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Loss of Communal Sustainability: The Kibbutz Shift from High-Trust to Low-Trust Culture*

by
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Abstract

What is the connection between leaders’ morality and the output performance of organizations? Can their morality explain, through trust, continuity and change of organizational cultures? These questions are fraught with so many complexities that they can be untied only by Simon’s (1992) proposal that organizational research should be analogous to zoology where an attempt is made to understand animals by a profound investigation of their immense variation. However, in the case of humans such investigation depends also on the finding of the right vantage point for proper interpretation of the criss-cross tapestry of cultures (Geertz, 1973), which makes a very complex organization. By studying this tapestry in the case of the kibbutz system a new picture is exposed than that portrayed by customary kibbutz research approach. It enables the explanation of both how most kibbutzim remained adaptive and creative for some six decades, and why have they lost creativity almost of a sudden, recently. A preliminary idea for preventing that process, based on leaders’ continuation in office being conditional on growing trust, is herein presented.

Introduction

Trust is an alternative to coercion (Riker, 1974). Capitalist firms usually are low-trust and coercive (Fox, 1974), while kibbutzim are high-trust and democratic (Rosner, 1993). High-trust engenders effectiveness and innovation (Harvey-Jones, 1988; Semler, 1993), but “the notion of ‘trust’ is a bit slippery” (Blalock, Jr., 1989:123), and both definitions and uses of the concept differ considerably. A quite obvious case of distrust is Michels’ “Iron Law of Oligarchy” (1959 [1915]), the self-serving conservatism of continuous leaders who betray members’ trust by accumulating power, prestige and privileges, distorting or forsaking common aims and castrating democracy. A counter-example of high-trust actions were the

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refusals by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson of a third term in office, limiting the Iron Laws deleterious effects on democracy with an eight-year norm for U.S. presidents. Another solution is rotation, whereby officers must be replaced periodically (hereafter Rotation). It was used in ancient Athens, Imperial China and is still used by armies, universities, and Israel’s kibbutzim.

Kibbutzim are self-managed organizations. Loss of managerial creativity was found a main cause for failure of such organizations, as success and growth have led to imitation of capitalist society (i.e., hired labor, hierarchy, bureaucracy and stratification), declining democracy, and conservatism (Stryjan, 1989). Stryjan explains the success of kibbutzim by a federative structure, optimally combining the advantages of small units, which have remained creative (i.e., devised original solutions to problems) and shared creative solutions among themselves, and federative organizations (FOs for short), which have performed functions for which each kibbutz is too small. Some examples: 1) Tnuva economic FO (EFO), was the second largest commercial-industrial concern in Israel, with sales volume of $1.7 billion in 1994; 2) in the mid-1980s, the two main national federations (NFOs) employed some 2500 kibbutz members whose upper echelons held some 900 company cars; 3) 12 Regional Enterprise EFOs owned some 110 plants, employed some 8000 hired workers and administered by some 1200 kibbutz members, almost each one having a company car (Shapira, 1987).

Stryjan ignores FOs’ hierarchic, bureaucratic, low-trust cultures as a factor in kibbutz creativity, much as the customary kibbutz research approach (CKRA for short) has never considered FOs an integral part of kibbutzim. Hence, studies of FOs have been very rare and completely ignored by CKRA representative anthology (Krausz, 1983). However, the kibbutz is a “community affiliated to a super-organization (an FO) and is misunderstood outside this context” (Rosolio, 1993:10). Kibbutzim have carried out national missions; FOs have organized such missions, distributed rewards and dominated many other vital kibbutz interests. FO heads were powerful also as they continued in office for decades, compared to few years for Rotational kibbutz officers, many of whom were their protegés (see below). Many heads advanced further, serving another 20–30 years as Histadrut (National Labor Federation) leaders, Knesset (Parliament) members and ministers.

CKRA ignored the Iron Law in FOs, which conservatively imitated capitalist firms: Hired employees had no say in management, nor was there any gain-sharing, while kibbutz member staffers had been generously remunerated, in addition to company cars, engendering stratification, distrust and conservatism (Shapira, 1987). In the 1950s, the two heads of the Artzi NFO, already a third decade in office,

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1Thus most of my FOs data is from non-research sources in Hebrew, so only very few are cited due to space limitations. Full reference list can be obtained from the author, Kibbutz Gan Shmuel, Mobile Post Hefer 38810, Israel. E-mail: shapira.rr@gan.org.il
rejected new ideas raised by kibbutz officers for helping with the huge national
task of absorbing a million immigrants and sidetracked innovative leaders of the
new generation, while Tabenkin, the veteran leader of the Meuchad NFO supported
experiments with immigrants absorption, but rejected all new solutions to kibbutz
social problems. In 1982, his successors’ successors as heads of the Takam NFO,
used the pretext of “national missions”, as defined in the 1920s-1940s (Kanary,
1989), to justify their decisions (Rosolio, 1995). Such continuity of conservatism
was hypothesized by Hirschman’s “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” (1970): Loyalists of
conservative leaders are promoted, while radicals who voice criticism of leaders’
policies are sidetracked and exit. Eventually, loyalists have been succeeding the old
guard, continuing their policies. Alas, they implement it much worse due to lack of
critical thinking.

Kibbutzim, FOs and Sudden Decline of Creativity

Contrary to FO conservatism, a kibbutz was depicted by CKRA as “a highly
successful enterprise ... adaptive and highly creative” (Krausz, 1983:4). Moreover,
it had remained adaptive and creative long after the first generation pioneers’
idealism vanished, for instance in its industrialization in the 1960s. However, since
1986-87 kibbutzim have been troubled by a huge debt crisis, with few signs of
the creative innovation that had once distinguished them. They have preferred
more bureaucracy, hierarchy and centralism. Their industry, formerly innovative,
remained in mature sectors, rather than turning to innovative, high-tech areas. Top
kibbutz federation officials, when facing dilemmas, would avoid decisions, while in
individual kibbutzim, “a continuous process of ‘small’ decisions accumulated into
a major change” (Avrahami, 1993:87): imitation of surrounding society, using its
concepts and reinterpreting their own values accordingly. Lack of trusted leaders
was widespread; officers did not view themselves as leaders, nor did most members
see them as such, and often with good reasons. Officers turned to outside consultants,
but adoption of their solution packages, often unsuitable to unique kibbutz problems,
caused wide distrust and paralysis of organized change. 3

How then can one explain the relatively sudden reversal whereby kibbutzim have
become conservative imitators of capitalist firms? Why has the democracy they
practiced with relative success so long failed to produce leaders able and willing
to cope with their crisis innovatively, as had once been the case?

Kibbutz True Stratification and Patronage Regimes

The essence of my answer is: Iron Law conservatism of low-trust FO cultures
and Hirschman’s negative selection of radicals gradually destroyed creativity and

democracy of high-trust kibbutz cultures, causing loss of communal sustainability. CKRA ignorance of FOs caused gross misunderstanding of stratification, power processes and leadership, as well as elite careers, motivations and selection for authority positions. Thus questions of both how creativity was maintained for decades despite the conservatism of leaders, and why it has recently been lost, has been left unexplained.

I will start with the misleading CKRA depiction of stratification. Main kibbutz officers were depicted by CKRA as the highest status group of a kibbutz, while in fact since the 1930s they were junior to senior FO officials. Everyone at Ein Harod knew the status of the Meuchad NFO leader Tabenkin and his deputies Tzizling, Levi‘te and Tarshish, was higher than main officers of Ein Harod itself. In all of the four kibbutzim I studied, top status was held, for almost a lifetime, by a few founding leaders and officers who advanced to FO executive jobs and became patrons inside their own kibbutzim. Their jobs and a network of relations with other top FO officials gave them, in three out of the four cases, unequaled power, knowledge, prestige, privileges and other resources. They usually dominated inside kibbutz decision-making through patronage regimes created by helping protegés succeeding them when they advanced to FOs, creating vertical cliques with loyal clients. Cliques provided mutual aid in promotion and nomination for managerial jobs. A patron helped his clients both in the management of kibbutz affairs and later on in obtaining promotion to FOs, while the clients supported his policies and helped him return to the main kibbutz job if he wanted it and/or failed to keep his FO job, thus creating “fortified power structures” (Topel, 1979: 119). Some patrons settled into power-behind-the-scenes jobs, such as export managers of large export-driven plants, or dominated industrialized kibbutzim by Iron Law continuity as managers of plants that employed hundreds of hired workers (Kressel, 1974, 1983).

CKRA failed to identify the real stratification, since FOs, the apex of the system where power, prestige and privileges were concentrated, lay beyond its horizon. It missed the dominance of the system by FO heads who became self-serving, and a growing strata of privileged protegés. It ignored Rotations becoming a non-egalitarian practice as privileged protegés continued circulating between managerial jobs, never returning to the ranks. In fact FOs, by their thousands of positions of authority, facilitated Rotation, as members could preserve status by circulation. Without status preservation, very few would have left highly rewarding jobs at the end of a short term (Shapira, 1995a). On top of company cars, other FO benefits included pocket money, overseas travels and private telephones, when all of 2-3 telephones

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4 Methods of the study were anthropological. Observations and interviews were made during 1986 through 1992. Details can be found in a paper submitted for publication that may be obtained from the author.

5 Patron is one who has loyal clients who help his domination in exchange for personal favors.

6 It was typical. See: Leshem (1969), Fadida (1972), Topel (1979), Rayman (1981) and Dangoor (1994).
were available to all other kibbutz members, air-conditioned offices, etc. Benefits were distributed differentially, in accordance with an FO’s relative power, size and importance, as well as with an officer’s rank in its hierarchy. They were used as a main control mechanism (Shapira, 1987).

FO officers’ careers and rewards were largely dependent on loyalty to FO heads. The latter, as patrons in their own kibbutzim, used defensive tactics against successful, creative officers, foiled many of their initiatives and saw to it that they were rarely promoted to FOs. FO jobs were filled through the FOs’ old-boy network of patrons, created over decades. Rotation exacerbated Hirschman’s (1970) negative selection of radicals in promotion, guaranteeing innovative officers early removal from positions of authority they successfully filled, and sidetracking their careers. The most talented and/or ambitious usually left, while others “left inside”, turning to private concerns (Am’ad and Palgi, 1986). However, both caused a brain-drain of creative resources from the pool of managerial talent in the kibbutz system (Shapira, 1995b).

Conflicting Power Elites, Ailing Democracy and Decline

CKRA conflated continuous elites with one-term officers. It missed the decline of kibbutz democracy, as promotion to the circulative, privileged strata became a prime aim of most of the main kibbutz officers. Weak and inexperienced juniors (mostly aged 30-40), even where patronage regime was weak, usually deferred to veteran seniors, forsook the public interests to advance themselves if they could not trust powerholders would always stick to democratic rules.

In a veteran kibbutz I call Rama, established in the 1920s and numbering 650 inhabitants in 1992, main power was held by two competing, self-serving power elites. One was the Talented Elite, consisting of authors, artists, professionals and others with successful outside careers, many of whom imposed their will on weak Rotational officers. Since time immemorial they violated egalitarian norms such as company car-sharing, and the pooling of property gained on the outside or obtained as gifts, etc. Their ability to resist egalitarian decisions that clashed with their interests was the result of both high prestige, independent resources and considerable influence making them able to avoid the unpleasant consequences of norm violations. Their successful careers provided an alternative path to FO circulation. Their superiority was also exposed when in the past, kibbutz officers tried to impose an egalitarian norm on a rebellious editor employed on the outside. He resigned his formal membership, but remained a resident, because of his wife’s membership; later, six others followed suit.

Competing power at Rama was held by the Economic Elite, present and past treasurers, economic officers and plant managers, and members of the powerful Economic Committee, who circulated among EFO managerial jobs. Their power was enhanced by the dominance for decades of the entire kibbutz system by economic
elites. The Economic Elite and its followers controlled Rama’s money, economy, most promotions to FOs, and most general assembly decisions, but failed to compel norms compliance on the Talented Elite. One reason was that the morality practiced by its members was not different from that of the Talented Elite; they too were self-serving opportunists who circumvented many egalitarian norms. On the other hand, many of the Talented were highly regarded in the kibbutz due to their successful careers.

Both elites used various tactics in order to foil initiatives by young Rotational officers aimed at kibbutz problem-solving, thus creating a high degree of anarchy, leading to the mistaken impression held by both members and outsiders that Rama was “liberal”. Liberalism is associated usually with innovation, but the opposite obtained here. Like at other conservative kibbutzim, management staffing was problematic (Am’ad and Palgi, 1986). Most talented members preferred outside careers, engendering a process that fed on itself: innovation fell prey to managerial incompetence, and creative junior officers, perceived as threats by weak seniors, were sidetracked. Furthermore, rivalry between power elites made innovation especially risky, as it was anyone’s guess who would violate a decision and who would follow suit; nor was it clear whether officers’ authority would be upheld at all.

Rama was industrialized very late and did so by buying an old plant which remained technological late-comer and used hired-labor, at a time when most new kibbutz plants were innovative, capital-intensive and used self-labor. Such conservatism reigned in most other of Rama’s sectors, including consumption: car-sharing was formally adopted years after it was initiated by Kochav, a creative kibbutz (see below), but never enforced. As car-sharing and other such decisions were violated, the authority of democratic decisions was undermined, the general assembly “dried up” (Kressel, 1983:154): Only a handful of members continued to regularly attend its meeting, while most did so only when interested in topics on the agenda. Crucial topics were dealt with in brief discussions involving few members. Oft-times, interested parties would appeal a decision and reverse it by mobilizing supporters. Some of Rama’s secretaries tried to reform that system but failed, as is usually the case with short-term, inexperienced officers, who came from the ranks and had a little chance of further promotion. Weakness and aspiration of later joining the privileged circulative stratum drove them to various subterfuges: committees were not convened, or were eliminated or circumvented, and information was monopolized. It ruined their credibility, and together with a deepening economic crisis, the outcome was an exodus of young people and further decline of communal activities. The kibbutz beautiful club-house became dilapidated, while members felt helplessness, distrust

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7 Based on Cohen (1978), Rosolio (1975) and Shapira (1987).
8 Depicted also in Gelbard (1993).
and suspicion about other's morality, much like a backward southern Italian village whose officers were completely selfish (Banfield, 1958).

**Conservatism of Young Kibbutzim Totally Controlled by Patrons**

However, while Rama was backward compared to Kochav, it was not so compared to two younger kibbutzim, where even worse failures of democracy were found. In these two kibbutzim almost half of the members left since the present crisis began, while Rama lost only some ten percent of its members, and Kochav none at all. In these younger kibbutzim, some of the founding leaders became very conservative by the 1950s. In one of them, established in 1949, three such leaders became loyal supporters of conservative FO heads, got early promotion to FO jobs, and started circulating in their mid-twenties, becoming patrons themselves. More critically minded officers were not promoted, have been rotated and sidetracked, and eventually left the kibbutz, while loyalists took their place. The patronage regime was especially strong in this case (Topel, 1979), as patrons’ early promotions to FOs helped them create clientelism and supporting cliques quite early.

Patrons’ paramount power led them to emasculate democracy, to conserve what they saw as the essence of communal life: in 1959, a referendum was held over allowing children to sleep in their parents flats instead of nurseries. Sixty-two percent favored the proposed change, but since only half of the membership voted, due to the bitter antagonism of the patrons, the subject was “buried” in committees for two decades, until many veteran kibbutzim made the change. Worse than that happened with industrialization: it was approved by the general assembly in 1963 against the will of the main patron who obstructed implementation up to the late 1970s. Then the new plant failed due to his and another patron’s antagonism toward the third patron who established and managed it. Another related reason was an overarching conservatism and undemocratic control which caused brain-drain and exit of disenchanted members, rendering the kibbutz dependent on its NFO for replacements. That dependency furthered patrons’ power, being brokers of the NFO. Recurring cycles of suppressing innovation and subsequent brain-drain helped their control by promoting protegés from among newcomers. All the above did not prevent, and may even helped, the promotion of the main patron to head the largest NFO in the 1980s.

**Explaining Six Decades of Adaptive Creativity**

Creativity in early days, when kibbutzim and FOs were small, is easier to explain than its continuation since the 1950s. Rosolio (1993) claimed FOs’ paternalism caused conservatism, but ignored the extreme differences among kibbutzim, regarding both FO dependency and conservatism. To wit, sometimes conservative industrialization imitated capitalist firms with a handful of kibbutz members managing hundreds of hired workers (Kressel, 1974), while others succeeded by
R. Shul’ira

self-work, innovative products, equipment and technologies, and creative, egalitarian coping with shift-work, gender, expertise and other problems. Such kibbutzim rarely required FOs help (though they obtained rewards FOs distributed to all kibbutzim). At Kochav, a veteran kibbutz of some 1000 inhabitants, I found such creativity. Its plant was established twenty years before Rama’s. Its founders had originally been imitative, with hired labor and no Rotation. Later, though, kibbutz officers repealed both types of imitation, with backing by the general assembly, and were succeeded by radicals, whose original solutions engendered success. Kochav was also original concerning inequality caused by proliferation of FOs company cars and their private use. In 1962 it initiated car-sharing after work and on weekends; and later, most kibbutzim imitated it. FO officials resisted this egalitarian creativity, causing extreme differences between and within kibbutzim concerning the implementation of car-sharing, as was in Rama and elsewhere (Kressel, 1983).

Such differences are also explained by main officers of kibbutzim (mostly aged 30-40) being junior figures in a system largely controlled by senior FO heads. However, only at Kochav, could juniors who defied seniors and innovated against their will, be certain that seniors would always stick to democratic decisions even when their views were rejected and their privileges restricted. The high morality of seniors engendered a high-trust culture that differentiated Kochav from the rest of my cases. In all of them, grass-roots democracy raised innovators to kibbutz sector management and some of them also to main offices, but only at Kochav were radicals able to overcome, democratically, patrons’ conservatism and then have their inventions backed by patrons. In other cases, the patrons, their cliques and/or behind-the-scenes powerholders deterred or obstructed implementation, by various subterfuges.

The high morality of Kochav patrons could be explained by their secure top FO positions, which made them immune to loss of standing to successful innovative juniors, an immunity circulative patrons did not have. Other reasons were: 1) Kochav patrons’ daily involvement in the kibbutz management made them sensitive to members’ wishes. Though opposing industrialization, they helped overcome a serious crisis caused by a demand by a majority of members of Rotation and self-labor in the plant, contrary to its managers’ policy of hired-labor and continuity. It paved the way for creative solutions for the plant’s problems; 2) while in the other kibbutzim many talented members preferred other careers to management, the opposite was the case at Kochav, where officers enjoyed strong authority, since they were trusted and considered among the most talented (the two groups of officers were quite identical in education, age and sex). Grass-root democracy in sector management taught them that devotion to agreed goals would be rewarded by dedicated teamwork, which brought success (Jay, 1972:Ch. 6), and promotion to main kibbutz offices. These officers genuinely cared for the public good, rarely used
their positions for private gain, and modeled high-moral servant leadership (Graham, 1991), whose integrity and credibility were beyond doubt, so that ascending trust spirals were created (Fox, 1974). A truly democratic tradition inspired by patrons' high morality and past visionary leadership, encouraged overriding patrons' opposition to radical changes. In addition to car-sharing, self-service in the dining hall supplanted forcing members to take turns in unwanted waiters' jobs. It was imitated by all kibbutzim, while Ran, the young secretary who initiated and led implementation of both innovations, returned to the ranks and later on was chosen to minor positions, never promoted or chosen for another main job. The sidetracking of his career points to the main explanation of Kochav's lost creativity since the 1970s.

**Explaining Loss of Creativity**

Kochav's creativity led to success, and today (1998), its social and economic situation is far better than the other cases. However, its high-trust culture was not immune to the negative influence of low-trust FOs, Iron Law conservatism and Hirschman's negative selection of radicals in promotion; FOs had been the main career ladder of its officers, too. Kochav's patrons preferred loyalists for promotion to FO jobs. Negative selection of radicals was exacerbated by Rotation, since early removal from office prevented innovators from capitalizing on trust created by success for furthering creative innovation. As with Ran, creative rotational officers not promoted to FOs lost standing, their careers were sidetracked, and many eventually left. While their creativity enhanced Kochav's success, loyalists were promoted and later circulated back and forth between FOs and main kibbutz offices, up to seven times in the case of one protege of the main patron. Rotation, which applied at the end of a 2-3 year term, was strictly enforced since the crisis in the early 1960s over plant managers continuity, so that the short time horizon of officers also hampered creativity (Jaques, 1990). Furthermore, early Rotation caused early exposure of officers to the negative socializing effect of imitative FO cultures, while "meteoric" promotion in some cases further curbed effectiveness and creativity (Jay, 1972:Ch.2).

Kochav's creativity gradually stopped with the growing power of the circulative proteges lacking the morality and vision of the old-guard. Their privileged status, due to self-serving loyalty to patrons, did not model high moral commitment for kibbutz values that would inspire creativity, while the sidetracked careers of older radicals like Ran also deterred younger potential innovators. Moreover, the circulative elite foiled Ran's radicalism in the 1970s: as a department manager in the plant, he proposed a major change, which succeeded a decade later, but was rejected at the time, due to lack of formal backing by a young and novice plant manager who liked Ran's idea, but yielded to pressure by veterans, who would have lost prestige by its

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Kochav's success also carried the seeds of its own undoing. It was double the size of a "tribe", where leaders can be acquainted with everyone personally (Jay, 1972:106), and with aggregate sales volume of some $17,000,000, but without creative solutions to problems, its culture declined, becoming like surrounding low-trust cultures. For example, Kochav's creative solution to the shift-work problem involved assigning members who did not work at the factory to evening or night shift once a week, on a voluntary basis. Recently few members outside the plant volunteered for shift-work. Another innovative solution, a partnership Kochav had with another kibbutz also discontinued, as the other kibbutz established its own plant; thus a manpower shortage led to hired labor.

The other three kibbutzim had some servant leaders who in the past initiated imitation of creative solutions of kibbutzim like Kochav, but as the latter gradually stopped being creative, the former turned to imitate capitalist firms. On top of industrialization with hired labor and other imitations in production branches, so happened with consumption, such as company car-sharing which was not fully enforced, as in most of the kibbutzim. Ample other imitations of capitalist culture indicates that without creativity, sustainable communal culture ceased in the three kibbutzim.

Conclusions and Preliminary Idea for a Solution

This study substantiated a new explanation of kibbutz democracy and why it has failed to produce leaders able and willing to cope with the kibbutz crisis creatively, as in the past. Creativity was an outcome of high-trust cultures and ascending trust spirals (Fox, 1974) engendered by transformative leaders' being attuned to members' values, needs and motivations, inspiring their efforts and raising kibbutzim to higher planes of morality (Burns, 1978). High morality maintained support for democracy, even when young radicals coped with problems by original means which clashed with the old guard's views and interests, and solved problems crucial for sustaining communality. Highly trusted servant leadership (Graham, 1991) was the secret of creative kibbutz adaptability.

Stryjan (1989) requires major correction: FOs help communal prosperity while their low-trust, hierarchic cultures, Iron Law conservatism, Hirschman's principle and its exacerbation by rotation, destroy high-trust, democratic communal cultures, their creativity and sustainability. Both stratification, power processes, elites' careers, morality and their will and ability to solve problems creatively are inexplicable when dominance of the system by FOs is ignored. Moreover, with such ignorance, Rotation and democracy decline were misunderstood as officers' promotion became independent of trust in them, while short terms helped little egalitarianism due

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10 It was substantiated during earlier studies in 13 kibbutzim and by other sources.
to circulation, and loyalty to FO heads becoming the key to power, prestige and privileges. This neglect prevents exposing the mismatch created by Rotation between responsibility and power; how main powerholders obstruct creativity and cause anarchy; and the negative impact on decision-making and the brain-drain of the low level of personal involvement and lack of modeling of commitment to communal cause, by the leaders (Shapira, 1995b).

Long-range communal sustainability depends on high-moral powerholders who model servant leadership, high commitment to communal cause and moral behavior. If and when officers’ main concerns shift to private ones, communal cultures are doomed. Rotation does not differentiate servant leaders from self-serving ones. A differential succession norm must be devised which would foster trust by differential continuity, dependent upon periodic trust tests, analogous to the second term vote for US presidents. However, as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson well knew, leading to their refusal of a third term, re-election after eight years of incumbency is quite probable, even if considerable distrust prevails. On the other hand, an officer’s effectiveness and creativity may continue much longer, as kibbutz founders and many other leaders proved. A solution may be the making of special, higher trust tests a criterion for allowing such leaders to remain beyond three 4-year terms, and a still higher one a criterion to permit very few to continue for a fourth term. However, as prestige tends toward exponential growth (Goode, 1978), a test of exponentially growing trust for these terms seems desirable. If, for instance, a third term would require a 2/3 majority, a fourth term will require 89 percent majority, and this will create a built-in mechanism for preventing percent further continuity, as a 119 percent majority is impossible.

The other major question is: whose trust must a leader gain in order to continue in office? In a large industrialized commune, many positions of authority are highly specialized, so that vote of trust by all members, many of whom lack minimal knowledge for judging experts, may not be the right way to keep a high-trust, innovative culture. Thus, members who are knowledgeable as workers or others directly involved in the sector or function the continuation of whose head is under consideration, must have extra voting power in the decision. Another possibility is a voting body which includes both those involved in the sector and others who are directly connected to it as main stake-holders.

More complex, but more important, is the question of FO succession. In “Union Democracy”, Lipset et al. (1956) suggested that in large, multi-unit organizations, only bi-partisan politics prevent the Iron Law. The idea raised above may do that without bi-partisanism, which seems inappropriate, as it does not prevent oligarchies within parties. Kibbutzim succeeded without partisan politics, but NFOs oligarchization points to the need for a powerful, independent, continuous legislature, instead of the present governing councils, most of whose members are main kibbutz
officers dependent on FO heads for furthering their careers. Such a legislature may be the right body for succession decisions if, and only if, most legislators are not such officers, but directly elected by ballot, representatives of kibbutzim who continue under a growing trust clause.\textsuperscript{11}

The above ideas are of course preliminary. Other high-trust, democratic cultures like the federative Mondragon (Whyte and Whyte, 1988) and Semco (Semler, 1993) point toward other alternatives and call for research, which would further reveal the complex dynamics of trust in communes and their federations aimed at overcoming the Iron Law and Hirschman's principle.

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\textsuperscript{11}To prevent their own oligarchization, as Latin American senators and congressmen (Mainwaring, 1990).


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