to ‘export’ financial services (as well as financial capital) to many economies with underdeveloped financial systems.” The very same process was at work in parts of Latin America, notably Argentina—and there perhaps to an even greater extent given her extreme degree of dependence on foreign capital. Thus did an Anglo-Argentine elite dominate the financial landscape of turn-of-the-century Buenos Aires. As noted by Díaz Alejandro above, about one half of Argentine capital was foreign owned, either directly or indirectly in 1913, a far higher percentage than in any other major lending nation at the time, and the bulk of that foreign capital was British in origin (Taylor 1992).

Financial and diplomatic ties grew to such an extent that the term “informal empire” has been coined to describe the relationship of such indebted nations to Britain, and the term “gentlemanly capitalism” to describe the British ventures overseas (Cain and Hopkins 1993). In terms of the volume of capital flows, this process reached its peak in the years immediately before 1914 (Edelstein 1982). It is hard to identify which came first in the nineteenth century: political engagement in less developed countries or foreign investment. A debate over the costs and benefits of formal (or informal empire), is not our purpose. It is enough to note here that international political and economic engagements started to dissolve in the autarkic atmosphere after World War I, with ramifications for world markets, and especially international capital mobility (Obstfeld and Taylor 1997). Savings-scarce countries, like Argentina, with a heavy dependence on foreign lending were bound to feel a tightening of capital

That is, do large scale foreign investments create the need for political involvement (all the way to gunboat diplomacy), or is the latter a prelude or an encouragement to the former? Issues such as these are beyond the scope of this paper, but impinge on the widespread suspicious view taken of foreign capital in Latin America over a hundred years or more. The political process is much clearer in the case of the formal empire: British sovereignty and the military capacity to enforce it were not doubted. But more ambiguity surrounded the British informal empire, and, similarly, the United States’ relationship to Latin America under the Monroe Doctrine.

constraints, unless they could mobilize and allocate domestic supplies of capital as effectively as the rapidly receding supplies of foreign capital. How did Argentina respond to this challenge?

Our aim in this paper is to address two sets of major questions about these events. First, exactly how remarkable was interwar financial development relative to previous and subsequent trends in Argentina and relative to other countries’ long-run experience? What were the financial magnitudes involved? How much capital was mobilized and allocated? And what can we infer about the capacity of financial development to significantly improve Argentina’s long-run rates of saving, investment and economic growth?

Second, what independent sources of macroeconomic instability were originated by financial shocks in this evolving domestic financial system? It requires us assess the inherent fragility of the domestic financial system: could it produce financial shocks that could influence business cycles? In addition, the economy soon faced one of the worst ever international depressions, which wrought worldwide financial panics and collapses. How did the institutional features of the emerging financial markets propagate (or dampen) shocks that originated in the real sector economy?

As we note below, the theoretical and empirical literature on finance and development has recently undergone a rapid expansion, with classic theories inserted and refined in contemporary growth models and applied empirics. There is now a deeper understanding of the role of financial systems in economic growth in allocating resources and enhancing investment productivity. Yet few economic historians have attempted to systematically research its influence on the level of economic growth. Our concerns address both long-run and short-run concerns about finance in the interwar period and its place in Argentina’s history. We want to know what kind of long-run change these developments did, or potentially could, produce. For this we employ comparative data at low frequencies. We also want to address issues of stability and crisis response, and for this we need high-frequency data for the Argentine economy in the interwar period itself. In the present paper we bring newly constructed databases to bear on each of these questions, using new primary and secondary sources.

**Finance and Development in Theory**

The influence of the development of financial and capital markets on economic growth and the emergence of market economies has been debated by economists and economic historians since Adam Smith’s (1776) seminal piece. Theoretical and empirical studies have focused on the role of financial deepening on the process of economic growth. As early as 1912, the Austrian Joseph Schumpeter in his *Theory of Economic Development* argued that finance scarcity was a serious obstacle to development. Economic historians such as Davis (1963), Cameron et al. (1967), Gerschenkron (1962), and Goldsmith (1969) made pioneering empirical contributions showing that financial markets were “necessary” institutions in the early stages.

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4 In particular, banking intermediaries have an inherent instability under the so-called Diamond-Dybvig (1983) framework. Since banks insure the nominal value in deposit contracts and they create high-powered deposits they are subject to runs from investors. In a scenario of generalized runs, the expectation of the bankruptcy of an otherwise safe institution is self-fulfilling.
of industrialization of today's developed countries. By following a comparative approach, these studies claim that a lack of well-functioning capital markets institutions is central in explaining the relative backwardness of some continental European countries.

More recently authors such as McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and Fry (1995) have studied the recent experience of a large sample of developed and developing countries. They examine the channels of transmission from financial intermediation to growth by inspecting institutional and economic forces such as legal regulation, and the influence of interest rates on savings and investments. The literature on endogenous growth has produced a renewed interest in the effect of financial development on the allocation of capital expanding and formalizing these ideas even further (see Fry 1995).

Two seminal contributions which organize an analytical framework for studying the finance-growth nexus and assessing the quantitative importance of the financial system for economic development are the works of Robert Townsend (1983) and Ross Levine (1996). It is stated that in an Arrow-Debreu world, with perfect information and no transaction costs, there will be basically no need for financial intermediaries. Otherwise, intermediation provides a potentially valuable service. A straightforward question about the functional role and usefulness of capital markets, and especially banks, was posed by Bradford De Long (1991) in his paper "Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective on Financial Capitalism". The same question might be asked of any intermediary, in any country, at any time.

The value-added characteristics of financial institutions, some of which were listed by Levine (1996), are key functions that could increase the prospects for economic development:

1. the deepening in the use of money and near-monies for transaction purposes to move beyond the technology of a barter-exchange system (i.e., the development of stable and credible monetary and financial institutions);
2. to ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk by reducing the uncertainty about the timing and settlement of intertemporal economic transactions (i.e., innovation in the creation of liquid financial instruments);
3. to ease the linkages between savers and investors by reducing the need for information so that available short run funding from surplus economic units will flow to those short-of-funds investors who can promise a higher expected rate of return for their long run projects (i.e., improved efficiency in allocating resources by transforming the maturity of assets); following Calomiris (1993), if financial intermediation did not develop beyond short-term credit and lending practices, the allocation of resources and the nature and speed of economic growth will be affected because the choice of

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5 Levine (1996) notes that "the link between liquidity and economic development arises because some high-return projects require a long-term commitment of capital, but savers do not like to relinquish control of their savings for long periods. Thus, if the financial system does not augment the liquidity of long-term investments, less investment is likely to occur in the high (risk-adjusted) return projects...." This is a crucial function because when performed in an efficient manner it enables entrepreneurs to overcome the problem of borrowing or credit rationing.
inputs in production will be biased towards variable-cost inputs and against investment in fixed capital;

(4) the mobilization of savings which involves the pooling of capital from disparate savers for investment to obtain efficient scales of operation in firms (i.e., a mobilization of savings can produce a fall in the cost of external finance for firms and entrepreneurs allowing them to choose their first-best techniques);

(5) the fall in the cost of finance and interest rates, and the resiliency of financial institutions to systemic fragility can provide for the flourishing of new entrepreneurs and new firms that otherwise could not have existed.

When all the factors mentioned above are in operation, financial intermediation will enhance capital accumulation and, most importantly, technological adaptation and innovation. Which will, in turn, translate into economic growth. Let us now turn to a first preliminary inspection of the available macrodata for Argentina to establish some links between measures of financial deepening and economic performance.

**Argentine Financial Development and Economic Growth: A Preliminary Sketch**

In Table 1 we offer some preliminary macroeconomic indicators of financial development and economic growth from 1900 to 1939. Let us examine the broad development indicators in the upper panel. The figures show that the Argentine economy suffered a significant slowdown in economic growth after World War I. From an average per capita real growth rate of about 3.5% per year for the first decade of the century, Argentina only rebounded in the twenties to a growth rate of 1.7% per year. The 1915-1919 period is characterized by a dismal performance of the real economy, even by international standards, but the depression years 1930-35 show relatively little decline by the same yardstick (Taylor 1992).

Instrumental in both recessions were dramatic declines in investment activity, which never recovered its level of 1905-1914. Several open economy indicators provide evidence of the increased autarky of the Argentine economy in this period: a big reduction in capital inflows measured by the ratio of current account to GDP, and a dramatic worsening in the terms of trade. Despite a modest terms of trade recovery in the mid-1920s, exports as a share of GDP gradually decline after peaking during the later years of World War One (more due to a collapse in the denominator than a rise in export quantum), and fall even further in the 1930s.

We would like to examine the association, if any, between economic development and several measures of financial development. The typical two candidates to be used as proxies for the degree of financial intermediation are: (1) monetary aggregates such as the money stock M3 defined as the sum of currency in hands of the public plus demand deposits and interest bearing deposits and liabilities of the banks and non-banks intermediaries (or DEPTH, following King and Levine 1993); and (2) the level of credit activity provided by the banking system as a ratio of GDP (or CREDIT following De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995). We have constructed, on the basis of a consolidated monetary database, annual and monthly data for a monetary aggregate that resembles M3. We have also collected monthly data on the
loan activities of the Argentine banking system for the second definition, relying on the pioneering work of Baiocco (1937).

Of course the usual caveats concerning the use of M3 as an indicator of financial and capital market depth arise. What about alternative assets that channel savings to the economy other than through the financial system or commercial banks? What about debt and equity instruments as vehicles to provide funding to the investors of the economy? Any definition of monetary aggregates or banking credit might be a weak indicator of capital markets development if it is the case that a significant percentage of industrial finance occurs outside the financial system. For alternative domestic channels of investment such as the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange Market we only have fragmentary evidence on its quantitative importance, which we will discuss shortly.6

Notwithstanding conceptual difficulties, the ratio of M3 to GDP is the traditional indicator of financial or monetary sophistication of an economy in most of the relevant historical studies. In different studies, it is shown that higher per capita incomes in developing economies are associated with higher degrees of monetization. In other terms, the secular declines in money velocity which characterizes financial sophistication are closely associated with sustained increases in the per capita real output.7

Perhaps a more accurate indicator to proxy the depth of financial intermediation is to use the amount of credit or risky loans effectively intermediated by private banks. In Table 1 we include the ratio of total loans of the financial system to GDP (CREDIT). As banks develop their capacity to create banking money should increase. Related to this indicator, we want to analyze the credit to the private sector net of the loans of the most important official (quasi-state) bank, the Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA). We then use the ratio of credit net of BNA to GDP as an indicator. Thus, we abstract from a bank that was the financial agent of the government, and this indicator should be effectively related to the level and efficiency of privately-financed investment (NETCREDIT).

We also include in the lower panel of Table 1 some other financial variables covering various aspects of bank and non-bank financial activity. We have a measure of the growth of savings accounts relative to GDP. From the Buenos Aires Bolsa we show an indicator of stock-market turnover volume relative to GDP, an index of banks' stock prices (derived from our monthly data set) and an index of all stock prices (from Nakamura and Zarazaga 1996). These indices allow us to get a sense of how banking performed relative to the rest of the equity market in price terms, and how the two finance channels, debt and equity, performed in terms of activity.

The empirical regularities that are confirmed in the existing literature are: (1) as the level of output rises, the ratio of financial institutions' assets to output tends to grow; (2) periods of rapid per

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6 See the work in progress by Nakamura and Zarazaga (1996). However, in their paper they attempt to construct a preliminary index of the prices of stocks in the Buenos Aires Stock Exchang, which we include in the above table, not the size of the market capitalization. This issue, as to exactly how much finance was raised via equity instruments, is a subject for future research.

7 For the monetary economic history of U.S.A. and U.K., Friedman and Schwartz (1982); for monetary history episodes of different European countries Bordo and Jonung (1987); and for recent experiences Fry (1985) and King and Levine (1992).
capita growth are accompanied by above averages rates of growth of the financial system's assets; (3) deposit banks tend to grow in the initial phases of economic development.

From our monetary and financial data we can infer that all was not well in the Argentine financial system. The DEPTH measure is certainly misleading. While it is the case that the traditional indicator of money deepening measured by the ratio of M3 to GDP increased in a sustained fashion from 35% at the beginning of the century to reach a high of 50% at the onset of the Great Depression, the optimistic picture changes when we observe the behavior of more detailed statistics of banking credit, and even the DEPTH measure drops back to 41% by 1935.

However, when financial development is proxied by credit to the economy—and especially by net credit as a proxy of privately created loans for investment—the vitality of the emerging financial system is more questionable. Total credit did rise appreciably prior to the slump, from a low of 27% in 1905 to a high of 43% in 1930. But net credit as a fraction of GDP fell during the World War I by 25%, recovered a little in the middle of the twenties, only to plunge, together with output, during the years of the Great Depression. Thus the widely-used M3/GDP measure depicts a monetizing economy, but one which nonetheless did not deliver financial development in the form of a bank credit expansion to the same degree. By either measure, trough-to-peak gains never amounted to more than increases from 27% to 37% (DEPTH) and 18% to 24% (NETCREDIT), but even these modest gains were reversed.

It is not just the credit data that suggest the banking sector had its problems. If banks were the best available technology to channel savings to investments, then their situation as perceived by the market participants did not flourish during the interwar period: from 1913 to 1935, the “value” of the industry declined by more than 50% as shown by the quotation of an index of bank stock prices. The relative value of banking as an industry had declined dramatically even by 1930, the first year in which the deflationary effects of the Depression were felt domestically. Relative to other stocks, bank stocks had fallen in price by about 60% relative to their pre-1914 peak. This decline in market value of banks calls into question whether banks were an effective technology to channel savings to investments in interwar Argentine, an issue that will receive further scrutiny.

As for alternative sources of finance, there was little relief from the equity market either, and stock market turnover suggests a stock market of dwindling importance: turnover relative to GDP fell by more than half from 1900 to the 1930s. Turnover is not the same as new capitalization, but even so, the data is suggestive of a weak stock market unable to deliver a dynamic and growing source of industrial and commercial finance when such funding was exactly the type needed by the Argentine interwar economy. Further research is surely warranted on the evolution of the Bolsa to uncover its workings in this period (see Nakamura and Zarazaga 1996).

However, to be fair, not all signs were disappointing, and certainly the expansion of savings accounts, in particular, from 5% to 21% in 1905–1930, has attracted attention. It was based on this trend, and the increase in monetization (DEPTH), led Díaz Alejandro (1970) to see an “expanding capital market.” But more concrete measures of financial development results (in terms of credit delivered and the health of bank stocks) do not seem to justify this rosy view. And most tellingly of all, more savings
accounts and more monetization, at the end of the day, could not by themselves deliver large and sustained increases in loan activity, and thus deliver an impact on the private finance of investment via the credit channel, the ultimate benchmark for financial development.

Thus, it is thus not surprising that the figures of the upper panel of Table 1 on saving and investment show such a disappointing bottom line. In the absence of foreign savings during the interwar years, the dwindling current account deficits meant that Argentina had to finance most of domestic investment out of domestic saving. Yet the home financial system could not respond to the challenge. The financial system failed in its two core microeconomic tasks: it could neither successfully mobilize more capital (quantities did not increase appreciably); nor did the allocation of capital improve in efficiency (indeed bank stock price declines suggest a shift to poorer quality assets over time). The macroeconomic results were predictable. After 1914 savings rates climbed only modestly, averaging just 8% of GDP; investment rates declined to average about 10% of GDP, much less than the investment rates of 15%-16% seen in 1905-1914 and so heavily financed by foreign capital inflows. After 1914 foreign capital only contributed an inflow of about 2% of GDP on average. Economic retardation was the result of this new capital constraint (Taylor 1992).

Hence, the standard measures of "financial development"—DEPTH and CREDIT—need to be always interpreted with caution in this and other historical contexts. On the face of it increases in DEPTH or CREDIT of about 15 percentage points (as seen in interwar Argentina) would deliver impressive gains in growth performance. According to King and Levine (1993) or De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), these changes would be worth about 0.5% per annum in growth performance, via improved mobilization and allocation of capital. Such results failed to materialize in Argentina for two key reasons: first, the underlying microeconomics of bank finance fell into worse shape over time, and, second, the macroeconomics of capital accumulation were so adversely affected by the retreat of foreign capital, that this struggling domestic system could not adequately substitute for external sources of finance. To understand why the domestic system failed we need to understand its own institutional shortcomings, and so why it faced a much harder task than the foreign financial intermediaries it was seeking to replace.

Argentine Financial Development: An International Perspective

To recall some of the key motivating questions for this study: we ask again how remarkable was interwar financial development in Argentina? What were the magnitudes involved? And what can we infer about the capacity of financial development to significantly improve Argentina’s prospects for long-run economic development? These questions are, at least in part, comparative questions: if we assess Argentine growth relative to that of other countries, so we must also seek international benchmarks for financial development. This is very much the spirit of the studies by King and Levine (1993) and De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), who use large cross-sectional databases covering scores of countries. We cannot hope to match this sample size given the availability of historical data before 1945, but we can compare Argentine experience to a sample of a few well-chosen developed and developing countries in Figure 1.
The figure shows two measures of financial development, both using M3, the only monetary aggregate available for this purpose (we were unable to obtain currency in the hands of the public for such a broad sample). The first measure is the DEPTH measure, the ratio of M3 to GDP for seven countries from 1913 to 1939. The second measure is real M3 per capita, measured in 1928 prices, and converted to U.S. dollars at 1928 parities. The sample includes Argentina, plus three benchmark rich “core” countries (Britain, the United States, and Germany) and three developing “periphery” countries (Italy, Portugal, and Spain). In 1913, Argentina was one of the five or so richest countries in the world, and would have been considered a good candidate for comparison with the first reference group. But in the postwar decades Argentina’s position has certainly lapsed into the developing country sample, and fell behind the three European periphery countries included in the second reference group. Can we find evidence of such a reversal of fortunes in this financial data?

We can indeed. The first chart shows that in 1913, Argentina’s DEPTH measure was only just behind that of the three core countries, and after the shocks associated with World War One, Argentina briefly surpasses all countries in the sample on this measures of financial deepening. This success proves short lived. A brief financial crisis in Argentina in the mid-1920s brings the DEPTH measure down to its initial level. The only core country below Argentina now is Germany, whose own financial system had been wrecked by the chaos of financial repression during the hyperinflation. There was then some stability up to 1929, but other periphery countries enjoy very rapid increases in DEPTH over the same years, which Argentina could not match. In the 1930s, Argentina faces further financial crises and these deliver a terrible blow, reducing the DEPTH measure below that of all other countries in the sample by the late 1930s, excepting Germany, an economy with serious problems financial and otherwise (heavily controlled currencies, an increasingly command-type of economy, and crowding-out via militarization all serving to strain the private financial system).

A similar story is told by the evolution of real M3 per capita in the second chart. Again, Argentine starts near the top of the financial league table in 1913, and her relative position improves a little by the early 1920s. But after 1920 almost nothing happens to change the Argentine level of real M3, whereas in all other countries, this measure of real financial activity per person is continually increasing. The core countries all surpassed Argentina in the level of this variable by the 1930s, and only Portugal and Italy (barely) have a lower level, though they were converging rapidly.

Both of these measure indicate that in terms of financial development Argentina began in 1913 in a very strong position, comparable to its claim to be one of the richest economies in the world. However, this position was continuously eroded in relative terms in the interwar period, such that by the late 1930s, Argentina had experienced virtually no net increase in terms of financial depth or real M3 per capita. Despite wars and the Great Depression, most other countries posted gains in the same period. It is very telling that Argentine financial development looks good only in comparison with a financial disaster case like Germany.

This sequence of events suggests that we examine the Argentine interwar financial system and economic growth in more detail. Figure 2(a) provides a starting point, and the first figures depict time
series of output per capita (PBIR/N), and two measures of financial development: currency in the hands of
the public as a share of GDP (CRL/PBI) and banking money (M3-M0) as a share of GDP (M3M0/PBI).
According to the established theories of finance and development, the level of CRL/PBI should remain
constant or even fall, and the level of M3M0/PBI should rise as development proceeds, reflecting an
increase in sophistication with the public's substitution of assets in the financial system (banking money)
for simple cash in hand (Townsend 1983).

The time path of output per capita shows the two major crises: World War One and the Great
Depression, with the latter less severe than the former. There are also minor recessions in 1906–07 (as in
the United States) and in 1924–25. These cyclical events, both big and small, can be seen to have parallels
in financial activity in the second and third figures. CRL/PBI is seen to be declining dramatically from a
high of 15% to about 6% in 1920, albeit with some reversal at the beginning in the 1914 crisis. But
thereafter CRL/PBI holds steady and even increases slightly, reaching a level of 9%–10% in the 1930s.
Thus, the substitution of banking system assets for cash seems to grind to a halt in Argentina soon after
World War One. This trend break is also evident in the path of M3M0/PBI, which shows volatility
around an upward trend before 1920 (almost doubling from 15% to 30%), no trend at all from 1920 to
1929 (with a mini-collapse in the mid-1920s), and a marked decline in the 1930s (almost falling back to
20%, comparable to pre-1914 levels).

Expanding on these trends to show the correlation of growth and financial development, Figure
2(b) shows the crude correlations of real output per person and the two financial variables—first for the
entire period 1900–1935, then for the two subperiods before and after 1920. The correlations are striking:
before 1920, the economy appears to be developing as per the standard economic model: real economic
growth moves in parallel with the relative expansion of the financial system, and the substitution away
from cash. After 1920, these correlations break down. Economic growth still proceeds, albeit slowly.
And this slow growth takes place with a lack of financial deepening. In fact, one can argue that there is
even evidence of financial retardation or involution after 1920, as the public substitutes back toward
currency, and away from financial assets in the banking system.

The interwar trends are certainly disturbing, and they may shed more light on the beginnings of
Argentina's long-run retardation. However, the macroeconomic data gathered so far can only provide weak
evidence of the failure of the Argentine financial system between the wars. The evidence is certainly
poorly equipped to trace the causal relationship between, on the one hand, the institutional structure of
the Argentine economy and its position in a changing international economy, and, on the other hand,
internal developments in the financial system and their relationship to economic development. To
understand these linkages better we now aim to provide an integrated view of the macroeconomic and
microeconomic workings of the interwar Argentine financial system.
Financial Markets in the Interwar Period: A Closer Look

Anatomy of the Argentine Financial System

Prior to World War I, Argentina took advantage of the abundance of financial and monetary liquidity in international markets. Under a gold-exchange standard regime adopted in 1899 (which fixed the nominal value of the paper peso in terms of the key international currencies) banking money, M3-MO, expanded at an annual rate of 12.2%, almost doubling the rate of growth of the monetary base, M0 (della Paolera et al. 1996). Despite an accentuated fall in the post-Baring crisis period, the ratio of inside money to monetary base, the money multiplier, rose from an all time low of 1.2 in 1893 to a maximum value of 2.3 in 1912. This trend does not fully show the sustained process of financial deepening and improvement in the financial structure of the economy. During the gold standard years, the development of financial intermediation was more genuine than similar changes witnessed during the Baring boom years because economic agents made real use of deposits as an alternative monetary asset. This indicator of financial development shows that in 1889, one year before the devastating Baring crash, for each paper peso in circulation a little more than two pesos of commercial deposits existed. By 1912, for each peso in the hands of the public, there were more than three pesos in private commercial deposits.

The process of deepening in bank money continued until the late twenties, and by 1925 commercial deposits were equivalent to five times the amount of fiduciary currency in hands of the public. This process was sustained by a development of an extensive and diversified network of commercial bank branches as shown in Table 2. From 1894 to 1913, the network of branches increased fourfold in the country as a whole, and by a factor of six in the Province of Buenos Aires. In the 1920s the network continued to expand and by then other regions, such as Santa Fé, Entre Ríos, and Córdoba, were the leaders in the growth of interprovincial branching. As will become evident further below, the technology of improving the network of branches was the best vehicle to attract deposits from regional investors. A rough measure of progress, defined as the per branch real quantity of deposits, show a sustained increase in “productivity”: in 1894 the financial system had just 0.85 million pesos per branch, but rising to 1.47 million in 1913 and 2.71 in 1925. The spread of banking in the most important cities of Argentina paralleled the trend in urbanization of the general population. As an economy moves from spatial separation to spatial integration, trade exchanges should overcome barter and even cash transactions, and we would expect to see an increase in trade credit activity. This trend is clear-cut from rows D and E of Table 2. From 1894 to 1925, economic agents “economized” their holdings of cash balances in terms of GDP while the ratio of banking money (as a proxy for trade credit) to GDP moved definitely in a procyclical fashion with GDP per capita. These co-movements were unambiguous until 1925 but after then, economic agents seem to have relied again more on the most liquid asset: currency at hand.

A crucial financial innovation for the spread of banking and the enhancement of the payments system throughout Argentina was the establishment in 1913 of official clearing houses in the most important provincial cities of Argentina. The Argentine retail payments system appears to have improved
thereafter until the onset of the Great Depression. In Figure 3 we see that regional markets adapted the financial innovation of check clearing at a fast speed relative to the financial hub of Buenos Aires, which traditionally had been the banking center of Argentina. This clearly had the effect of enhancing the credit system because banks started to make the trade-credit (check) payments system work at a lower cost. If one assumes that the respective regional demands for quasi-money instruments such as checks or overdrafts are positively related to the economic transactions of that region, and inversely related to the risk associated with the solvency of the checks, we can read the evolution of clearing balances as an indirect proxy for the demand (or supply) of credit in the regions. This is valuable information, since we do not have data for regional interest rates or rates of discounts for commercial documents. But it seems that the regions were deepening their financial systems through the adoption of the clearing technology to make the settlement of payments more efficient.

The positive trend in financial development for the regional economies was abruptly truncated in 1929. It is remarkable to see that, with the exception of Mendoza, the remaining cities could not continue to gain ground on Buenos Aires in the 1930s. A question that remain to be answered is: what is behind this apparent structural shift from “deepening” to stagnation? One possible explanation is that the financial crises that started with the abandonment of the Gold Standard in 1929 produced a substantial increase in the idiosyncratic or provincial risk which dramatically raised the regional real interest rates above the national level; in other words, the provinces might have started a process of credit rationing.

Thus, judging by the performance of two preliminary indicators—bank branching and the adoption of new financial technologies—one might be tempted to leap to the conclusion that financial deepening was an unambiguous success in “interwar” Argentina. But we should be cautious here, for several reasons. First, recall that the expansion of branching parallels, paradoxically (or not), the relative decline in the “price” of banking (i.e., the falling perceived net worth of banks revealed in the trend of bank stock prices). Second, in spite of the diversification provided by branching which could reduce the risk in the intermediation of funds, a small, open economy like Argentina was extremely vulnerable to recurrent financial panics and crises. Third, perhaps because of a sub-optimal institutional regime, of which more later, the “output” of the private banking industry—that is, the choice of the leverage defined as the ratio of loans to capital—was constrained in Argentina by comparison to other emerging economies.

We could go further, asking if even prewar Argentina had an adequate supply of finance. In the celebrated Belle Époque period of 1900–1914, though macrovariables would have indicated a swift process of financial deepening (e.g., M3/GDP rises from 0.30 in 1900 to 0.50 in 1920) scholars still debate the extent and impact of financial development. For example, Jeremy Adelman (1994, 200, 204) in a comparative work on the economic development of Argentina and Canada affirms (albeit without detailed data) that for the years 1895–1914: “Finance, like labour, was notoriously scarce on the frontier, a binding constraint on development...if short-term lending was scarce and costly, longer term loans geared to helping farmers buy agricultural machinery, good seed or livestock were almost non-existent....bank lending within the Republic continued to favour commerce and large landowners, and in so doing raised the relative cost of machinery and capital investments for modest producers.” In another study of the
behavior and development of private banking during the same period, Andres Regalsky (1994, 58–59) has a somewhat different view [our translation]: “The splendid growth of the banking system was interrupted in 1914 by a severe crisis, the most important since 1890....In 1914 ends a long period of growth on the part of domestic private banks which had occupied the open space provided by the official banks....Paul Soweine in 1927, remarked the absence of a sector of investment banking in Argentina and the notorious disinterestedness of private banks to develop a policy of industrial credit or promotion.” These views are not necessarily incompatible. The Argentine financial system of 1914 could look back on a rapid phase of growth, but it was still a relatively immature and limited system by international standards. The subsequent experience of the interwar years was to expose its fragile foundations.

**Institutional and Economic Fragilities**

**Macroeconomic Twin-Risk: Exchange-Rate Regime and Financial Structure**

We must therefore ask what were the institutional and economic impediments to establish a fully-fledged and resilient financial system during the interwar period? We have just described the important process of bank branching and regional signs of monetary integration. It is interesting to note that in spite of a very liberal banking law that allowed branch banking with its advantages of asset diversification, the country suffered from banking instability and recurrent financial crises. In well-documented studies, Calomiris (1993) and Bordo (1985), argued that the “industrial organization of banking affected the propensities for panics and for nonpanic waves of bank failures” and they put special emphasis on the advantages of a branch banking system as a mechanism that could systematically avert financial panics and crises. Yet a country not included their studies, Argentina, which had extensive bank branching, did not avoid such panics.

To understand why Argentina suffered recurrent financial distress it is important to introduce here the concept of intertwined macroeconomic monetary and financial risk for a small, open economy under, mostly, a fixed exchange-rate monetary standard (i.e., the gold or gold-exchange standard). Crucial here is the fact that until 1935 the Argentine monetary and financial regime operated without a central bank. Until that time, a major cause of a sub-optimal financial structure came from the existence of a different kind of monetary authority, the *Caja de Conversión*, which had the exclusive macroeconomic responsibility of guaranteeing the external value of the domestic currency. However, it could not, at the same time, for all possible macroshocks, guarantee the internal convertibility of banking deposits (a multiple of the currency issue) into cash in the event of general bank runs. That is, the *Caja de Conversión* could not act as a lender of last resort of the financial system without threatening its macroeconomic responsibility of defending the external value of the domestic currency.

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8 The quote is from (1993, 25). Calomiris and Bordo discuss U.S. banking structure with an international perspective which includes the causes of panics and crises.
The almost simultaneous problems of exchange-rate crises and financial crises were a recurrent problem for Argentina, and this type of economic phenomenon is now better understood (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996). The complicated dynamics of a regime that combined a high ratio of inside to outside money (i.e., a fractional reserve financial system) and a fixed exchange-rate regime (e.g., the Gold Standard) become apparent by the end of 1913. The “world Central Banker,” the Bank of England, decided on successive and dramatic increases in its discount rate. The outbreak of the First World War was a devastating foreign shock for the Argentine economy and for the monetary and financial regime in particular. In Table 3 we show the anatomy of several financial crises to highlight the main channels of transmission to the real economy. We include three important financial crises: (1) the Baring crash (as a reference point); (2) the financial crash of 1913–1914; and (3) the 1930–1931 financial distress.

A common characteristic of real financial crises is that the fall in bank money or in the ratio of inside to outside money (due to a persistent run on bank deposits) is translated into a severe loss in output. By focusing on the 1913–1914 crisis we can see that, although a major devaluation of the currency was avoided (a major cost during the Baring crash), the banking industry was devastated. Bank stock prices fell by 38% in one year. There was an intense process of “capital crunch” (the use of capital to pay out depositors when assets fail). Paid-in capital falling by more than one tenth in less than twelve months.

It is important to notice that the destruction in the banking industry, measured by the price of bank stocks, was far worse than the (expected) behavior of overall stocks which declined by a “mere” 6%. Suppose that the quotation of bank stocks reflected the expected net present value of the future stream of income of the industry. Then, judging by what happened ex-post facto in the subsequent years to 1930–1931, one is tempted to say that investors and economic agents had a very accurate perception that World War One had had a devastating effect on the health of financial and capital markets institutions. By 1930–31, prices of bank stocks are at the same level as 1914, general stocks are up by 47%, while nominal paid-in-capital is below the 1913 level! In other words, it seems that financial markets were losing strength at each successive stage of financial distress. Even when a recovery was in place after a shock hit the system, the investment in the industry never recovered its previous level.

To show the links between the expected solvency of the banks as determined, simultaneously, by monetary and real factors, we have regressed the logarithm of bank stock prices on (a) the logarithm of bankruptcies that is used as a proxy for the distress of borrowers or the state of affairs in the real sector; and (b) on the logarithm of current and lagged values of the gold stock, variables used as a control for the domestic money market situation and possibly to be interpreted as a proxy for country macro-risk. The results are reported in Table 4 and the principal inferences to be drawn are:

1. an increase in bankruptcies lowers the market value of banks: the long-run elasticity is -0.2, so an increase of 10% in bankruptcies lowers the price of bank stocks by 2% in the long run;
2. a gold inflow (an improvement in the balance of payments) eases the monetary liquidity of the economy and has a positive impact on the financial intermediation industry: a rise of 10% in the stock of gold increases the monthly price of bank stocks by 3.6% in the long-run.
In the equation presented in Table 4, it is shown that the solvency of banks is crucially linked to a principal macroeconomic variable: the level of gold stock, mostly international reserves at the Caja de Conversión. From the point of view of individual bankers and investors, who set the “price” of banks, this variable, like the bankruptcy level, would be seen as exogenous—hence our choice of specification. The gold stock, in turn, is related to the choice and stability of the level of the exchange rate.

The above transmission mechanism distinctly parallels the seminal ideas of Bernanke (1983), who argued that the financial system constituted an additional channel through which monetary crises could cause havoc in the real economy. The above model is fairly simple, and describes the first-order effect by which the terms of Argentina’s deviation from gold standard rules can have a definite impact on the “pricing” of banks by exacerbating gold outflows. As it stands, we can trace out important independent effects of the real and monetary sectors on the perceived solvency of banks. Such effects are also apparent in Figure 4. A second-order effect (of expected depreciation of the currency) via the behavior of depositors (investors) in a fractional reserve banking system also deserves comment here. But our data still preclude a detailed econometric analysis of this effect, usually referred to as twin exchange-rate and financial crises. This phenomenon blocked, in some sense, the process of “smooth” financial deepening and encouraged “stop and go” cycles in lending.

The story for 1913–1914 is compelling. Let us suppose that like in 1914, a foreign shock hits the economy and starts a financial crisis when economic agents begin to panic and try to convert all their deposits into currency. If the monetary authority, the Caja de Conversión, acts as a lender of last resort to finance the drain of deposits, the money market could at first absorb the fall in the nominal quantity of money. However, if the intervention is of a magnitude such that the relationship between the monetary base and international reserves increases significantly, this would exacerbate the expectation of an eventual devaluation of the currency. This, in turn, would feed a new run on bank deposits, but this time to convert peso deposits into specie (della Paolera et al. 1996, 28).

Thus, one might now ask what was the “effective” cost, in terms of lending, of having a fragile-prone financial regime subject to this twin macro-shocks? This is a difficult question to tackle without examining the microeconomic behavior of banks.

Microeconomics of Banking

Thanks to the construction of a new data set based on the monumental work done by Baiocco (1937), we can assess the microeconomic behavior of bankers and banks (by origin of capital) and see how such behavior affected the availability of credit in the economy. In Figure 5 we display the share in the financial system of the Banco de la Nación (BNA, the most important official bank), domestic banks (founded domestically by “coalitions” of migrants: Banco Frances del Río de la Plata, Nuevo Banco Italiano, Banco Español, etc.), and foreign banks (international banks). One striking aspect is that from 1910 until 1930, domestic banks’ share in total loans declined from almost 50% to less than 35%, foreign banks could hardly maintain a share of 20%, and the Banco de la Nación jumped from 28% to 45%. In short, it appeared that the private sector was losing ground in the capital market.
In Figure 5, the evolution of paid-in-capital of banks is reported. It is interesting to note the dramatic “capital crunches” suffered by domestic banks during financial crises or distress. In the 1914 crisis, the domestic banks lost almost half their capital; again in the short-lived drain of 1922–23 they lost 25%; and in 1934, as we said previously, their nominal paid-in-capital was almost the same as in 1913. In a virtually unregulated banking environment, the bankers could optimize their asset holdings and portfolios, and we could think of the level of lending in terms of its assets or capital as being the most important choice variable in the industry.

In Figure 7, we observe that, excluding the Banco de la Nación, domestic-owned banks had a leverage ratio of risky loans to paid-in-capital much lower than the leverage of foreign-owned banks. Differences in capital constraints and in attitudes towards the tolerated riskiness of assets might explain the micro differences in lending. We speculate that foreign-owned banks, which after the Baring crash accounted for more than half of lending activities despite losing relative importance, could choose a higher loan-to-capital ratio because: (1) they could rely more on their international headquarters to avert and overcome financial crises (remember there was no such a thing as a lender of last resort in Argentina until 1935); and (2) they were lending to “safer” assets, giving them a mix of risk and returns that allowed them to carry a higher leverage (they specialized in trade financing where exchange-rate risk, self-liquidating characteristics, and collateral risk are all well hedged).

Our interpretation of the differences in observed leverages across banks of different type follows that of the Censo Bancario de la República Argentina 1925 (Republica Argentina 1926). In the census the disparity between the loan-capital ratios is not attributed to systematic differences in fractional banking reserves. For example, in December 1925, foreign banks maintained a loan-capital ratio of 7.3 while having a reserve-deposit ratio of 29%; domestic banks had a loan-capital ratio of 5.3 and a reserve-deposit ratio of 21%. Following Calomiris’s (1993) model, one can infer that this is fully consistent with domestic banks having greater portfolio risk than foreign banks. That is, domestic banks had to hold more “capital” because they were “longer” in riskier and more illiquid assets; foreign banks had high liquidity but more lending intermediation too. How this can be reconciled? First, not surprisingly a large share of funding comes through deposits, and deposit-capital ratios, as a first approximation, explain the observed differences in loan-capital ratios. However, on top of this, domestic banks relied exclusively on capital, reserves and deposits to effect lending. Meanwhile foreign banks could rely on profits generated internationally and, especially, on easy access to open letters of credit from international correspondent banks. In other words, foreign banks could “leverage” more easily by using international credit.

The evidence suggests that only foreign-banks could have a net-indebtedness position vis-a-vis correspondents in the rest of the world. That is they could channel resources from abroad but only for investing in very safe and short-term assets. For example, long-term loans and mortgage loans represented
16% of assets in domestic banks, but only 4% in foreign banks. Conversely, short-term loans accounted for 22% in domestic banks versus 45% in foreign banks (Republica Argentina 1926, 39). 9

The second important behavioral consideration is that changes in leverage are more important as a response to changing business cycle conditions in the case of foreign banks. This is apparent from the data presented in Figure 7. By combining Figures 6 and 7 we can see that when financial crises or exchange rate crises arise, severe capital crunches occur in domestic banks but no severe curtailment of paid-in capital occurs in the other banks. Therefore, it was principally the domestic banks, who were more prone to long-term lending, that were exposed to capital crunches. We argue that this was because they could not rely on international diversification to smooth out financial runs or crises. Under stressful conditions, domestic banks might have been forced to call back loans, but a total transformation of assets to pay back short-term debt was, in general, neither sufficient nor feasible: therefore, capital was squeezed out. On the other hand, foreign banks could immediately call up loans, and they could decide not to open up new letters of credit. In the former case, idiosyncratic risks could not be by-passed by domestic banks and the adjustment mechanism during a downturn in the business cycle was a capital crunch. In the latter case, lending was immediately curtailed to effect adjustment in the case of foreign banks.

To reinforce the argument, in Table 5 we use an econometric analysis to illustrate the differences in lending behavior as a function of: (1) gold flows, to show how inflows and outflows of capital are channeled to lending by bank type; and (2) bank stock prices, to assess the performance of the industry and how bankers react to the “pricing” of banks by the market. The signs are consistent with theory: in a monetary, small, open economy, gold inflows and increases in the expected net present value of the banking industry should be conducive to an increase in the amount of lending. Note also the long-run elasticities of lending by type of bank to the level of gold stock of the economy: if the economy experiences an increase of 10% in the gold stock, foreign banks increase lending by 12.2 %, but domestic banks by only 7 %. It is important to notice how elastic is the reaction of foreign banks to liquidity considerations and to the situation of the balance of payments of Argentina. (There are no significant differences in relation to the elasticity of loans to changes in the bank stock prices but it is worth noting that the elasticity is again very high.)

To display these effects more clearly, Figure 8 displays impulse-response functions for the two types of banks based on the dynamic equations estimated in Table 5. It is apparent that full adjustment by the banks takes a number of years. Even after 36 months, a 10% decline in gold stocks translates into only a 5.4% (8.2%) fall in loans for domestic (respectively, foreign) banks, whereas the long-run adjustment would be 10% (12.2%). Evidently, banks could not adjust their loan portfolios overnight, so external shocks had long-lasting effects, as banks continued to adjust their lending activity over several years.

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9 In the census it is shown that foreign-owned banks typically had a net debtor position, that is they were recipients of financial capital from correspondent banks abroad which was applied to trade lines. Domestic banks and the Banco de la Nación had a net creditor position vis-à-vis such correspondientes en el exterior. For 1925, the net debtor position for foreign banks was equivalent to 60% of total paid-in-capital of those banks (Republica Argentina 1926, 26–27, 44).
The finding of structural differences in lending behavior as a response to macroeconomic and microeconomic events from different type of banks, domestic and foreign, is an extremely important result, one that has not been identified in previous studies of banking in emerging markets in a historical perspective, nor in contemporary studies.

**Finance and Development in Argentina: Success or Failure?**

A review of the existing literature on Argentine financial development suggests a much more optimistic view of the interwar period than the one we have just presented. Marshaling new evidence both for Argentina in time series, and relative to other countries in cross-section, we have shown the weakness of the financial system between the wars. According to this new view, we have reason to suspect the financial system as one cause of Argentina's relative retardation after 1914.

Our study highlights two important institutional features of the interwar financial system as they interacted with the behavior of two types of intermediaries: domestic and foreign banks. First, we highlighted the macroeconomic "twin risk": under a quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime, with a currency board, but without a lender of last resort, the fractional-reserve financial system was prone to systemic risks triggered by external shocks via gold flows. Second, we examined the micro behavior of banks under such monetary and financial institutions, and we found significant differences between domestic and foreign banks. Adverse external shocks damaged the value of all banks, but elicited a larger and swifter adjustment of lending by foreign banks. However, in terms of capital adjustment, it was only the domestic banks that suffered "capital crunches."

The two types of banks differed in asset risks, type of lending, and they served different niches after 1914. Foreign banks narrowed their lending activities to specialize in liquid short-term commercial loans, leaving domestic banks to supply longer-term loans up in firms and real estate. They also crucially differed in terms of exposure to risk. *Ceteris paribus*, a foreign bank was less likely to fail. First, it could pool risk via international diversification (in a time of crisis foreign banks could call on overseas partners for liquidity; for example, a bank's London headquarters). Second, it could avoid systemic risk by its link to a monetary authority that acted as a lender of last resort (if the crisis was very severe then central banks would intervene; for example, the London headquarters of the bank would enlist the support of the Bank of England).

Given these considerations, domestic banks were forced to choose a lower leverage: they had to maintain a higher capital cushion. Therefore, domestic banks could not fill the void left by the retreat of foreign capital after 1914; the lower leverage meant that they could not mobilize finance to the same extent and thus could not facilitate so easily the accumulation and allocation of capital in this emerging economy.
References


### Table 1
Finance and Development 1900–1939

#### Broad Development Indicators

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<td>109</td>
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<td>B. Saving/GDP (%)</td>
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#### Financial Development Indicators

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<td>G. DEPTH = M3/GDP (%)</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>I. NETCREDIT = Non-BNA Loans/GDP (%)</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>J. Savings Accounts/GDP (%)</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>K. Stock Market Turnover/GDP (%)</td>
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<td>10</td>
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Table 2
Evolution of Financial and Monetary Sophistication

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong> Number of Commercial Bank Branches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal District</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong> Real Deposits per Branch (million $mn of 1913)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> Urban Population/Population (%)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong> Currency in Hands of Public/GDP (%)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong> Banking Money/GDP (%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong> GDP per capita (1913=100)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: A, Censo Nacional (1895), Enrique Kohn (1916-17), Censo Bancario (1925); B, D, E, F, della Paolera et al. (1996); C, Vázquez Presedo (1971, 1976).

Table 3
Anatomy of Financial Crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baring 1890</th>
<th>Baring 1891</th>
<th>WWI 1913</th>
<th>WWI 1914</th>
<th>Gt. Depression 1930</th>
<th>Gt. Depression 1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Real Activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Output (% change)</td>
<td>-10.9</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Monetary Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Supply (% change, M0)</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Base (% change, M3)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Created Money (% change, M3-M0)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-17.5</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Reserves Backing (%)</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devaluation (% change in $mn/Soro)</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (% change, WPI)</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Banking Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits (% change)</td>
<td>-47.2</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking Fractional Reserves (%)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Multiplier (M3/M0)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Financial Market Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Post Real Interest Rate (% internal bonds)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal Interest Rates (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High month</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low month</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Stock Prices (Dec. 1913 = 100)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock Price Index (Dec. 1913 = 100)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid-In Capital (millions $mn)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: della Paolera et al. (1884), Baiocco (1937), Nakamura and Zarazaga (1997).
Table 4
Bank Stock Prices, Bankruptcies, and Macroeconomic Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>In Bank Stock Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Bankruptcies</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Gold Stock</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Gold Stock (-1)</td>
<td>0.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Gold Stock (-2)</td>
<td>-0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Bank Stock Price (-1)</td>
<td>0.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-run elasticities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Bankruptcies</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Gold Stock</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: .957
NOBS: 222
SEE: 0.03

Notes: Monthly data, February 1917–December 1935. In Bank Stock Price = In bank stock price index; In Bankruptcies = In value of bankruptcies in million peso moneda nacional; In Gold Stock (-1) = lagged In of domestic gold stock in million peso oro.
Source: Baiocco (1937) except bankruptcies from Revista de Economía Argentina (various issues).
Table 5
Lending by Type of Bank as a Reaction to Gold Flows and Bank Stock Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Bank</th>
<th>Domestic In Loans</th>
<th>Foreign In Loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.059 (1.31)</td>
<td>-0.082 (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend</td>
<td>0.000 (0.77)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln Gold Stock</td>
<td>0.025 (2.72)</td>
<td>0.046 (3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln Bank Stock Price</td>
<td>0.023 (1.93)</td>
<td>0.026 (1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln Loans (-1)</td>
<td>1.048 (17.2)</td>
<td>0.689 (13.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln Loans (-2)</td>
<td>-0.083 (1.41)</td>
<td>0.274 (5.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Long-run elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Domestic In Gold Stock</th>
<th>Foreign In Gold Stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln Gold Stock</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln Bank Stock Price</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²      | .996                   | .990                 |
NOBS    | 343                    | 343                  |
SEE     | 0.02                   | 0.04                 |

Notes: Monthly data, May 1907–January 1936. ln Loans = ln loans in million pesos moneda nacional; ln Gold Stock (-1) = lagged ln of domestic gold stock in million pesos moneda nacional; ln Bank Stock Price = ln of bank stock price index.
Source: Baiocco (1937).
Figure 1
International Comparisons of Monetary and Financial Deepening

(a) ln(M3/GDP)

(b) ln(real M3 per capita [1928 US dollars])

Sources: Argentina from della Paolera (1996); others preliminary from Mitchell (1992; 1993) and Bordo (unpublished data).
Figure 2
Financial Deepening and Economic Development

(a) Time Series

160  
140  
120  
100  

PBIR/N

0.50  
0.40  
0.30  
0.20  

1910 1920 1930
YEAR

0.15  
0.10  

CRL/PL

0.05  

1910 1920 1930
YEAR

0.50  
0.40  
0.30  
0.20  

M3M0/PB

1910 1920 1930
YEAR
(b) Correlations

(i) 1900–1935

\[ \rho = -0.33, \beta = -0.05, t = -2.07 \]

\[ \rho = 0.68, \beta = 0.41, t = 5.40 \]

(ii) 1900–1919

\[ \rho = -0.03, \beta = -0.00, t = -0.12 \]

\[ \rho = 0.47, \beta = 0.18, t = 2.27 \]
Figure 2
Financial Deepening and Economic Development (ctd.)

(iii) 1920–1935

\[\begin{align*}
\text{CLPBI} & = 0.2 \quad \text{to} \quad 0.1 \\
\ln(\text{PBIR/N}) & = 4.5 \quad \text{to} \quad 4.8
\end{align*}\]

\[\begin{align*}
\rho & = 0.56, \beta = 0.07, t = 2.59 \\
\rho & = 0.03, \beta = 0.02, t = 0.12
\end{align*}\]

Notes: CRL/PBI = currency in the hands of the public/GDP; M3MO/GDP = (M3-M0)/GDP; PBIR/N = real GDP per capita. \(\rho\) is the correlation coefficient, \(\beta\) is the OLS slope, and \(t\) is the corresponding t-statistic.
Source: della Paolera et al. (1996).

Figure 3
Evolution of the Payments System: Check Clearing in Various Cities

Source: Baiocco (1937).
Figure 4
Bank Stock Prices, Leverage, and Bankruptcies

Note: Index numbers only. LK=overall loan-capital ratio of banks; QUIEBS = bankruptcies; QUIEBSAV = mean level of bankruptcies; COTZBANK = stock price of banks.
Source: Baiocco (1937), except QUIEBS from Revista de Economia Argentina (various issues).

Figure 5
Share of Total Loans of Banks, by Bank Type

Note: LNL=BNA, LOL=domestic, LFL= foreign.
Source: Baiocco (1937).
Figure 6  Capital of Banks, by Bank Type

Note: Paid-in capital only. KN=BNA, KO=domestic, KF= foreign.
Source: Baiocco (1937).

Figure 7  Loan-Capital Ratios of Banks, by Bank Type

Note: LKN=BNA, LKO=domestic, LKF= foreign.
Source: Baiocco (1937).
Figure 8: Impulse-Response Functions from Gold Stock to Loans By Bank Type

Response of $\ln(\text{loans})$ to a permanent -0.1 shock to $\ln(\text{gold stock})$, 0-48 months

Source: Table 5.
| C96-083 | “The United States, the ITO, and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership.” Barry Eichengreen and John Odell. October 1996. |