The Impact of Farmers’ Risk Preferences on the Design of an Individual Yield Crop Insurance

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Abstract

Kahneman and Tversky's Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) has proved to be better suited for representing risk preferences than von Neumann and Morgenstern's Expected Utility Theory (EUT). We argue that neglecting this may explain to some extent why farmers do not contract crop insurance as much as they are expected to. We model the decision to contract an individual yield crop insurance for a sample of 186 French farmers. We show that 21% of the farmers who would be expected to contract assuming that their preferences are EUT, would actually not do so if their true preferences are in fact CPT.

Keywords
Yield, Crop Insurance, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Premium subsidy, France

1. Introduction

The debate on, on the one hand, why farmers do not contract crop insurance policies as much as they should when considering the risk they face and, on the other hand, the ways to remedy the issue by designing optimal insurance contracts, has a long history in the agricultural economics research.

From the insurer's point of view, i.e., the supply side of the crop insurance market, authors have identified three main reasons why insurance companies are likely to set too high premiums, namely moral hazard and adverse selection (see Skees et al. (1997), Nelson and Loehman (1987), Quiggin et al. (1993), Glauber (2004) and Smith and Glauber (2012) among others) and the systemic nature of the risk (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). From the farmer's point of view, i.e., the demand side of the crop insurance market, it has been noted that farmers are likely to prefer cheaper ways of coping with production risk than insurance (Smith and Glauber, 2012).

As far as moral hazard and adverse selection are concerned, authors mainly assumed that they originate from the propensity of farmers to adopt ‘fraudulent’ behaviors vis-à-vis the insurer in order to exploit information asymmetries (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). In this paper, we argue that such a situation is also likely to derive, at least to some extent, from the preferences of farmers (i.e., ‘non fraudulent’ attitudes) towards risk.

In effect, the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) Expected Utility theory (EUT) has been the dominant invoked theoretical framework in most previous papers to model the decision of risk-averse farmers to get insured or not. However, since the pioneering work of Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), many empirical studies have confirmed that the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) is a more adequate framework to represent agents’ attitudes towards risk (Tanaka et al., 2010), farmers being no exception (Galarza, 2009; Bougerara et al., 2011; Godinho Coelho et al., 2012; Bougerara et al., 2012). CPT extends EUT in three respects. Firstly, agents are not only risk averse but also loss averse, that is, the dis-utility of a loss is larger than the utility of a gain of the same absolute amount. Secondly, losses and gains are defined with respect to a threshold, the ‘reference point’, which is commonly set to zero for convenience purposes but which is likely to in fact depend on the situation. Thirdly, agents ‘distort’ the probabilities for events to occur in their utility computation, even when having an objective knowledge of these probabilities; empirically, people generally have been found to overestimate small probabilities and to underestimate high
Here, we show that using the theoretical framework of the CPT to model preferences towards risk may explain why at least some farmers do not contract insurance while they would be expected to do so under the assumption that their preferences follow the theoretical framework of the EUT. To this end, we model the decision to contract an individual yield crop insurance for a sample of 186 farmers of the “Meuse” region located in the North-eastern part of France, and investigate the policy implications of such an extended theoretical modeling framework.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the modeling framework. Section 3 describes the data used and the functional forms chosen while section 4 reports the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2. Modelling framework

We consider $N$ farmers who produce a unique and homogeneous good with an individual-specific yield $\tilde{y}_i$, where $i = \{1, \ldots, N\}$. This yield is random because production is subject to exogenous shocks such as climatic events or pests attacks. In order to secure production against such risks, farmer $i$ may decide to contract an individual yield crop insurance (IYCI) from a unique insurance company. The contract is defined as follows: if, at the end of the cropping season, the realized yield $\tilde{y}_i$ is lower than a critical yield $y^*_i > 0$ defined in advance, he receives an indemnity $n(\tilde{y}_i)$, and nothing otherwise. Formally:

$$n(\tilde{y}_i) \equiv \max(y^*_i - \tilde{y}_i, 0)$$

where, following Miranda (1991) and the subsequent works by Smith et al. (1994), Skees et al. (1997) or Mahul (1999), $n(\tilde{y}_i)$, is expressed in the dimension of a yield, i.e., in tons per hectare.

In order to get insured, farmer $i$ has to pay a $t/ha$-equivalent premium $\rho_i$. We do not allow farmers to insure only a fraction of their area so that the decision to purchase the contract may be modeled through a set of binary variables $d_i$, where $d_i = 1$ when farmer $i$ actually purchases the contract and $d_i = 0$ when he actually does not. We neither let the farmer elect the critical yield $y^*_i$. Each farmer therefore gets the net yield:

$$\tilde{y}_i^{net} = \tilde{y}_i + n(\tilde{y}_i) - \rho_i.$$  

Miranda (1991), Smith et al. (1994) and Skees et al. (1997) assumed that, through insurance, farmers seek to minimize the variance of their net yield or, equivalently, to maximize their yield risk reduction, as measured by the difference between the variance of the yield and the variance of the net yield. Rather, Mahul (1999) and Bourgeon and Chambers (2003) considered that the objective of farmers is to maximize the expected utility stemming from their net yield. We adopt a third approach which is also based on the (expected) utility maximization but consists in viewing the maximization program of the farmer as a lottery choice. Actually, each farmer faces the following two lotteries:

- **‘Insurance lottery’**: if the farmer contracts, he faces the following outcomes:
  - if $\tilde{y}_i < y^*_i$, the net yield he expects is $y^*_i - \rho_i$
- if \( \tilde{y}_i \geq y_i^* \), the net yield he expects is \( y_i - \rho_i \)

• ‘Non-insurance lottery’: if the farmer does not contract, he faces the following outcomes:

  - if \( \tilde{y}_i < y_i^* \), the net yield he expects is \( y_i \)
  - if \( \tilde{y}_i \geq y_i^* \), the net yield he expects is \( \bar{y}_i \)

where \( y_i \equiv \mathbb{E}(\tilde{y}_i | \tilde{y}_i < y_i^*) \) and \( \bar{y}_i \equiv \mathbb{E}(\tilde{y}_i | \tilde{y}_i \geq y_i^*) \). In both lotteries, the ‘unfavorable’ outcome, i.e., whenever \( \tilde{y}_i < y_i^* \), happens with the probability \( q \) and the ‘favorable’ outcome, i.e., whenever \( \tilde{y}_i \geq y_i^* \), happens with the probability \( 1 - q \).

In order to set up a general enough framework to encompass both the EUT and the CPT, we assume that: i) there exists an individual-specific value function \( \nu_i(y) : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) which maps net yields into the utility space, and; ii) farmers, when evaluating their utility, distort the cumulative probability of yields through an individual specific weighting function \( \psi_i(q) : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] \). Then, the expected utilities of the above lotteries are given by:

• ‘Insurance lottery’: \( \mathbb{E}(U^I_i(\rho)) = \psi_i(q)\nu_i(y_i^* - \rho_i) + \psi_i(1 - q)\nu_i(\bar{y}_i - \rho_i) \)

• ‘Non-insurance lottery’: \( \mathbb{E}(U^N_i) = \psi_i(q)\nu_i(y_i) + \psi_i(1 - q)\nu_i(\bar{y}_i) \)

Under this setting, farmer \( i \) will decide to purchase the insurance as long as the ‘insurance lottery’ will provide him with an expected utility greater than or at least equal to the ‘non-insurance lottery’:

\[
d_i = 1 \iff \mathbb{E}(U^I_i(\rho_i)) \geq \mathbb{E}(U^N_i) \tag{3}
\]

For each farmer, we can then find the threshold premium \( \hat{\rho}_i \) which leaves him indifferent between both lotteries (i.e., \( U^I_i(\hat{\rho}_i) = U^N_i \)), that is, his willingness-to-pay (WTP) for transferring his risk to the insurer. Equation (3) then re-writes:

\[
d_i \times (\mathbb{E}(U^I_i(\rho_i)) - \mathbb{E}(U^I_i(\hat{\rho}_i))) \geq 0 \tag{4}
\]

3. Empirical study

3.1. Data

We used individual-level data for a sample of French farmers originating from the NUTS3 region Meuse.\(^2\) It was a balanced panel of 186 farmers observed over \( T = 12 \) years for the period 1992-2003 (186 \times 12 = 2232 observations). Though the database included 10 crops, we focused on rapeseed because, according to planted area, it was one of the major crops cultivated by farmers in our sample, and because it was produced every year by all of them.

Summary statistics for our sample show that the average acreage of rapeseed was fairly stable from year to year, amounting to a little more than 30 ha, or around 15% of the total utilized area of farms (Table 1). There was no clear trend in rapeseed yield,

\(^2\)The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a hierarchical breakdown system for the European Union territory (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:NUTS). France consists of 101 NUTS3 units which correspond to the administrative regions ‘départements’, five of them being overseas.
Table 1. Summary statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Total area (ha)</th>
<th>Rapeseed area (ha)</th>
<th>Rapeseed yield (t/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>185.94</td>
<td>92.92</td>
<td>60.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>198.19</td>
<td>96.61</td>
<td>77.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>202.73</td>
<td>97.67</td>
<td>77.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>205.34</td>
<td>97.76</td>
<td>77.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>207.82</td>
<td>98.21</td>
<td>77.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>210.25</td>
<td>99.81</td>
<td>77.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>211.08</td>
<td>101.10</td>
<td>77.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>211.71</td>
<td>101.68</td>
<td>77.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>214.71</td>
<td>102.92</td>
<td>77.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>216.04</td>
<td>102.26</td>
<td>77.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>215.92</td>
<td>101.82</td>
<td>77.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>217.52</td>
<td>103.83</td>
<td>76.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all years</td>
<td>2232</td>
<td>208.10</td>
<td>99.90</td>
<td>60.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADHEO, 1992-2003 - authors’ calculation
neither at the individual nor at the average level, so it was not necessary to detrend those yields. As shown in Figure 1, the distribution of yields for rapeseed over the whole sample and the whole period was negatively skewed, which is consistent with evidence found by other authors (e.g., Skees et al. (1997)). A detailed review of yield data showed that it was zero in three cases only, corresponding to three different farmers, two of them appearing in 1996 and one in 2002.

3.2. Functional forms

We used the CPT specification proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) both for $\nu_i(y)$ and $\psi_i(q)$, for any yield $y$ and probability $q$:

$$\nu_i(y) = \begin{cases} 
(y - y_i^0)^{\alpha_i} & \text{if } y \geq y_i^0 \\
-\lambda_i(-y + y_i^0)^{\alpha_i} & \text{if } y < y_i^0 
\end{cases}$$

$$\psi_i(q) = \frac{q^{\gamma_i}}{(q^{\gamma_i} + (1-q)^{\gamma_i})^{1/\gamma_i}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where $y_i^0$ is a individual-specific reference yield which defines the gain ($y \geq y_i^0$) and loss ($y < y_i^0$) domains for each farmer $i$, and $\alpha_i$, $\lambda_i$ and $\gamma_i$ are individual-specific parameters characterizing the attitude of farmer $i$ towards risk: $\alpha_i$ is the risk aversion coefficient, $\lambda_i$ is the loss aversion coefficient and $\gamma_i$ is the probability distortion coefficient.

This specification is general enough to encompass both the CPT and the EUT since, if we set $y_i^0 = 0$, $\lambda_i = 1$ and $\gamma_i = 1$, it reduces to the standard von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) formulation of the EUT.
4. Results

The individual-specific critical yield was set for each farmer to the average yield, \( y_i^* \equiv \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \bar{y}_i(t) \). From this definition and the observed yields, we deduced the empirical individual-specific conditional yields \( y_i \) and \( \bar{y}_i \), and the probability of unfavorable outcome \( q \) as the empirical average probability of experiencing a yield loss:

- \( y_i = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{y}_i^-(t)}{\sum_{t=1}^{T} t^-}, \) with \( \tilde{y}_i^-(t) = \tilde{y}_i(t) \) and \( t^- = 1 \) if \( \tilde{y}_i(t) < y_i^* \) and zero otherwise;
- \( \bar{y}_i = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{y}_i^+(t)}{\sum_{t=1}^{T} t^+}, \) with \( \tilde{y}_i^+(t) = \tilde{y}_i(t) \) and \( t^+ = 1 \) if \( \tilde{y}_i(t) \geq y_i^* \) and zero otherwise.

In turn, the probability of unfavorable outcome \( q \) was computed at the sample level as the empirical average probability of experiencing a yield loss:

\[
q = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} p_i^-(t), \text{ with } p_i^-(t) = 1 \text{ if } \tilde{y}_i(t) < y_i^* \text{ and zero otherwise.}
\]

We then used equation (1) to compute the indemnities each farmer would have received over the studied period conditional on the definition of \( y_i^* \). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the resulting reference yields, conditional yields and expected indemnities. The probability of unfavorable outcome \( q \) was found to be 0.442.

In order to compute the WTP, \( \hat{\rho}_i \), for each farmer under both theoretical frameworks for risk preferences, EUT and CPT, values for the parameters in equation (5) had to be set. We assumed that farmers are homogeneous, \( i.e., \alpha_i = \alpha, \lambda_i = \lambda \) and \( \gamma_i = \gamma \) for all \( i \), and took the values from Gassmann (2014), who experimentally estimated them on a different sample of 197 French farmers located near “Meuse”. He concludes that, for this sample, CPT is a more likely assumption than EUT to model preferences (see also Bougherara et al. (2012)).

Table 3 shows that, according to Gassmann (2014)’s findings, farmers in this region are risk averse (\( \alpha < 1 \) under both theoretical frameworks) and that, under CPT, they are loss averse (\( \lambda > 1 \)) and overweight lower probabilities and underweight higher probabilities (\( \gamma < 1 \)). It appeared that due to the particular value of \( \gamma \), on the one hand, the unfavorable-outcome probability \( q \) was only slightly (downside) distorted, since \( \psi_{\gamma=0.818}(q = 0.442) = 0.440 (-0.5\%) \), while, on the other hand, the favorable-outcome probability \( 1-q \) was a bit more (downside) distorted, since \( \psi_{\gamma=0.818}(1-q = 0.558) = 0.532 (-4.7\%) \). Finally, under CPT, we set the reference net yield \( y_i^0 \) to the average yield \( y_i^* \), assuming that, for each farmer, a net yield below (respectively above) the average yield defines a loss (gain).

**Table 2. Summary statistics for the reference yield, conditional yields and expected indemnity.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>obs.</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>std. dev.</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reference yield ( y_i^* ) (t/ha)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable conditional yield ( y_i ) (t/ha)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable conditional yield ( \bar{y}_i ) (t/ha)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected indemnity ( \rho_i ) (t/ha)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADHEO, 1992-2003 - authors’ calculation
Table 3. Preference parameters under EUT and CPT.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EUT</th>
<th></th>
<th>CPT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk aversion ((\alpha_i))</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss aversion ((\lambda_i))</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1.385</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability distortion ((\gamma_i))</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) 'n/a': not applicable

Source: Gassmann (2014: 51, Table 2.4) for EUT and Gassmann (2014: 53, Table 2.5, model 1a) for CPT

Table 4. Summary statistics for the WTP (in t/ha) under EUT and CPT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>obs.</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>std. dev.</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUT</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADHEO, 1992-2003 - authors’ calculation

Figure 2. Distribution of farmers’ WTP under EUT vs. CPT.

Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics for the WTP obtained under both risk preferences frameworks. It shows that the average WTP under EUT is 0.305 while it is 0.310 under CPT. That is, on average, if we consider that preferences follow the CPT framework, our sample of farmers is ready to contract at a higher premium than they are expected to if one assumes that preferences are EUT-like. However, as is visible from the maximum values in Table 4 and is confirmed by Figure 2, this is only true on average: for 39 out of the 186 farmers in the sample, the WTP under CPT is actually lower than that.
under EUT. This means that, neglecting that risk preferences should be modeled through the CPT, 21% of our farmers would actually not contract insurance if they were proposed a premium consistent with EUT preferences. This supports our case that ignoring the superiority of the CPT with respect to the EUT may explain why some farmers contract less than expected.

Yet this result could have been contingent to the particular combination of parameters we chose. We therefore performed a Monte-Carlo analysis to test its robustness. WTP computations were thus replicated 5,000 times by drawing the parameters in the normal distributions deriving from their estimators as reported in Table 3 (Figure 3). It appeared that for one half of the replications, the percentage of farmers whose WTP under CPT was actually lower than that under EUT lies between 20% (first quartile) and 30% (third quartile), with the median being at 22%. While our above conclusion thus appears quite robust to the combination of parameters, it is worth noticing that, as Figure 3 shows: (i) this percentage was never under 8% for any replication and; (ii) it could even reach quite high values, with 7% of the replications leading to a percentage above 50%.

When considering again the central values chosen for the parameters, the largest absolute WTP difference for those whose WTP under CPT is lower than their WTP under EUT amounts to 0.166 (for an WTP under EUT at 0.604 and a WTP under CPT at 0.438). From a policy perspective, this leads to conclude that the EUT-premium would have to be subsidized at a 27.5% rate if all farmers were to be encouraged to contract.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown that neglecting that Kahneman and Tversky’s Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) is better suited for representing preferences towards risk in place of the traditional von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Expected Utility Theory (EUT) may
explain why some farmers do not contract crop insurance policies as much as they are expected to do.

Though we are confident that this general qualitative conclusion would remain valid, the model and empirical analysis presented here could be extended in three respects. Firstly, we have assumed that all farmers in the sample are homogeneous with respect to their preferences towards risk, i.e., that they share the same parameter values. It would certainly be more relevant to introduce individual heterogeneity in these preferences; the extension of the structural estimation proposed by Bougherara et al. (2012) towards this direction, as proposed by Gassmann (2014), is a first step to do so. Secondly, we have followed the modeling framework proposed by Miranda (1991) and extended by Mahul (1999) which grounds farmers decisions with respect to the expected net yield. It would be more theoretically sound to express the model in terms of expected profit, which would imply, as Chambers and Quiggin (2002) note, to explicitly introduce the production function in the model. Thirdly, we have modeled the choice of an individual yield crop insurance contract. It would be desirable to turn to the modeling of an area yield crop insurance, which, as several authors like Miranda (1991) show, is less sensitive to adverse selection and moral hazard issues.

Acknowledgments

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