Foreign labour in agricultural sectors of some EU countries

Siudek, Tomasz; Zawojska, Aldona
Warsaw University of Life Sciences – SGGW, 166, Nowoursynowska Str., 02-787 Warsaw, Poland

* Correspondence: tomasz_siudek@sggw.pl


Copyright 2016 by Authors. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.
Foreign labour in agricultural sectors of some EU countries

Siudek, Tomasz¹*; Zawojska, Aldona²

1. Warsaw University of Life Sciences – SGGW, 166, Nowoursynowska Str., 02-787 Warsaw, Poland, tomasz_siudek@sgw.pl (Corresponding author)*
2. Warsaw University of Life Sciences – SGGW, 166, Nowoursynowska Str., 02-787 Warsaw, Poland, aldana_zawojska@sggw.pl

Abstract:
The majority of studies on rural migration in the EU have tended to focus rather on the scale and implications of exodus from rural societies than on rural areas as receivers of migrants, especially foreign ones. This research examines the foreign employment in the agricultural sectors of the selected countries as well as ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors of foreign labour supply. It presents both positive and negative views on the process of rising inflow of foreign workers into rural areas that leads or can lead to reshaping the rural job markets, economies and communities. The theoretical background lies in economic, social and integrated theories and concepts of migration (political economy of migration, dual labour market theory, network theories, human capital models, relative deprivation theory etc.). The study is mainly devoted to migrant agricultural workers from Poland (being the largest source of post-accession migrants) in the UK (being second, after Germany, the most popular migrant destination for Polish-born citizens).

Key words: agriculture, rural areas, labour market, foreign workers, migration

1. Introduction
In several EU member states, especially those more developed (the UK as an example) agricultural sector has become increasingly reliant upon low wage foreign labour. The large presence of foreign workers has sparked political and academic debate in host countries about economic and social consequences of foreign labour influx. It seems, however, that the ‘foreign worker problem’ in rural areas, and specifically in agriculture, is different than that facing urban areas and non-agricultural industries.

Our goal is to summarize the evolving ideas and findings on labour mobility/migration intra- and to the EU with focus on migration to rural areas for jobs in agriculture. We wish to point out that much of the recent research on labour migration is associated with the migration from rural to urban areas and from the developing to the developed economies. The latter may be
explained by the wage differentials, unemployment compensation programs and other government policies and programmes in the developed countries. Much less is about migration from outside the country to its rural areas.

The study aims to examine the recent experience, in selected EU states, with inflow and hiring foreign labour migrants in rural areas – mainly in agriculture. The special focus is on Poland as both destination and sending country, but examples from other countries are also cited where relevant.

We will investigate the following questions:

1) Can agriculture of western EU countries exist without foreign labour (workforce)?
2) What are farm employers’ reasons for hiring foreign nationals?
3) Do foreign farm workers feel welcome on the farms and in local communities?
4) Do host rural areas in general benefit from foreign labour inflow?
5) Does the CAP address the issue of rural job market support by promoting/encouraging fair employment of foreign workers?
6) What questions arise for policy makers and researchers in the light of migration implications for the rural labour market and economies in host (destination) countries?
7) What would be the impact of a Brexit on UK’ employment of farm workers originating from the EU countries and its agriculture?

The article consists of five parts. Following this introduction, the second part presents the theoretical background for the study of labour migration. The third part explains methodology and data collection. The fourth part presents findings. The fifth part consists of conclusions and suggestions for policy and further studies.

2. Theoretical Framework

Labour migration/mobility\(^1\) relates to individuals whose general purpose in moving is to sell their work capacity in the receiving areas. The UN Migrant Workers’ Convention\(^2\) (1990, Article 2.1) defines a migrant worker as “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”, irrespective of his/her migratory legal status.

There is no single universal, overall encompassing theory which could satisfactorily explain nature of labour migration, its reasons and consequences. Migration (including international

\(^1\) The terms ‘migration’ and ‘mobility’ are used interchangeably in this paper. In the EU policy context, mobility refers to movements within the EU, while migration – to movements between EU and non-EU countries.

\(^2\) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990.
one) is often viewed as a multi-dimensional process that requires interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach to its study. Economics, demography, sociology, political science, law, health studies, geography, anthropology and public administration are the major disciplines involved in the migration research. Table 1 summarizes the selected theories and concepts which have developed throughout the history of ideas about migration.

Table 1. The ideas about migration – the literature review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributors</th>
<th>Assumptions/arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The mercantilist school</td>
<td>People considered the nation’s most important economic resource. It opposed emigration from the home country on the grounds that it would weaken the national economy. Maintaining a large domestic working population is best for economic prosperity. The state should ease immigration laws. The markets (e.g. regional wage differentials) that each profession depends on are important reason for migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Child (1668 [1751], pp. 146-147)</td>
<td>Emigration to colonial countries “is certainly a damage, except the employment of those people abroad, do cause the employment of so many more at home in their mother kingdoms, and that can never be, except the trade be restrained to their mother kingdoms.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith (1776, Ch. X)</td>
<td>Support for free circulation of labour both from employment to employment and from place to place. Differences in labour supply and demand as well as wage differentials in different regions are the main factors stimulating migration. Poverty and wish of every person to provide for himself and his family are also strong motives for migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricardo (1817)</td>
<td>The international mobility of goods under assumption that both capital and labour do not move internationally. Capital and workers would stay put in their home countries (with perfect domestic mobility).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malthus (1798)</td>
<td>Emigration (especially in the form of colonization) would strengthen home economy by opening new markets for its products and bringing relief from overpopulation and unemployment burden. Export of population and capital may counteract the tendency of profits to fall to minimum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mill (1848)</td>
<td>The inhabitants of the country immediately surrounding a town of rapid growth flock into it; the gaps thus left in the rural population are filled up by migrants from more remote districts. Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce or industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of Migration</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoclassical economics</td>
<td>Hicks (1932, p. 76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New economics of labour migration</td>
<td>Piore (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual (segmented) labour market theory.</td>
<td>Gordon (1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative deprivation theory</td>
<td>Stark and Taylor (1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capital models</td>
<td>Schultz (1961; 1978) Becker (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of (migrant) networks</td>
<td>Portes (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The theory of cumulative causation</td>
<td>Myrdal (1957) Massey (1998)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structuralist approaches</th>
<th>Wood (1982)</th>
<th>Migration as the outcome of institutional, economic, social and political forces both in sending and receiving countries. It is a macro-social rather than an individual process, determined historically (with an important role played by colonialism) and structurally (by the global economy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structuration theory</td>
<td>Goss and Lindquist (1995)</td>
<td>Migration has been traditionally determined by the interrelated individual and historic-structural forces which are interacting with national and international institutions being able to connect potential employers and labour migrants in the entire world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility transition hypothesis</td>
<td>Zelinsky (1971, p. 221)</td>
<td>A dramatic expansion of people mobility was brought by modernisation. ‘There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Healthy migrant’ hypothesis</td>
<td>Marmot et al. (1984) Rumbaut and Weeks (1996)</td>
<td>The positive selection of migrants with respect to health. The healthiest individuals are most likely to migrate. They enjoy a health status that is superior to those who stay behind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Unhealthy remigration’ hypothesis (Salmon bias)</td>
<td>Abraido-Lanza et al. (1999)</td>
<td>Unhealthy migrants or migrants who experience deteriorating health have a greater tendency to return than healthier migrants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own research based on literature selected in the table and Portes and Walton (2013).

The motives that drive individuals’ decisions to move internally or externally generally seem to be the same today as they were over 130 years ago when Ernst G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889) revealed migration patterns called the ‘laws of migration’. Having recognized various motives for migration, he posited that employment and wage opportunities were its major determinants. This is summed up by him in the following statements:

“In most instances it will be found that they did so in search of work of a more remunerative or attractive kind than that afforded by the places of their birth.” (1885, p. 181).

“It does not admit of doubt that the call for labour in our centres of industry and commerce is the prime cause of those currents of migration. (...) If, therefore, we speak perhaps somewhat presumptuously of “laws of migration,” we can only refer to the mode in which the deficiency of hands in one part of the country is supplied from other parts where population is redundant.” (Ravenstein, 1885, p. 198).
The reason why people move is determined by factors of attraction or repulsion (pull and push factors). Potential migrants for job purposes analyze the ‘pull factors’ of attractive qualities in a specific destination and ‘push factors’ of deteriorating or negative conditions in the place of origin (Gmelch, 1980, p. 140). This concept rests on neoclassical economics, namely individual cost-benefit analysis. Neoclassical approach views migration as a response to local/regional/national labour market disequilibrium.

Economic migration theories generally regard labour migration as the result of rational decision making. Conventional economic theories of migration from poor to rich countries (or regions) are based on the movements of workers in response to differences in wages (or incomes) and work availability (see for example the economic Nobel Prize laureate Sir John Hicks’ point of view, Table 1). One of their implications is that the economic development of both the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving country (region) matters. However, according to Becker (1962, p. 24), “Earnings may differ greatly among firms, industries, and countries and yet there may be relatively little worker mobility”. This can be due to the irrationality of workers or formidable obstacles in moving they face, but also due to perfectly rational behaviour of those of them who possess training specific to firms, industries or country (e.g. lawyers, physicians).

Theories and concepts from the other social sciences do not generally rely on single-causal explanation. They underline the interdependence of the various migration determinants. Integrative approaches (e.g. structuration theory), on the other hand, interrelate individual motives and interests with historical and structural determinants as well as with institutional factors. Except for economic, social, institutional, political and historical factors migration and re-migration decisions can be also affected by an individual health status. Unhealthy remigration hypothesis or selective return migration, for example, suggests that foreign migrants who face health problems are less capable of achieving high productivity in destination labour markets, what could result in reduction of their earnings and standard of living, and finally lead to making the decision on returning or moving closer to home.

3. Methodology and Data

The study uses desk research and descriptive methods. In particular, the paper draws on studying academic literature, scholarly discussions of labour migration, public statistics (UK Home Office, Central Statistical Office of Poland – GUS, National Bank of Poland, DEFRA, Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy of Poland, etc.), content analysis of newspaper and magazine articles and official reports on foreign migrant workforce.
The research employs the topoi analysis based on the contents of a set of articles published in the English-language and Polish-language scientific papers and newspapers. Topoi analysis seeks to identify distinct discursive models or schemes of argumentation and thoughts embedded in a given text. Greek word ‘topos’ is that which justifies a line of argument, but requires less justification itself because it represents common-sense reasoning that relates to a body of collective knowledge that is shared among groups and communities (Burroughs, 2012). A topos is also more strongly tied to concepts than to words constituting salient part of argumentation. The topoi are often assumed rather than mentioned explicitly in a text.

Although the research is mainly devoted to migrant agricultural workers from Poland (the country being the largest source of post-accession migrants) in the UK (the state being second, after Germany, the most popular migrant destination for Polish-born citizens), it is not limited to those instances.

4. Results

In 2004, when the eight Central Eastern European (CEE) states (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) joined the European Union, only three EU states (the UK, Ireland and Sweden) permitted citizens of new members unrestricted access to their labour markets. Although the UK, Ireland, and to a lesser degree Sweden were initially the preferred destination states for CEE, including Polish, labour migrants, the other countries (e.g. Netherlands, Germany) also received them in relatively large numbers (Engbersen et al., 2013, Snell et al., 2015). Labour-intensive regional economies of Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) have also been fuelled by migrants arriving from new member states, although a rapid increase in migrant employment in agriculture and rural regions of those countries began at the end of the previous century (Kasimis, 2005).

Post-accession labour migration flows were partly a continuation of migration paths that had already been established before 2004 (Garapich 2008) but also involved substantial new migrant groups who did not follow in the footsteps of earlier labour migrants (Engbersen et. al, 2013). In the UK rural agribusiness, for instance, labour migration channels for the CEE citizens have evolved from labour providers who sourced workers directly from CEE countries and supplied them to the UK employers, to providers and employers engaging with migrants locally in the UK through their informal social networks, i.e. through family/friend networks of people who were already living in the UK (Findlay and McCollum, 2013, p. 16).
Migrants from the CEE, irrespective of their education level and previous work experience, often work in the destination countries in low-skilled occupations, and on a temporary – usually seasonal basis (Glorius et al., 2013).

One million migrants employed in low-skilled work in the UK in 2013 have come to this state within the previous ten years. Half of these came from CEE, following the EU enlargements (in 2004 and 2007). Over 300 thousand arrived from Poland contributing to around 1/6 of all migrant workers in low-skilled employment and almost 1/3 of those who arrived since 2004. Even so, by 2013 migrants from CEE accounted for little more than a quarter of all foreign born workers in low-skilled occupations (MAC, 2014, p. 31). Many immigrants who work in low-skill occupations come to the UK with high qualification levels (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015, p. 3-4). The Wales Rural Observatory (WRO) research on Polish migrant workers in rural Wales found that around half of the surveyed Poles held jobs that did not match their qualifications or training, and around half of these had tried unsuccessfully to find more appropriate employment (Woods, 2011).

In the Netherlands, 75 per cent of the Polish respondents (N=167) who were surveyed by Snell et al. (during 2009-2011) worked in semi-skilled or unskilled manual or agricultural jobs. An average earned net wage for Polish agricultural workers in the Netherlands was about 1300 EUR per month (Snell et al., 2015, p. 525-528), i.e. almost twice higher than an average monthly wage in Polish national economy at that time.

Also in Poland, migrants from Eastern Partnership countries (mostly from Ukraine) are mainly employed in low-skilled occupations in sectors like agriculture, construction and domestic services (Kahanec et al., 2013). Although accurate figures for foreign migrant labour in Polish agriculture are not captured, it is estimated that the sector employs about 600 thousand of Ukrainian citizens (Saulski, 2016).

According to the research of the National Bank of Poland conducted in 2016 on the sample of 710 Ukrainian citizens working in Mazovia region, the most of them were employed in

---

3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
4 According to the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy of Poland, the share of Ukrainian citizens in the total number of issued work permits and recorded declarations (without the obligation to have work permit) in the first half of 2016 was about 77% and 98% respectively (MRPiPS, 2016). Ukrainians are generally employed on the basis of relatively short work permits (for the period of 3 to 12 months). Among the employers’ declarations about the intent to employ a foreigner (for a period up to 6 months within consecutive 12 months), the biggest fraction concerns the employment in agriculture. The numbers about issued work permits and employment declarations should be treated with caution, as they may not reflect an actual employment size; according to suggestions by Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, foreigners use them primarily to obtain entry to the Schengen area (Wójcik, 2016).
households (37.6%), construction and repair services (23.6%), as well as in agriculture (19.3%). On average, a third of their monthly wage is spent on living in Poland, while the rest is saved or sent back to their home countries. The remittance outflows from Poland (funds sent by foreign workers to recipient economies abroad, mostly to their countries of origin) continue to grow over last years, mainly due to an increase in the number of short-term labour migrants. Just in the second quarter of 2016, about PLN 2.5 billion (EUR 0.52 billion) were transferred abroad, of which PLN 2.2 billion by short-term foreign workers, predominantly Ukrainians (88%) but also citizens of Belorussia, Moldavia and Russia (NBP, 2016, p. 17).

A key feature of the CEE post-accession migration on the UK labour markets is a greater orientation towards rural areas (‘rural bias’) than in previous migrations (Chappell et al. 2009, Stenning and Dawley, 2009; Woods, 2016). According to Chappell and co-authors, the most commonly reasons for working and living in the countryside, reported by the interviewed Polish migrants, was the requirement by an employment agency to work in rural areas as well as willingness to be near friends and family. Harris et al. (2015, p. 210) suggest that relatively large presence of Polish migrants in the UK rural (or peripheral) areas could be due to their concentration in low-skilled occupations5 (e.g. in agricultural and food processing temporary/seasonal jobs). Additionally, an awareness of well-established Polish community (population from the post-war era), which offers a sense of stability and familiarity when migrating to a new country, make some rural areas (e.g. in the West Midlands, the South East) desirable locations for new migrants. By contrast, the research of the WRO shows that contemporary Polish migrants in rural Wales have little contact with a previous generation of Poles who settled in the region after the Second World War.

According to the DEFRA (the UK Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), the number of seasonal and temporary workers engaged in the agricultural sector in 2013 was 67 thousand. The Home Office reports that a third of those employed in seasonal farm work in 2013 were Bulgarian and Romanian nationals6. Under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), closed in 2014, more than 22 thousand people from Bulgaria and Romania

---

5 For skilled agricultural traders (farmers and gardeners), the ratio of immigrants to UK’ natives was 0.042 in 2004-2006, and 0.044 in 2012-2014, while for agriculture managers – 0.165 and 0.202, respectively (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015, p. 42).

6 Since 2008 to the end of 2013, among CEE EU nationals only Romanians and Bulgarians could have been recruited through the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) in the UK. Citizens from Romania and Bulgaria did not have the right to freely access the UK labour market (restrictions were lifted on 1st January 2014) and were limited to working in agriculture, and on a temporary basis only (for up to six months at a time). Nationals of 8 CEE countries had been free to, and aspired to, work in other parts of the British labour market.
were allowed in to work temporarily on farms. Seasonal agricultural workers with work permits are generally from Eastern Europe (formerly Ukraine and Poland, and currently Bulgaria and Romania), while those informally employed are generally citizens of Pakistan, Russia and the UK (Bayraktar et al., 2016, p. 38).

The Guardian (Carrington, 2016) reports that about 90% of British fruit, vegetables and salads are picked, graded and packed by 60-70 thousand workers from overseas, mostly from Eastern Europe. According to Ruz and Stevens (2016), around 60 thousand foreign workers, mainly from Eastern Europe, come to UK farms every summer. A good fruit and vegetable pickers may be earning GBP 8-15 per hour (Morris, 2016).

In England, Wales and Scotland, agricultural workers, including foreign ones, must be paid at least the national minimum wage7 (in October 2016 – GBP 7.20 per hour for workers aged at least 25 years) (GOV.UK, 2016; The Scottish Government, 2016). To compare, in Poland a minimum statutory wage with effect from 1 January 2017 (introduced for the first time on hourly basis) was set at PLN 13, i.e. about GBP 2.55 or EUR 2.94 (Ustawa..., 2016). In Ukraine, the legally wage rate for simple, unqualified labour (corresponding with the minimum wage) since 1 December 2016 is at UAH 9.29 (EUR 0.33 or GBP 0.28).8

The numbers suggest that official wage differentials between Poland and other EU countries may be seen as an important push and pull factors for the labour migration decisions9. Many studies show however, that agriculture in the EU is one of the sectors having considerable large shadow economy with an undeclared work10 (Woolfson, 2007; Schneider, 2014), thus official economy wage rates can differ from (be generally higher than) their level in shadow economy. To give an example, the Central Statistical Office (2015, p. 20) reports that agriculture and horticulture are the most frequent working activities in the Polish informal economy – almost every fourth (22%) those employed in the ‘black market’ in 2014 were engaged in agriculture and gardening related jobs.

7 Workes employed in England before the changes in rules (1 October 2013) have the right to the Agricultural Minimum Wage if it says so in their contract, which ranges from GBP 4.67 to GBP 14.10 per hour depending on worker’s grade).
8 Ukrainian Government reports that in draft state budget for 2017 they decided to double the minimum wage for Ukrainians (to UAH 19.34) from 1 January 2017.
9 For example, Bayraktar et al. (2016) stress that earning income is not the sole pull factor of migrant seasonal agricultural labour the UK. Other drivers behind migrants’ decisions include learning opportunities about modern agricultural techniques and British culture. Also availability of affordable housing, which can be a particular problem in rural areas is recognized as an important determinant of labour supply for the food processing and agriculture (Ruhs and Anderson, 2012).
10 Work which is undeclared to the government by employers and workers in order to avoid paying taxes and social contributions, compliance with certain legal labour market standards (e.g. mandatory minimum wage, security standards) and documents.
The informal recruitment in agriculture is common with regard to migrants. Some foreigners may be more likely than nationals to enter informal market because of their weaker position in the formal economy or, eventually, due to relatively larger net wages than in the registered economy. Some employers, in turn, may seek illegal labour migrants in order to fill in their vacancies quickly and cheaply and minimise labour costs. According to the Amnesty International (2012), irregular migration status increases the risk of labour exploitation.

Agriculture of the EU countries, in general, and western countries particularly, is one of the main recipients of undocumented foreign national migrant workforce. The special role in its supply is played by gangmasters – labour providers who contract, recruit and organize groups of people to performing work, traditionally on farms and in food industry. In the UK in recent years, gangmasters have recruited flexible labour from the poorest rural areas of the former Soviet bloc. At present, they recruit Latvian, Lithuanian and Russian migrant workers who are desperate enough to tolerate low pay and long working hours (Laurence, 2016). In Italy, according to Osservatorio Placido Rizzotto (2014), roughly 400 thousand workers, of which 80% are foreigners, are susceptible to being employed through illegal intermediation.

People trafficking, health and safety violations, financial exploitation, housing abuses, lack of holiday and/or sick pay, daily dismissals and other violation of workers and human rights are endemic in the gangmaster system (Pollard, 2012; Strauss, 2013). The EU agri-food sector reports worrying cases of exploitation, unsafe working and squalid living conditions not only of illegal migrants but also those with their legal status (see for example Wasley, 2011; Osservatorio, 2014; Austin, 2016; Due..., 2016).

In Italy, for example, 400 thousand farm workers are exploited by gangmasters in fields for an average pay of EUR 2.5 per hour (EFFAT, 2016). About 100 thousand of workers, mainly foreign national ones, experience severe exploitation and are forced to live in unsanitary and derelict buildings and makeshift shelters without running water, electricity or heating (Amnesty International, 2012; Osservatorio, 2014). Also in Poland, as media reports, Ukrainian farm workers are exploited and cheated by employers (IAR, 2016).

As we present in the next part of this chapter, there are several responses to questions concerning foreign agricultural labour posed in the paper’s introduction. Table 2 summarizes coverage of issues on labour migration and migrants in newspapers, journals and other sources.
Table 2. Perception of foreign labour force in European agriculture and rural areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Questions and answers/comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Can agriculture of western EU countries exist without foreign labour?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chappell et al. (2009)</td>
<td>The UK                                                                                                      In agriculture, the balance of evidence appears to suggest that in many sub-sectors (e.g. horticulture) the potential for replacing labour with technology has been exhausted. It seems unlikely that a UK-based labour supply, and possibly an EU-based supply, will be available in the medium term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findlay and McCollum (2013)</td>
<td>The UK                                                                                                      In rural areas many employers rely on migrant labour as they struggle to source labour regardless of prevailing conditions (boom or bust) in the wider economy. Eastern Europeans are essential to the functioning of the agricultural sector since it is not possible to source the labour locally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Watch (2016a)</td>
<td>The UK                                                                                                      Immigration is not an optimal solution to agricultural labour shortages. To reduce the sector's dependence on migrant labour, the UK should aim to focus on technological innovation. In the longer-term the industry must invest in technological change to increase labour productivity. Importing seasonal labour perpetuates low productivity in the agricultural sector and denies opportunities to British workers who are unemployed or are seeking part time work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confédération Paysanne</td>
<td>France                                                                                                      Migrants who work in seasonal agriculture carry the burden of French agricultural production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>What are farm employers’ reasons for hiring foreign nationals?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chappell et al. (2009)</td>
<td>The UK                                                                                                      Migrants are particularly productive, efficient hard workers and responsible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findlay and McCollum (2013)</td>
<td>The UK                                                                                                      Labour and skills needs that cannot be met from within domestic labour force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC (2014)</td>
<td>The UK                                                                                                      The migrants’ supposed better work ethic. Their willingness to live on-site or work long-hours. Migrant workers tend to be more committed, hard-working and productive; thus their decision to hire them is directly related to business performance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| O’Carroll (2016)               | The UK                                                                                                      Chairman of British Summer Fruits: “All first-world economies employ foreigners to pick, pack and plant fruit. This is not unique. Canada, Australia even Spain employs migrants because their own citizens don’t want to do the work”. Britons “do not want to get up at 6am and work on their hands and knees all day”"
Table 2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donaldson (2015)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Cheap seasonal-migrant labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szymanderski (2010)</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Immigrants are willing to take jobs which the Poles do not want to do (e.g. those in smaller farms).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wprost (2014)</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Poles are reluctant to work in the orchards and farm fields; they prefer permanent employment and wages. Therefore, growers are looking for employees coming from across the eastern border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strzelecki (2016)</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Due to cheaper workers from Ukraine the production costs can be reduced, what in turn allows Polish farmers to maintain or improve market competitiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zawojska (2009)</td>
<td>Germany, UK, Ireland</td>
<td>Higher work ethic, productivity and reliability of Polish nationals compared with native workers of the host countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Do foreign farm workers feel welcome on the farms and in local communities?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szymanderski (2010)</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Foreign seasonal agricultural workers are invisible. They do not function in the local community. They usually are provided with accommodation and meals on the farm operation. They spend their free time in their own groups. (lack of assimilation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chappell et al. (2009)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>The interaction of some unskilled migrants with local British-born people was limited since they were working with a high proportion of other migrants; so they were not integrated into broader society. Migrants’ social interactions with host communities were varied: some of them formed friendships outside their communities and others did not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruz and Stevens (2016)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Bulgarian worker has always felt welcome on the farm. His employers have done a lot for him; they have paid for his agricultural courses and helped him move into a cottage nearby, along with other Bulgarians. But he does not think that many of the English workers like Bulgarian workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris (2016)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Polish seasonal migrant: ‘The money is good and I can see that the farm appreciates me coming. I feel a link with this area. I feel part of the business, part of the team. I feel a connection with the countryside here and with English people. We go to the pubs, we are part of the community’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice (2011)</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>The country has a great need for labour, especially in agriculture, though this need is accompanied by a xenophobic, partly directed against the 100 thousand Polish temporary workers living there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFAT (2016)</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Worrying cases of migrant agricultural workforce exploitation, lack of decent housing, working and living conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woods (2016)</td>
<td>The EU countries</td>
<td>Migrants’ experiences of integration with the local community vary between localities and regions, reflecting the differing outlook of both migrants and established local residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do host rural areas in general benefit from foreign labour inflow?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szymanderski (2010)</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Divergent opinions within habitants of municipalities hosting foreign agricultural workers: Immigrants compete with and take jobs from Poles vs. immigrants are needed because they are doing the work, which the Poles are unwilling to take.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan (2008)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Local rural economies tend to be smaller than urban ones, so size effects (long-term changes in local population size and in local economy’s size and productivity), and diversity effects (medium-term changes in the workforce diversity and consumer tastes) will be limited. Labour market impacts are likely to be most significant. The major effect may be filling vacancies and skills shortages. In rural areas with rapidly growing migrant communities, some diversity effects may occur, with new markets for goods and services emerging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC (2014)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>The biggest gains go to the migrants themselves. Their earned income is much higher than in their home country and their extended family might benefit from any remittances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods (2016)</td>
<td>Lithuania, Germany, Sweden, Slovenia, Ireland</td>
<td>Foreign migrants have the potential to contribute to rural economic development if their skills, training, connections and entrepreneurship can be effectively exploited/supported. International migration contributes to the production of parallel, overlapping spaces of engagement in rural communities that are inhabited by different cultural groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the CAP address the issue of rural job market support by promoting/encouraging fair employment of foreign workers?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFAT (2016)</td>
<td>The EU</td>
<td>According to the CAP, farmers are required to comply with environmental regulations – but not with social standards – in order to receive EU subsidies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What questions arise for policy makers and researchers in the light of migration implications for host rural labour market and economies?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confédération Paysanne (2014)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Migrant workers’ rights violations have been documented across European and Mediterranean countries. Current legislation is insufficient to prevent these abuses. It requires coordinated action to be taken at the European level. It is crucial to reveal the living and working conditions faced by those who migrate and to support them to mobilise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Impact on Employment of Farm Workers Originating from the EU and Its Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moris (2016)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Eastern Europeans who work seasonally at UK farms fear for their livelihoods, while their employers are concerned about a labour shortage (harder recruiting and keeping loyal workers) that could make it more difficult to harvest fruit and vegetables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrington (2016)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Brexit could herald end to British fruit and vegetable sales. The nation’s food security would be damaged and that produce in UK shops would become more expensive if the freedom of movement for EU workers came to an end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Watch (2016b)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>When the UK leaves the EU, the current labour supply from the EU will not disappear overnight. The agricultural industry, however, should now implement reforms to ensure its longer-term sustainability while also benefiting UK-born workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris (2016)</td>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Brexit could leave a great many unfilled jobs in agriculture which are significantly staffed by foreigners. Since many of them are taking unskilled jobs British people do not want to do, the result could be a serious labour shortage in temporary and seasonal work. Businesses particularly reliant on migrant workers may need to rethink their business models.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own research.

The responses of surveyed media toward the foreign migrant labour in agriculture have been various and sometimes very polarized but generally quite positive. Analysis of key topoi in the studied articles and documents indicates that they display elements of both economic and social discourse. Economic and humanitarian aspects are relatively much important compared to cultural and political considerations. Foreign labour migration and employment of migrants are most commonly described as possessing an economic logic (what is supported by the theoretical approaches).

Although the topos of (migrant) burden and topos of (their) threat and danger for the local economies and communities are often put forward in public discourse about employing foreigners in general, the agricultural sector seems to be quite exempted from such allegation. ‘Hard-working’ and ‘productive’ labour force from abroad is welcomed, especially by relatively richer EU countries, in order to save their agriculture from bankruptcy and match the needs of rural employers. The topos of numbers and statistics were used by authors to
portray a high scale and importance of foreign workers presence on the agricultural labour markets.

5. Conclusions

The results of the present study suggest the following conclusions:

1. The current migration of workforce from CEE region (including Poland) to rural areas of other EU countries is probably best explained by neoclassical economics, new economics of labour migration and dual labour market theories. Wage disparities, particularly between western and eastern European countries are still the main reason why agricultural workers migrate in search of employment and pay.

2. As agriculture is recognized as one of the most hazardous industries and, in many cases (e.g. picking fruits and vegetables), requires from workers long hours of physical activity in hard and harsh (e.g. weather) conditions, ‘the healthy migrant’ effect is possibly present among immigrants from the CEE to the UK and other destination countries.

3. Agricultural sectors in the EU, especially (but not solely) in the old member states generally value foreign immigrant labour (particularly unskilled and seasonal) since the natives are less likely than incomers (or not likely at all) to accept low wages and bad working conditions and not always meet the employers’ demands in terms of work motivation and mobility.

4. Much of the concern about the EU farming sector arises due to an illegal and shadow employment of foreign migrants and due to exploitation and abuses that they face from the gangmasters and employers. Foreign labour conditions in rural areas, especially in agriculture, were, and still are, often ignored in academic and policy debates, at least in some EU countries. For the first time in 2014, the EU adopted rules (Directive 2014/36/EU) on less well-paid group of non-EU migrant workers, i.e. seasonal workers. Member states had to apply this law till 30 September 2016 but considering that some of them (Ireland, Denmark and of course the UK) opted out of it, and that directive itself is limited to new potential labour immigrants, the EU efforts to protect foreign labour in agriculture may be ineffective.

5. Up to now, there is no reference under the CAP to questions directly aimed at foreign seasonal or casual labour in agriculture. The enforcement of employment and social rights for all (native- and foreign-born) agricultural workers should be incorporated into the CAP mechanisms (modelled on mechanisms enforcing environmental requirements).
References


Child, J. (1668 [1751]). *New Discourse of Trade*. Glasgow, Robert and Andrew Foulis.


Glorius, B., I. Grabowska-Lusinska and A. Kuvik (eds.) *Mobility in Transition Migration Patterns after EU Enlargement*. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.


NBP (2016) Bilans Płatniczy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej za II kwartał 2016 r., Warsaw, NBP.


Reynel C. (1674) The True English Interest or an Account of the Chief National Improvements in Some Political Observations, Demonstrating an Infallible Advance of this Nation to Infinite Wealth and Greatness, Trade and Populacy, with Imployment and Preferment for All Persons. London, Giles Widdowes.


Ustawa z dnia 22 lipca 2016 r. o zmianie ustawy o minimalnym wynagrodzeniu za pracę oraz niektórych innych ustaw, Dz.U. 2016, poz.1265.


