Market-Based Instruments for the Optimal Control of Invasive Insect Species: B. Tabaci in Arizona

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Invasive insect species represent perhaps one of the most significant potential sources of economic risk to U.S. agricultural production. Private control of invasive insect species is likely to be insufficient due to negative externality and weaker-link public good problems. In this study, we compare a system of Pigouvian taxes with tradable permits for invasive species control. While the emissions control literature shows that taxes are preferred to permits under cost uncertainty, invasive-species control involves correlated cost and benefit uncertainty. Hence, we expect a quantity-based system to be preferred. Monte Carlo simulations of optimal steady-state outcomes confirm our expectations.

Key Words: externalities, invasive species, optimal control, permits, spatial-temporal model, taxes

Introduction

Invasive insect species represent a significant economic risk to both the financial viability of agricultural producers and the sustainability of U.S. agriculture more generally. With the rapid growth of international trade in agricultural commodities of all types, agricultural systems in the United States are under constant threat from new species thriving in environments lacking natural predators. Pimentel, Zuniga, and Morrison (2005) claim that insects alone are responsible for losses amounting to 13% of total U.S. crop production, valued at $33 billion.1 According to these authors, 40% of all insects can be regarded as invasive. Therefore, including the indirect costs associated with control, the total damage attributable to invasive insect species in the United States is $13.5 billion in 2001 dollars.

In the absence of alternative institutional mechanisms, private market incentives to control invasive species are likely to be insufficient from a social perspective for two reasons: (a) control provides a positive externality to others (or a lack of control confers a negative externality), and (b) pest-free environments are public goods (Knowler and Barbier, 2005; Burnett, 2006). First, if one grower does not control his or her insects, others will experience higher control costs. The fact that these external costs are not reflected in the grower’s decision...
regarding the level of suppression means each grower will invest in too little pest management. Second, invasive species control is a weaker-link public good in that a grower is likely to appropriate some of the pest-reduction benefits from controlling insects on his or her own land, but will not achieve ideal control if neighboring growers do not control as well (Cornes, 1993). In this study, therefore, we investigate two market-based institutional mechanisms for invasive species control: a system of taxes on insect population numbers, and a marketable permit system that allows each grower only a certain amount of infestation.2

Invasive species management programs involving direct government control are neither practical, desirable, nor efficient (Costanza and Perrings, 1990; Cornwell and Costanza, 1994). Fortunately, a number of market-based options have proven workable. First, as Knowler and Barbier (2005) argue, a system of Pigouvian taxes may achieve the optimal balance between controlling damage from an invasive species and encouraging the diversity benefits that follow from importing non-native species. Yet, taxes are still regulatory in nature, as they require a taxation authority to design, administer, and enforce their payment. Costanza and Perrings (1990) and Cornwell and Costanza (1994) offer a system of performance bonds providing for financial penalties if environmental goals are not met. Shogren, Herriges, and Govindasamy (1993), however, point out that bonds suffer from a number of practical limitations, such as moral hazard, liquidity problems, and legality. Horan and Lupi (2005), on the other hand, describe a system of tradable “risk permits” written on the probability that any ship entering the Great Lakes is likely to import a species which may ultimately become invasive. Unfortunately, they conclude the first-best system of permits will not work because the cost of ensuring that ships are clean is too heterogeneous.

In this study, we consider two of these options: a tax on adult insects measured at a certain point in time on each farm, or a permit system that provides for overwhelming penalties if the allowed population is breached. Growers, however, will be able to trade permits such that those with lower control costs can sell permits to other growers with relatively high control costs.

There is a large literature that compares the efficiency of taxes and permits as alternative means of externality control in the context of carbon pollution and greenhouse gas (GHG) accumulation. It is well accepted that, under certainty, taxes and permits produce the same outcome in terms of emission control (Baumol and Oates, 1988), but under uncertain control costs, Weitzman (1974) finds taxes are preferred when the marginal social benefit of controlling emissions is relatively flat and the marginal cost of abatement steep. In contrast, a quantity-based system of controls, such as a permit-based system, is preferable if the marginal social benefit curve is steep and marginal control costs relatively constant.

Importantly, uncertainty regarding marginal benefits is irrelevant to the choice of instrument. Other researchers extend this logic to the case of stock externality where regulation takes place in a dynamic environment (e.g., Hoel and Karp, 2001, 2002; Pizer, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003; Karp and Zhang, 2005). These studies confirm the Weitzman (1974) intuition in analytical models of quadratic abatement cost and multiplicative uncertainty and, moreover, conclude that a price-based policy (taxes) is preferred over permits in a welfare-metric sense. In a static framework, Stavins (1996) reports that correlated cost and benefit uncertainty reverses this result, leading to a preference for a quantity-based system under

2 Accurate on-farm monitoring is clearly important in implementing either the tax or the permit policy. However, sweep-monitoring such as that used to gather data for this study and pheromone traps are both highly accurate sampling methods, not subject to strategic manipulation by growers, and are well understood by insect management practitioners (Naranjo et al., 1998).
realistic parameter assumptions. Here, we extend Stavins’ logic to the case of spatial-temporal uncertainty and also show that the Weitzman result is reversed. In this case, a quantity-based system of regulation is preferred to a price-based system. This outcome is fortuitous from a regulatory perspective, because a permit system is likely to be both politically and administratively easier to implement than a system of taxes.

The objective of this study is to investigate whether taxes or permits are preferred for controlling spatial-temporal externalities that arise in the management of invasive insect species. We apply our model to a specific insect—Bemisia tabaci, or whitefly, in Arizona. Welfare outcomes are compared under scenarios of only privately-optimal insect control, private control with taxes, and private control with permits relative to a socially-optimal benchmark. We compare steady-state solutions and social welfare under both certainty and uncertainty to determine whether the insights of Weitzman (1974), Stavins (1996), Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002), and Newell and Pizer (2003) hold in a model of spatial-temporal insect movement and dispersion.

**Background on Whitefly: Q-Biotype B. tabaci**

We focus on one of the most notorious invasive insect species in Arizona, the whitefly (Q-biotype Bemisia tabaci). While the B-biotype B. tabaci is arguably not invasive, having been identified as a significant economic pest at least since 1981 (Oliveira, Henneberry, and Anderson, 2001), the Q-biotype was discovered in a commercial greenhouse in Tucson in 2005 (Dennehy et al., 2006).

Q-biotype B. tabaci is particularly troublesome due to its resistance to a number of insecticides that have proven effective in controlling B-biotype. B. tabaci, in general, is a uniquely harmful insect to cotton and nursery crops. First, B. tabaci is polyphagous, meaning it feeds on many types of food, so is able to move from host to host as cropping cycles evolve (Watson et al., 1992; Oliveira, Henneberry, and Anderson, 2001). Second, the whitefly has proven to be remarkably adaptable to poor host plant conditions through natural selection over only a few generations (Basu, 1995) and travels rapidly from host to host, often over considerable distances through commercial transportation or weather patterns (Ellsworth and Martinez-Carrillo, 2001). Third, it is an important vector for a range of viruses known to be the source of several common diseases in tomatoes, beans, cassava, and—most critical to Arizona—cotton and lettuce (Watson et al., 1992; Oliveira, Henneberry, and Anderson, 2001). Fourth, Dittrich et al. (1990) document the ability of B. tabaci to develop resistance to common insecticides and to increase egg-laying rates when under stress from insecticides. Finally, the destructive nature of B. tabaci can mean the elimination of entire cropping systems once infestation occurs. Finding an effective and efficient means of control is therefore an economic imperative for Arizona agriculture.

**Economic Model of Whitefly Control**

Invasive species control is inherently spatial-temporal because two forms of externality are involved: (a) a dynamic externality that arises as a result of population growth over time, and (b) a spatial externality resulting from migration. Unlike the case of pollution control, invasive species cause damage both to farms that serve as hosts and to the more general growing community. The externality arises when insects migrate from one farm to the next, and this migration causes population growth to accelerate. Therefore, a level of control
considered to be optimal from a private perspective is not likely to be optimal from the perspective of the community as a whole. As in the fisheries model of Smith, Sanchirico, and Wilen (2009), “adding up” must hold—i.e., the sum of all out-migrations from all locations must, by definition, be equal to the sum of all in-migrations. Growers responsible for out-migrations therefore impose an externality on those who experience net in-migration, so the former should bear the cost in a first-best, socially-optimal outcome. This is the essence of the community-based management programs described by Ellsworth and Martinez-Carrillo (2001), but with incentives provided by economic means and not through a sense of altruism and community responsibility.

We assume there is one firm located at each location \( s \) in a grid structure in which distances between firms are measured from centroid to centroid.\(^3\) From the firm’s perspective, the optimization problem is written as:

\[
V^f = \max_{x_{st}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left[ (p_t - c_{st})y(b_{st}) - k(b_{st}, x_{st}) \right] dt, \quad \forall s \in \Theta,
\]

where \( V^f \) is the present value of the firm, \( \delta \) is the discount rate, \( p_t \) is output price, \( c_{st} \) is marginal cost of production, \( y \) is yield, \( b_{st} \) is insect population at location \( s \) and time \( t \), \( x_{st} \) is level of control, and \( k \) is the control cost function. Control costs are convex in the population level and control such that: \( k_b > 0 \), \( k_x > 0 \), \( k_{bb} > 0 \), \( k_{xx} > 0 \), and \( k_{bx} < 0 \). Equation (1) is solved subject to the equation of motion for \( b_{st} \), which is given below.

**Solving the Planner’s Problem**

The planner’s problem, on the other hand, is to maximize the value of production across all locations, net of control and social damage costs, \( V^m \), by choosing control activity levels at each point in space and continuously over time according to:

\[
V^m = \max_{x_{st}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left[ (p_t - c_{st})y(b_{st}) - D\left(ND_s(b_{1t}, b_{2t}, \ldots, b_{nt})\right) - k(b_{st}, x_{st}) \right] dt,
\]

where \( D \) is a “social damage function” that reflects the damage inflicted on others’ crops from net dispersion (\( ND_s \)) from location \( s \) to all other locations (Smith, Sanchirico, and Wilen, 2009). For simplicity, we assume the industry is comprised of \( n \) identical firms so we can aggregate the solution to (1) to compare directly to the socially-optimal solution. Both the firms and the regulator are assumed to take output and input prices as parametric. All firms are located at different points in a discrete space transcribed by the set of grid points \( \Theta \).

Entomologists recognize that invasions of new pest populations tend to follow a three-phase process: \((a)\) arrival, \((b)\) establishment, and \((c)\) spread (Hof, 1998; Liebhold et al., 1995). Therefore, equation (1) is solved subject to spatial-temporal equations of motion that govern \( B. tabaci \) growth and dispersion within the sample data set.

The equation of motion for insects at each point (on one farm) is relatively simple. Insect numbers grow as a function of the existing population, less removals due to control activities:

\[3\] Clearly, this assumption is necessary to make the problem analytically tractable, but ignores border issues, nearest-neighbor effects, and the likelihood that insects are distributed more continuously over the relevant geography than a grid structure would imply.
where the specific form of the growth function, $g_s(b_{st})$, is specified below. The planner, however, must also take into account the spatial externalities associated with movement from one location to the next. The random nature of the spatial-temporal diffusion of $B. tabaci$ is described using a general diffusion model, wherein the rate of population growth at a point consists of an autonomous growth component, migration from other locations, and planned removals through control activities. The rate of diffusion, in turn, depends on the population at the point, its distance from an initial point, and the rate of diffusion. The general form of the state equation is therefore written as:

\[
\frac{\partial b_{st}}{\partial t} = g_s(b_{st}) - x_{st},
\]

where $G$ is the diffusion coefficient governing the rate of spatial movement. Equation (4) is Fisher’s reaction-diffusion equation in general, continuous notation. In our application of this model, we approximate the diffusion process in (4) using a discrete-time analog.

Consistent with the discrete nature of the space described in (2), we follow Sanchirico and Wilen (2005) by assuming that whitefly make discrete movements from one location to the next, on the assumption that each grower is located at one point on the spatial grid defined by the set $\theta$. The change in population from one period to the next at each point in space therefore consists of autonomous growth, net dispersal (in-migration less out-migration), and insect removals:

\[
\frac{\partial b_{st}}{\partial t} = g_s(b_{st}) + G \frac{\partial b_{st}}{\partial s} - x_{st} = g_s(b_{st}) + G \frac{\partial^2 b_{st}}{\partial s^2} - x_{st},
\]

where $ND$ is the net dispersal function. In Fisher’s equation, growth is governed by a relationship that depends on the current population and the population relative to carrying capacity:

\[
g_s(b_{st}) = r_s b_{st}(1 - b_{st} / K_s),
\]

where $r_s$ is the intrinsic growth rate and $K_s$ is the carrying capacity of location $s$. Next, we approximate the net dispersal function with an additive function which accounts for all in-migration and out-migration such that:

\[
ND_s(b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_s) = \sum_{j=1}^{s} d_{js} b_j,
\]

where the $d_{js}$ are coefficients representing the movement from location $j$ to location $s$ as a share of the total population (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2005). Depending on time since introduction and location in space, in-migration can be either positive or negative.

We then follow Hof and Bevers (2000) and calculate each of the $d_{js}$ elements using Fick’s law. Others combine Fick’s law with an exponential growth component to arrive at a continuous-time dispersion and growth model (Skellam, 1951; Liebhold et al., 1995; Hof, 1998; Burnett, Kaiser, and Roumasset, 2007; Richards et al., 2008). However, exponential population growth is not realistic on one plot of land. Therefore, the dispersal coefficients are calculated using:
for an initial point in space and time \( (s_0, t_0) \) and an estimated diffusion rate \( (G) \) for each discrete location during each time period. According to Fick’s law, the spread of an invasive insect from a starting point \( s_0 \) is normally distributed with a dispersion rate given by \( G \). Because the rate of dispersion is host-dependent among polyphagous insects, we model the ability of \( B. \) tabaci to transition between cotton seasons on hosts other than cotton by allowing \( G \) to depend on the host \( h \), where the variable \( h \) is a qualitative indicator that essentially allows the rate of dispersion to vary with the attributes of each location: \( G(h) \) (Smith, Sanchirico, and Wilen, 2009). Further, the impact of varying crop location relative to a source of infestation is modeled through the variable \( q \), which is a continuous measure of the distance of a population at point \( s \) from one at \( s_0 \).

Including the control activity, the equation of motion then becomes:

\[
\frac{\partial b_{st}}{\partial t} = b_{st}^* = r b_{st} \left( 1 - b_{st} / K_s \right) + \sum_{j} d_{js} b_{jt} - x_{st}
\]

for each location \( s \) and time \( t \).

We first solve the problem from a planner’s perspective. Recall, by defining the problem such that each discrete location in space is a “farm,” the planner’s problem internalizes all of the spatial externalities implied by insect movement from one location to the next. Although highly stylized, this solution captures the nature of the externality we wish to describe and control. We first solve the problem under certainty, assuming net dispersal amounts are known with certainty, and then move to a stochastic solution in which movement is determined by random draws within the Fisher equation structure. We solve the planner’s problem by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle to the objective function above, on the assumption that each location represents a different, but connected, subproblem. Specifically, the optimal population and control policy will depend on the growers’ location in space.

The Hamiltonian for the planner’s problem at each location, \( s \), is written as:

\[
H(x_{st}, b_{st}, \lambda_{st}; \theta) = (p_t - c_{st}) y(b_{st}) - D(ND) - k(b_{st}, x_{st})
+ \lambda_{st} \left( g_{st}(b_{st}) + ND - x_{st} \right),
\]

in general notation where the arguments of the net dispersion function have been suppressed for clarity, where \( \lambda_{st} \) is the costate variable associated with the insect population at each location \( s \) and time period \( t \). Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition with respect to the choice of insect control is given by:

\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial x_{st}} = -k_{st} - \lambda_{st} = 0.
\]

The costate equation created by optimizing with respect to the state variable is denoted by:

\[
\lambda_{st}^* - \delta \lambda_{st} = \frac{-\partial H}{\partial b_{st}} = - \left( (p_t - c_{st}) y_b - \sum_j D'(ND_b) - k_b + \lambda_{st} (g_b + ND_b) \right).
\]
where $D'$ is the incremental external damage associated with the movement of one insect from location $s$ to locations $j$. Subscripts indicate partial differentiation at each location $s$ and time period $t$. Finally, the spatial-temporal constraint on insect growth at each location is written as:

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial \lambda} = g(b_{st}) + ND(b_{st}) - x_{st},$$

in addition to the usual transversality and nonnegativity constraints. These first-order conditions imply the current value of any increment to future insect populations at each location must be equal to the marginal cost of reducing the population by one insect and the marginal social damage inflicted on the rest of the growing community associated with migration from location $s$.

For purposes of this paper, we are interested only in the characteristics of the steady-state solution and the welfare implications of the implied long-run industry equilibrium. The optimal steady-state solution for the number of whitefly at location $s$ is expressed as:

$$b^*_s = \left(\frac{K_s}{r_s}\right) \left( x_s - \sum_{j \neq s} d_{sj} b_j - d_{ss} - 1 \right).$$

The optimal solution for the amount of whitefly control at each location is given by:

$$x^*_s = \left(1/k_{sb}\right) \left( (p-c_s) y_b - \sum_j D'(ND_b) - k_b + k_s g_b + ND_b + \delta + k_{sb} (g + ND) \right),$$

where the $x$ and $b$ subscripts refer to partial differentiation with respect to insect control and population levels, respectively. Solving for the steady-state value of the costate variable gives:

$$\lambda^*_s = \left(1/\delta\right) \left( (p-c_s) y_b - k_b - \sum_j D'(ND_b) j - k_s (g_b + ND_b + \delta) - \sum_{j \neq s} k_s d_{js} \right),$$

which is interpreted as the marginal value of one more unit of control or of reducing the insect population at one point in space by one individual.

These three sets of equations (3S equations) are solved simultaneously for the optimal whitefly population ($b_s$), management policy ($x_s$), and value of the costate variable ($\lambda_s$) in the steady state. Because we include net dispersals in this solution, however, it describes the socially-optimal solution and not the one expected to be generated by the private market. Again, assuming there is one grower located at each point $s$ on the grid, he or she will not take into account the externality associated with insect movement to other locations.

Solving the Firm’s Problem

Clearly, the solutions to the firm’s and the planner’s problems above differ in that the former does not take into account the externality created by the spatial migration of insects from one property to the next. Each grower only controls insects until the marginal value of damage inflicted on his or her own crops is equal to the marginal cost of control, including future growth on the grower’s own land. However, other growers are negatively impacted to the extent that some of the population growth native to a grower’s own fields ultimately migrates to others’ fields according to the net dispersal function. Grower-specific taxes on external
damage caused by this migration can provide sufficient incentives for an optimal amount of control, as can a direct limit on insect population managed through a system of marketable permits. In this case, the permit price in equilibrium will be equal to the optimal Pigouvian tax levied on insect numbers above an allowable threshold. In the simplest case, the equivalency of taxes and permits shown by Baumol and Oates (1988) and others holds exactly.

However, this is no longer the case when pollution reduction costs are uncertain and benefit uncertainty is irrelevant (see Weitzman, 1974; Roberts and Spence, 1976; Adar and Griffin, 1976; Yohe, 1977). Moreover, under uncertainty, which policy is preferred depends on the relative slopes of the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost curves. If the slope of the marginal social benefit function is relatively flat or if the slope of the marginal-abatement cost function is relatively steep, then price-based policies will be preferred. If the opposite is true, then permit, or quantity-based, policies will be more effective and efficient. The intuition is straightforward. If the benefit function is relatively flat, then errors in estimating the marginal cost function will cause only small deviations from the optimal solution when a policy that fixes the marginal social damage level is used. On the other hand, if permits fix the amount of effluent and the realization of the cost function is far different from that expected when the policy was put in place, then the deviation in the resulting marginal social damage will be large.

More recent research extends this reasoning to a dynamic context. These studies show there are many reasons why taxes and permits are not equivalent in the control of stock externalities (Requate, 1998; Hoel and Karp, 2001, 2002; Karp and Zhang, 2005; Newell and Pizer, 2003; and others). It is well understood that in the case of stock externalities, taxes and permits will not be equivalent.4 Intuitively, this is because taxes generally do not change over time, while permit prices can vary as the cost of abatement changes. Further, Stavins (1996) shows that correlated uncertainty between benefits and costs creates a preference for quantity-based regulation in a static environment.

It is our hypothesis that a similar variance outcome arises when the externality is spatial and taxes (the first-best solution) are levied on a grower-by-grower basis. In this case, taxes are assumed to be location-specific and fixed in a spatial sense. This fixes the marginal social damage for each location. In a permit system, however, the allowable insect count is fixed for each location and permit prices are allowed to vary, thus allowing the marginal social damage to depend on production and infestation conditions at each location. Permits will be traded within each period to remove any arbitrage possibilities and thus equate the marginal social damage across locations. Consequently, permit trading results in a more efficient outcome for the community as a whole and, we expect, greater social welfare relative to a system of taxation.

We first compare the socially-optimal solution above to the privately-optimal solution with a system of taxes. Because the externality arises as a result of net dispersions from each farm, we modify the social problem such that the social damage function is no longer part of the objective function. The optimal solution under a location-specific (first-best) tax regime is found by including a tax on net dispersals ($ND_s$) in the objective function introduced above. With this change, we write the current-value Hamiltonian as:

\[ H(x_{st}, b_{st}, \lambda_{st}; \theta) = (p_t - c_{st}) y(b_{st}) - k(b_{st}, x_{st}) + \tau_{st} ND_s + \lambda_{st} (g_{st} + ND_s - x_{st}), \]

\[ (17) \quad H(x_{st}, b_{st}, \lambda_{st}; \theta) = (p_t - c_{st}) y(b_{st}) - k(b_{st}, x_{st}) + \tau_{st} ND_s + \lambda_{st} (g_{st} + ND_s - x_{st}), \]

\[ \]

4 For example, pollution accumulates over time whereby emissions during each time period add to the stock of pollution, and it is the stock of pollution that causes the damage.
where \( \tau_{st} \) is the Pigouvian tax for location \( s \) at time \( t \). The first-order conditions are modified to include the new costate equation:

\[
\lambda_{st}^* - \delta \lambda_{st} = -\frac{\partial H}{\partial b_{st}} = -\left[ (p_t - c_{st})y_b - k_b - \tau_{st} ND_b + \lambda_{st}(g_{b} + ND_b) \right].
\]

Using the costate equation to solve for the steady-state control level by a private firm facing tax rate \( \tau_{st} \) becomes:

\[
x_{st}^* = (1/k_{xb}) \left( (p_t - c_{st})y_b - k_b - \tau_{st} ND_b + k_s(g_{b} + ND_b + \delta) + k_{xb}(g_{st} + ND_{st}) \right),
\]

again simplifying notation. Analogous changes to the optimal steady-state for insect population numbers and costate values are obvious and therefore not reported here. Comparing the socially-optimal solution to the solution with tax, the optimal tax is simply \( \tau_{st} = k_{xb} \) in the first-best solution, as the marginal damage of an insect that moves from one location to the next is the marginal cost of controlling that insect once it arrives at its destination.

Next, we compare the solution with taxes to a requirement that places a quantitative restriction on the number of whitefly at each location and allows growers to trade permits. In this case, growers can either control insects that would migrate from their farm to the next, or they could buy permits to allow more insects to remain on their land. Assuming the location-specific limit on insects is given by \( ND_{st} \), the Hamiltonian above is replaced by:

\[
H(x_{st}, b_{st}, \lambda_{st}, \pi_{st}, \theta) = (p_t - c_{st})y(b_{st}) - k(b_{st}, x_{st}) + \lambda_{st}(g_{st} + ND_{st} - x_{st}) + \pi_{st}(ND_{st} - ND_{st}),
\]

where \( \pi_{st} \) is the multiplier associated with insect restriction or the marginal value of obtaining one more license for whitefly. Solving this problem for the optimal amount of whitefly control, the costate equation now includes:

\[
\lambda_{st}^* - \delta \lambda_{st} = -\frac{\partial H}{\partial b_{st}} = -\left[ (p_t - c_{st})y_b - k_b + \pi_{st}(g_{b} + ND_b) - \pi_{st} ND_b \right].
\]

The steady-state solution for the control variable now becomes:

\[
x_{st}^* = (1/k_{xb}) \left( (p_t - c_{st})y_b - k_b - \pi_{st} ND_b + k_s(g_{b} + ND_b + \delta) + k_{xb}(g_{st} + ND_{st}) \right).
\]

The equivalence between taxes and permits is apparent from comparing (22) and (19) and noting that \( \pi_{st} = \tau_{s} \) in equilibrium.

Despite these equivalent results, it is unclear whether the similarity of the steady-state solutions means they provide the same welfare results when we explicitly account for the uncertainty inherent in the spatial-temporal movement of insects, and the correlation between the uncertainty in the cost of control in the benefits. Newell and Pizer (2003) and Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002) conclude uncertainty in stock regulation is introduced through the cost of control. This is reasonable in the case of effluent regulation, as the amount of production is under managerial control, and managers are presumably aware of the relationship between output and effluent from their plant. Uncertainty is attributed to regulators’ imperfect knowledge regarding this relationship and is thus understandable.
In the invasive species case, however, the nature of the externality is fundamentally different. Specifically, both the benefit and cost of control depend on the biology of insect movement, so both are inherently uncertain and, because both are largely driven by weather events, likely to be correlated. First, the arrival time of an invasive insect is never known with certainty. Typically, this type of a priori uncertainty is modeled using a hazard function approach in which the probability of arrival increases the longer the particular area has been insect free. Second, once arrival occurs, movement involves both dynamic and spatial uncertainty. The diffusion model developed above captures this uncertainty directly and implicitly as the insect population at any given location is known only up to the normal probability distribution that characterizes the Fisher equation. Third, conditions leading to favorable yields are also conducive to insect growth. Therefore, both the benefits of controlling insects and the costs of doing so rise in high-yield years.

Consequently, while the uncertainty in Weitzman (1974), Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002), Karp and Zhang (2005), and Newell and Pizer (2003) derives from the cost of pollution abatement, the uncertainty in the current model comes from both the cost of control and the movement of insects from one location to the next. As long as insects arrive and move according to biological growth processes, problems of invasive species management will always be subject to a significant amount of uncertainty, affecting both the benefit and the cost of regulation. Moreover, because the impact of population uncertainty on both the cost and benefit sides is likely to be correlated, Stavins’ (1996) analysis applies to the invasive species problem in a spatial-temporal, rather than static, context. For this reason, we consider the welfare effects of taxes and permits when whitefly dispersion is subject to correlated uncertainty, conditional on their having already arrived.

Because of the complexity of our solution, a closed-form solution under uncertainty is not available. Therefore, we follow the common empirical approach in this literature and assume linear-additive uncertainty in both costs and benefits of control (Stavins, 1996). We then create a welfare differential metric similar to Weitzman (1974) and Newell and Pizer (2003) and simulate expected values using numerical Monte Carlo techniques. Essentially, their “net benefit” measure compares the present value of the economic surplus generated from a first-best, socially-optimal solution to that resulting from the regulated outcome under a location-specific tax regime and a location-specific system of tradable permits. The net benefit comparison in the current application is given by:

$$\Delta_{st} = E[NB_{st,\text{tax}}] - E[NB_{st,\text{permit}}],$$

where $E[\cdot]$ is the expectation operator, taken over the assumed distribution of uncertainty governing net dispersion.

In comparing welfare outcomes, we assume the output market is perfectly competitive, so all welfare effects are captured by producer’s surplus. In this regard, the benefit function in each regime is given by the objective function described above—the maximum total surplus to society over the cost of producing cotton and controlling whitefly spread. Once optimal values for $x$ and $b$ are found, we substitute back into the specifications for optimal firm ($V^f$) and social value ($V^m$) in equations (1) and (2), respectively, to find the maximum welfare associated with the social solution, and each of the regulated firm solutions.

5 Weather is also the most common source of benefit/cost correlation described by Stavins (1996).
6 Whereas Kim et al. (2006) consider the probability of arrival as another source of uncertainty, adding this to the uncertainty of dispersion is beyond the scope of the current research and is a fruitful topic for future research in this area. Further, another source of uncertainty is not likely to change our conclusions in a qualitative way.
Empirical Model of Whitefly Diffusion and Optimal Control

We use experimental *B. tabaci* data from field insecticide trials conducted by Agricultural Research Service (ARS) researchers in Brawley, CA, to estimate the diffusion equation (Naranjo, Chu, and Henneberry, 1996; Naranjo et al., 1998). These data represent two 13-week years of insect counts, yield measurement, and whitefly control experimentation (for a detailed description see Richards et al., 2009). Table 1 summarizes these data. Because the grid cells in the experimental plot were adjacent to each other in a 5×5 design, insects had the opportunity to move from cell to cell and interact with insects in other locations as if each grid location was an individual farm. To simplify the spatial-dynamic model, we estimate the diffusion process for all 25 cells but use the dispersion parameters from only the upper-left nine cells of the entire matrix. Although simplified, the estimation and optimization procedure is still very complex, as the 3×3 structure consists of 81 distinct interaction parameters that must be estimated.

With these data and the objective of finding optimal control solutions across a set of geographically-contiguous locations, we parameterize each component of the optimal control model described above. The data are pooled from each spatial location, *s*, over all 13 weeks and both years, and the equation of motion is estimated using a location-fixed effects procedure. Because observed control activities are endogenous, we estimate the constraint equation using an instrumental variables procedure (2SLS) where the set of instruments includes the time of year, weather, and lagged endogenous variables. The control variable, however, does not measure removals directly, but is a count variable that indicates the number of applications of a particular insecticide. Therefore, in the econometric model, we estimate the apparent amount of control as a function of the number of insecticide applications, interactions between applications and population levels, cooling degree days (CDD), rainfall, and a binary variable for the year 1994. Further, we define the change in insect population in discrete terms as the current population less the population observed last period.

To obtain estimates of the growth parameter from Fisher’s equation, we first need estimates of the dispersion coefficients that define the amount of population growth due to immigration less out-migration. Accordingly, the constraint equation is estimated using a two-step procedure—first estimating the dispersion coefficients using Fick’s law and nonlinear least squares and then, using the estimates of *d*ₗ, estimating the growth parameter, the location fixed effects, and parameters of the control function in a second stage. More formally, the estimation equation is given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
    b_{s,t} - b_{s,t-1} &= r_s b_{s,t} \left(1 - \frac{b_{s,t}}{K_s}\right) + \sum_{j=1}^{s} d_{sj} b_{j,t} - x_{s,t},
\end{align*}
\]

where the *d*ₗ are estimated using Fick’s law as:

\[
\ln(b_{s,0}) = \ln(b_{s_0,0}) - \frac{(1/G) q^2}{4r} - \ln\left(2 \sqrt{\pi Gt}\right),
\]

and the only parameter to be estimated is the rate of diffusion, *G*, from location *j* at distance *q*. In these data, dispersion declines in distance from the origin. However, the difference in dispersion between populations located near to and far from the origin declines with time as insects are able to reach the farther distances. Control costs are determined by the marginal effect of control activities on insect numbers; thus, the elements of *k(*) are estimated through equation (25) from the control function described above. Damage estimates are obtained
using the econometric model described in Richards et al. (2009). Because population density is measured on a per plant basis and the objective function is in terms of dollars per hectare, estimating the damage model in this way ensures the marginal value of an additional insect is measured in the appropriate units.

We then use the parameters estimated from (25) and (26) to populate the spatial-temporal optimal control model (all parameter definitions are summarized in Table 2). Because insect movements are inherently random, the nine equations in nine unknowns are solved using Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 draws from a standard normal distribution. Our primary interest lies in characterizing the steady-state solutions, so we calculate the solution for each location and compare welfare results by summing over all nine grid locations.

**Results and Discussion**

In temporal econometric models, the nature of time is well understood. However, in spatial models, or spatial-temporal models, it is important to understand the specific context of space under study. Table 3 provides a description of the grid structure of the experimental farm-community used in this study in terms of the distances between each cell. Table 4 focuses on the nine grid locations that form the basis of the optimization model and shows the dispersion rates, normalized across each row, between each pair of locations. From this table, it should be clear how the dimension of the problem expands with the complexity of the geography involved. These dispersion rates are calculated using the parametric estimates shown in Table 5.
Table 2. Parameters Required for Whitefly Simulation Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. State variable: $b_{st}$</td>
<td>no./leaf</td>
<td>Endogenous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Control variable: $x_{st}$</td>
<td>no./leaf</td>
<td>Endogenous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Costate variable: $\lambda_{st}$</td>
<td>$$/insect</td>
<td>Endogenous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. $K_s$ = carrying capacity</td>
<td>no./leaf</td>
<td>Estimate from ARS data</td>
<td>241.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. $r_s$ = growth rate</td>
<td>no./leaf</td>
<td>Estimate from ARS data</td>
<td>0.0823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. $d_{st}$ = dispersal</td>
<td>no./leaf</td>
<td>Estimate from ARS data</td>
<td>[see below]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. $p_s$ = cotton price</td>
<td>$$/kg</td>
<td>Arizona Agricultural Statistics</td>
<td>$1.32/kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. $c_{st}$ = marginal cost</td>
<td>$$/kg</td>
<td>Univ. of Arizona Farm Budgets</td>
<td>$0.70/kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. $y_s$ = marginal damage</td>
<td>kg/ha</td>
<td>Estimate from ARS data</td>
<td>4.656 kg/ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. $k(b_{st}, x_{st})$ = control cost</td>
<td>$$/ha</td>
<td>Estimate from ARS data</td>
<td>$37.37 + 0.101 b - 1.73 + 0.101 x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. $\delta$ = discount rate</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Federal Reserve</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The marginal damage estimate is taken from Richards et al. (2009). Infestation intensity is commonly measured using sampling methods on a per leaf basis. The control cost function is estimated in yield units (kg/ha) and multiplied by the assumed grower margin.

Table 3. Distances Between Cells of Experimental Plot, in Index Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cell Column Address</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The estimates in table 5, in turn, result from estimating Fisher’s equation and Fick’s law under the assumptions described above. Although we estimate this model using a location-fixed-effects procedure, we do not show the location effects here as there are a number of parameters in the full model.7

Control costs are inferred from the control function estimated as part of equation (25). As shown by the results in table 5, the control function is quadratic in the number of insecticide applications, and the marginal effectiveness of control increases in the insect population, both as expected. Further, insect numbers fall with the number of cooling-degree days (warmer temperatures reduce population levels), but are unaffected by either rainfall or the yearly fixed effect. Using the assumption that marginal cost must equal marginal value in equilibrium, marginal control costs are calculated by multiplying the marginal product of control by the

---

7 Because of the large number of cells in this and any real-world application of this procedure, it was necessary to assume the movement parameters are constant across locations. This assumption could easily be relaxed with more detailed agronomic data on the conditions prevailing at each location.
Table 4. Normalized Dispersion Rates After Imposing Adding-up Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Row, Col.)</th>
<th>(1, 1)</th>
<th>(1, 2)</th>
<th>(1, 3)</th>
<th>(2, 1)</th>
<th>(2, 2)</th>
<th>(2, 3)</th>
<th>(3, 1)</th>
<th>(3, 2)</th>
<th>(3, 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1, 1)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.444</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>1.444</td>
<td>1.169</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1, 2)</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1, 3)</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>−0.174</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 1)</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 3)</td>
<td>−0.123</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>−0.123</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 1)</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>−0.174</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 2)</td>
<td>−0.123</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>−0.123</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
<td>−0.634</td>
<td>−0.240</td>
<td>−0.083</td>
<td>−0.240</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>−0.083</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Own-dispersion is not defined in this model. The nine cells represented here are drawn from a larger 25 × 25 matrix of dispersion rates throughout the entire sample plot.

Table 5. Estimates of Whitefly Diffusion Model: Fisher’s Equation/Fick’s Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>t-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Diffusion Rate</td>
<td>166.281*</td>
<td>9.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood Function</td>
<td></td>
<td>−2,134.553</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>t-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>Growth Rate</td>
<td>0.087*</td>
<td>6.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b₁</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>13.347*</td>
<td>3.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b₂q₂</td>
<td>Population*Distance</td>
<td>−0.664</td>
<td>−0.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x₂</td>
<td>Control Level</td>
<td>2.239</td>
<td>1.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b₁x₂</td>
<td>Population*Control</td>
<td>0.211*</td>
<td>11.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x₁₀)²</td>
<td>Control²</td>
<td>−0.673*</td>
<td>−2.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Cooling Degree Days</td>
<td>−0.305*</td>
<td>−4.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rain</td>
<td>Rainfall</td>
<td>44.975</td>
<td>1.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D94</td>
<td>1994 Binary</td>
<td>1.759</td>
<td>1.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood Function</td>
<td></td>
<td>−4,031.347</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Estimates in this table are obtained with the ARS experimental data using a two-stage procedure. Plot-specific effects in the growth model are available from the authors upon request.

per insect impact on gross margins (marginal yield multiplied by per pound price-cost margin, table 1). With the objective function and equations of motion thus parameterized, we then solve both the socially- and privately-optimal problems using Monte Carlo simulation.

Table 6 shows the optimal steady-state control and whitefly population values for each location in the socially-optimal solution relative to the privately-optimal result. In each case, the difference between the privately- and socially-optimal solutions is considerable; on average, the privately-optimal control amount is 24.02% larger than the socially-optimal amount and the population level 54.41% greater. Moreover, recall that the metric for infestation levels
Table 6. Steady-State Solution to Spatial-Temporal Control Problem: Socially- versus Privately-Optimal Control and Population Levels, Baseline Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location (Row, Col.)</th>
<th>Socially Optimal</th>
<th>Privately Optimal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control Level</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1, 1)</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>6.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1, 2)</td>
<td>3.876</td>
<td>6.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1, 3)</td>
<td>3.420</td>
<td>5.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 1)</td>
<td>3.875</td>
<td>6.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
<td>3.694</td>
<td>6.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 3)</td>
<td>3.045</td>
<td>5.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 1)</td>
<td>3.381</td>
<td>5.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 2)</td>
<td>3.042</td>
<td>5.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>4.247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objective Function

- Socially Optimal: $69,674.391
- Privately Optimal: $64,321.862

Notes: Solutions are means of Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 draws from normal distribution under base-case parameter assumptions. Optimal population and control levels are measured in adult insects per leaf.

is number of adults per leaf; hence, aggregated to an entire field, these values imply large absolute numbers of insects. Further, the difference in objective function values implied by these differences is significant in an economic sense—the socially-optimal solution generates 8.32% more surplus than the privately-optimal solution. However, relative to the number of adults in the sample data, both the privately- and socially-optimal results show considerably lower infestation levels, suggesting the market fails in some other important way that the model is not capturing. With these benchmark results, it remains to be seen which policy tool is able to restore the socially-optimal result in the most efficient way.

To show the effect of using either policy tool on whitefly control strategies, we first consider the certainty case, where the policy maker is omniscient and is able to know exactly the amount of net dispersion from each cell to the others. In either case, however, it is a simple matter to design an optimal policy that restores the first-best result, so this solution is of little interest. Yet, under uncertainty, each of these tools is expected to generate different control solutions and different levels of aggregate welfare. These differences are of interest to policy makers and are reported in table 7. Based on 1,000 random draws for each dispersion coefficient, the expected present value cotton production is fully 45.8% higher under a quantity-based permit system relative to a price-based tax system. Further, a simple t-test of the difference in mean values between the two easily rejects the null hypothesis of equality at a 5% level. Clearly, therefore, permits are preferred in this case. This result, however, supports Stavins’ (1996) conclusions and is exactly the opposite to the findings reported by Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002), Newell and Pizer (2003), and Karp and Zhang (2005). In designing stock-externality control programs, policy makers need to understand the source of uncertainty—whether it derives from the demand side or the supply side and the correlation between the two—as much as they need to know that uncertainty matters.

As in any policy-design problem, policy makers also need to know the parameters governing the slopes of the marginal social benefit and cost curves, because welfare calculations are critically dependent upon them. In table 8, we show the effect of varying the slope of the marginal damage (marginal benefit) and marginal cost functions. In the upper panel, causing
Table 7. Comparison of Welfare Under Taxes versus Permits: Baseline Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$V_0$</th>
<th>$\sigma_V$</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>$t$-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>688.330</td>
<td>110.960</td>
<td>387.920</td>
<td>958.750</td>
<td>−40.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits</td>
<td>1,003.700</td>
<td>201.780</td>
<td>608.440</td>
<td>1,399.400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Solutions are means of Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 draws from normal distribution under base-case parameter assumptions.*

Table 8. Comparative Statics: Effect of Marginal Damage/Marginal Cost Variation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$y_0$</th>
<th>$V_0$</th>
<th>$\sigma_V$</th>
<th>Taxes</th>
<th>$V_0$</th>
<th>$\sigma_V$</th>
<th>Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.500</td>
<td>527.060</td>
<td>55.640</td>
<td>1,532.200</td>
<td>533.420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.500</td>
<td>634.580</td>
<td>71.420</td>
<td>1,533.600</td>
<td>531.170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.656</td>
<td>742.380</td>
<td>89.451</td>
<td>1,524.900</td>
<td>478.570</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.500</td>
<td>809.530</td>
<td>102.530</td>
<td>1,510.700</td>
<td>440.180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.500</td>
<td>876.010</td>
<td>118.060</td>
<td>1,483.800</td>
<td>396.410</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$k_x$</th>
<th>$V_0$</th>
<th>$\sigma_V$</th>
<th>Taxes</th>
<th>$V_0$</th>
<th>$\sigma_V$</th>
<th>Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>533.000</td>
<td>71.672</td>
<td>913.490</td>
<td>280.580</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>636.200</td>
<td>79.920</td>
<td>1,151.300</td>
<td>358.270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>742.380</td>
<td>89.451</td>
<td>1,524.900</td>
<td>478.570</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>855.170</td>
<td>96.269</td>
<td>2,016.300</td>
<td>639.640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>982.360</td>
<td>100.940</td>
<td>2,697.700</td>
<td>865.820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: Solutions are means of Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 draws from normal distribution. Base-case parameter assumptions appear in italics.*

the slope of the damage function to rise from $2.50 per insect to $6.50 per insect causes the optimal value of cotton production, net of damage costs, to rise by 66.2% under a system of taxes and to fall by 1.5% under a system of permits. Thus, steeper marginal social benefits favor taxes, not permits. On the other hand, causing the slope of the marginal control-cost function to rise from $0.05 per insect to $0.15 per insect—a range that brackets the estimated value—causes the net benefit to rise by 84.3% under taxes and 195.3% under permits. Therefore, steeper marginal costs favor a system of permits relative to taxes. Both of these results are, again, opposite to those found in the greenhouse-gas (GHG) regulation literature.

This raises the obvious question: Which scenario is likely to prevail? Unlike the GHG literature, where the difference in social value between taxes and permits was found to be an order of magnitude different, the values in this case are sufficiently close, and sufficiently sensitive to variation in the key parameters, that extreme variation in one curve or the other could reverse our conclusions. However, in the case at hand, and in the neighborhood of infestation levels that growers will realistically allow to occur, an additional insect is not likely to increase the amount of damage over what has already occurred. On the other hand, Q-biotype whitefly promise to be sufficiently difficult to kill that the incremental cost—perhaps an additional treatment per season—could be substantial.
Conclusions and Implications

Should it be allowed to spread, the Q-biotype whitefly promises to be one of the most important invasive insect species to agriculture in the U.S. Southwest. Government control efforts are unlikely to be forthcoming. Hence, this study investigates preferred institutional arrangements for addressing externality issues that prevent a system of private control from being fully efficient. Similar policy tools proposed for the control of GHG emissions find that a price-based system (taxes) is preferred to a quantity-based system (permits), but these findings are based on the assumption that regulators are uncertain about the slope of the cost-of-control function and that the benefits of control are irrelevant. If uncertainty arises on both sides of the equation, however, regulator preferences are likely to change to a quantity-based system of regulation. In the invasive species case, uncertainty is endemic to both the benefit and cost sides, since the growth and diffusion of insects from one farm to another are driven by biological processes.

We construct a spatial-temporal model of optimal insect control to investigate which policy tool is preferred. Using realistic parameter assumptions, a system of permits is found to be preferred to a system of taxes. This result contradicts the conclusions reported in the GHG literature. Moreover, we show that a steeper marginal social damage function favors the use of taxes, while a steeper control-cost function favors permits. Again, this result is opposite to previous results that assume only cost-based uncertainty. Based on the evidence provided by negotiations on climate change legislation in the United States, this outcome is fortunate for insect regulators because permit-based systems of control are evidently more politically acceptable than tax-based systems.

Our findings are likely to generalize beyond the invasive species case. In the GHG regulation literature, uncertainty is assumed to lie on the cost side because it is highly plausible that regulators will not know the state of technology faced by polluters. However, given the unsettled science on this issue, uncertainty in the GHG case could just as easily come from mis-estimates of marginal social damage as well. Similar debates will arise in other forms of externality regulation, from water pollution to SO2 control, and even to the case of whether to force citizens to immunize themselves against influenza in the case of a threatened pandemic.

As in the climate-change regulation case, there are many institutional details that would need to be resolved. Because the taxes and/or permits in our model are location-specific, the data-gathering effort required to implement any regulatory system would be difficult and costly. Nonetheless, most growers monitor insect infestations through either pheromone trap or sweep technologies, so the burden of an additional requirement may be small. Advanced monitoring technology, which would surely arise in the face of increased regulation, would likely reduce the cost of more intensive on-farm insect monitoring practices.

Concerning the technology issue, future research in this area is necessary to investigate the relative incentives to develop innovative insect-control technologies if either a system of taxes or permits is put in place. Does a system of permits favor either chemical or biological control? Would growers instead have incentives to develop better management technologies in order to conserve permits? Are the assumptions put forward by Requate (1998) in answering these questions for the emissions case similarly critical to the invasive species example? Each of these questions offers a potential avenue for future research.

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References


