Unlocking water markets: an experimental approach

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Introduction

Water markets - the lease and sale of water rights between willing buyers and willing sellers - have long interested economists. They have the potential to increase the efficiency of water use by moving water from lower-valued to higher-valued uses and increasing the incentive for irrigation efficiency. Despite the enthusiasm of economists, water markets have largely generally failed to develop in the western U.S., and indeed in most of the world (Young 1986, Brewer et al. 2008, Donohew 2009).

There are a number of possible explanations, including legal uncertainty surrounding water rights and fear of discovery, high transaction costs, potential third-party effects, and opposition from irrigation districts. We explore one of the reasons that we feel has received less attention in the economics and policy literature: farmers as sellers may have preferences for different elements of a water market transaction that are not captured in the relative comparison of their profits from farming and their profits from agreeing to a deal.

Objectives

What elements of the institutional context of a water market trade (specifically a 1-year lease) are most important to senior water rights holders? Do irrigators (as sellers) prefer: (a) to lease to other irrigators over environmental or municipal buyers? (b) to lease their water rights for only part of the growing season (split season leases)? (c) to lease through a non-profit water bank or a state-run bank?

If so, what compensating differentials (premia) might the irrigators demand for different leasing scenarios?

Finally, do experiments using student participants, the typical participants in existing water market experiments, give comparable results? We focus only on the irrigator results in this poster.

Methods

We recruited 49 irrigators with senior water rights in the upper Yakima River Basin in Washington state to participate in a series of experimental auctions. These auctions asked participants to imagine that they owned and operated a 100-acre, sunny farm with a given level of net revenue (i.e. an induced value design). Participants then reacted to series of offers for 1-year leases from hypothetical buyers where several attributes of the lease varied across tasks (Figure 2). We randomly chose one of the ~20 choices and paid participants on the earnings of their hypothetical farm in that round. We replicated the experiment with 38 UW undergraduates, though with lower cash payments.

Results

We analyze the data using a random parameters logit (RPL) approach. We specify the following model, where $V_i$ is the indirect utility of rejecting a lease offer and continuing to farm and $V_j$ is the indirect utility of accepting the lease:

$V_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_i + \epsilon_i$

$V_j = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1X_j + \epsilon_j$

where $X_i$ and $X_j$ are the vector of lease characteristics and $\epsilon_i$ and $\epsilon_j$ are the error terms. We find that non-monetary attributes are important to participants. Sellers prefer to lease to another irrigation district rather than the Dept of Ecology, or (especially) a developer. They are also more likely to accept a lease if they are currently farming, and more likely to accept if they are younger, have water market experience, or have higher levels of education.

Conclusions

Using a sample of potential water market participants, we find that several non-price attributes of a water market contract matter, and that the irrigators demand a different premium, depending on the water contract offered.

Agriculture-to-agriculture water transfers occurring in the later part of the growing season appear to have the highest potential for success. These results could be embedded in an hydroeconomic model of possible water market activity for the Basin.

Bibliography


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